Fenômeno e conflito: Sexto contra Porchat

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2020.181248

Keywords:

Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus, Oswaldo Porchat

Abstract

Opposing the original Skeptic as portrayed by Sextus Empiricus to Oswaldo Porchat’s Neopyrrhonist, the paper aims to show the essential difference between the two, especially in regard to the notion of phainómenon. Porchat offered a brilliant and innovative interpretation of Sextus, but failed to realize a somewhat anachronistic aspect of the notion of “the apparent”: it is part of the conflict that leads the skeptic to suspension of judgment and it impacts the skeptic not only psychologically, but also philosophically. The outcome is that the Ancient Skepticism, unlike Neopyrrhonism, is as much an outcome of examining dogmatic and metaphysical discourse as of contemplating the apparent things.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Heidegger, M. (2012). Ser e tempo. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.

Porchat, O. (2006). Rumo ao Ceticismo. São Paulo: Editora Unesp.

Porchat, O. (2013). A noção de phainómenon em Sexto Empírico. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, v.17, n.2, p. 291-323.

Schvartz, V. H. (2015). “Porchat, sua interpretação de Sexto, e um possível ne-opirronismo rústico”, in: Silva Filho, W. J.; Smith, P. J. (ed.). Oswaldo Porchat: Interpretações e debate. São Paulo: Alameda Editorial. p. 181-204.

Sexto Empírico (1976). Sextus Empiricus in four volumes (v.1: Outlines of pyrrho-nism; v. 2-4: Adversus Mathematicos VI-XI). Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge/Massachussetts/ London: Harvard University Press.

Published

2020-12-09

How to Cite

Schvartz, V. H. . (2020). Fenômeno e conflito: Sexto contra Porchat. Discurso, 50(2), 181-192. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2020.181248