Restrições a robôs em pregões eletrônicos: impactos nos leilões de café do Comprasnet

Autores

  • André Luís Menegatti Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto
  • Claudio Ribeiro Lucinda Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Atuária https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2190-9497

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/1980-5330/ea184717

Palavras-chave:

diferenças em diferenças, lances automáticos, leilões

Resumo

O estudo analisa os impactos econômicos de duas regras que restringiram o uso de programas de computador para submissão automática de lances em pregões eletrônicos do Comprasnet. A “Regra dos 20s” impôs o intervalo mínimo de 20 segundos entre lances subsequentes de um mesmo fornecedor. A “Regra dos 3s” impôs o intervalo mínimo de 3 segundos para cobrir a melhor oferta. A Regra dos 3s teria causado um aumento de preços de aproximadamente 15%, correspondendo a um aumento de R$7,5 milhões nos gastos do Governo Federal com aquisição de café entre janeiro de 2014 e dezembro de 2015.

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Publicado

2024-06-01

Edição

v. 28 n. 2 (2024)

Seção

Artigos

Licença

Copyright (c) 2025 Economia Aplicada

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Como Citar

Menegatti, A. L., & Lucinda, C. R. (2024). Restrições a robôs em pregões eletrônicos: impactos nos leilões de café do Comprasnet. Economia Aplicada, 28(2), 219-256. https://doi.org/10.11606/1980-5330/ea184717

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