Representation and Phenomenalism in the Critique of Pure Reason
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v24i1p151-172Palavras-chave:
Representation, Phenomenalism, Spatial objects, Mental entities, Transcendental idealismResumo
Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an alternative conception of “representation” according to which the claim that something is a mere representation does not entail that it is a mere mental item (or an organized collection of mental items). I offer evidence that Kant does not conceive of representations as mental items and outline an alternative conception of representations.
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Referências
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