A revalorização filosófica da visão comum de mundo segundo Porchat e o equilíbrio reflexivo e a solução de problemas em metafilosofia

Abstract

In this text, the compatibility between
Oswaldo Porchat’s skepticism (in both of its guises, the philosophy of the Common Worldview and neopyrrhonism) and a pair of other general metaphilosophical theses — namely, reflective equilibrium and the problem-solving view — is investigated. An effort is made in order to show the manner in which said theses are compatible and able to throw light on one another, and an articulation between them is proposed. Reflective equilibrium helps one to understand the relationship of a skeptical/postskeptical philosophy with the Common Life, first, and then with the phenomenic domain afterwards. The problem-solving view is the metaphilosophical outlook favored by Porchat himself throughout his neopyrrhonic period. We attempt to show that reflective equilibrium is sought, in the first period, bewteen Common Life and particular philosophical theses (of a nondogmatic character, having as boundary condition their foundation in Common Life); and, in the second period, equilibrium must obtain between the phenomenic domain and another sort of epistemic unit — namely, philosophical problems that are amenable to be re-translated onto the phenomenic domain and are subject to dynamics of a certain kind. In order for the analysis to be carried out, an investigation of Porchat’s notions of phenomenon and objectivity is of paramount importance. The text ends with some considerations regarding the place of scientific knowledge within Porchat’s general philosophical outlook.