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How Do the Eight Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides* Come to Light? Chiasmus as a Method of Division[1]

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In this paper, I aim to explore the structure of the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In analyzing the transitional section, I claim that in addition to diairesis, there is another method of division, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus. On this basis, I explain how Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses, in which the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ. In closing, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato's use of chiasmus.

Introduction

This paper aims to articulate the structure of the dialectic exercise presented in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In this regard, two questions are discussed. First, how many hypotheses are included in the exercise? Most scholars have maintained the existence of eight

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hypotheses in this context[2], while others have argued for nine.[3] Second, how do these

[2] Cherniss, H. F. (1932), "Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato", *American Journal of Philology* 53 (2): 126; Walker, M. G. (1938), "The One and Many in Plato's Parmenides", *The Philosophical Review* 47 (5): 494; Cornford, F. M. (1939), *Plato and Parmenides, Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides*, London: Kegan Paul: 107; Chen Chung-hwan (1944a), "On the *Parmenides* of Plato", *Classical Quarterly* 38 (3/4): 105, 105-113; (1944b, Repr. 2013), *Plato's Parmenides*, Beijing: Shangwu Press: 118-9n157; Sayre, K. M. (1978), "Plato's Parmenides: Why the Eight Hypotheses Are Not Contradictory", *Phronesis* 23: 135, 140; (1983, Repr. 2005), *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 40-4; (1996), *Parmenides' Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press: 108-9; Moravcsik, J. M. (1982), "Forms and dialectic in the second half of the *Parmenides*", In Schofield, M., Nussbaum, M. C. (eds.), *Language and Logos: Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 135-6; (1992), "Chapter 4: The Parmenides: Forms and Participation Reconsidered", In *Plato and Platonism: Plato's Conception of Appearance and Reality in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics, and its Modern Echoes*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 142-3, 162; Miller, M. (1986), *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul*, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 74; (1995), "Unwritten Teachings in the *Parmenides*", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48 (3): 601, 604-6; Halper, E. (1990), "A Note on the Unity of the Parmenides", *Hermes* 118: 36, 38; Meinwald, C. C. (1991), *Plato's Parmenides*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 36-9, 117-130; (2014), "How does Plato's Exercise Work?" *Dialogue* 53: 470; Halfwassen, J. (1992, Repr. 2006), *Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin*, Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner: 298-300; Horn, C. (1995), "Der Platonische Parmenides und die Möglichkeit seiner prinzipientheoretischen Interpretation", *Antike und Abendland* 41: 97; Kutschera, Franz von (1995), *Platons Parmenides*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter: 46, 50-1; Peterson, S. (1996), "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Principle of Interpretation and Seven Arguments", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34 (2): 168; (2003), "New Rounds of the Exercise of Plato's *Parmenides*", *The Modern Schoolman* 80 (3): 249; (2019), "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Reconsideration of Forms", In Fine, G. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (Second Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 249; Rickless, S. C. (1998), "How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms", *The Philosophical Review* 107: 540; (2007), *Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 109-111; (2020), "Plato's *Parmenides*", In *Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: 16-19; Turnbull, R. G. (1998), *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy. Translation of and Commentary on the Parmenides with Interpretative Chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Philebus*, Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press: 47-9; Coxon, A. H. (1999), *The Philosophy of Forms. An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato's Parmenides with a new English translation*, Assen: Van Gorcum: 115-127; Brisson, L. (2002), "'Is the World One?' A New Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22: 15-16; Scolnicov, S. (2003), *Plato's Parmenides*, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press: 25-9; Tabak, M. (2015), *Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 59-60; Fronterotta, F. (2019), "L'ipotesi di Parmenide in Parm. 137b1-4: cosmologia, enologia o ontologia?" *Études platoniciennes* 15: 8. Remarkably, Proclus enumerates either eight (1008.9-13, 1008.13-29, 1009.16-1010.2, 1010.2-14, 1010.23-1011.8, 1011.9-23, 1012.17-28, 1012.28-1013.11) or twenty-four hypotheses (622.24-623.12, 623.12-15, 624.9-16, 1000.26-1002.3, 1002.4-25, 1004.10-1006.13, 1016.4-1017.25). I explore this point elsewhere. I cite Proclus's text using Steel's edition (2007-2009), *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria I-III*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[3] Proclus 1039.5-1040.17; Allen, R. E. (1997), *Plato's Parmenides*, New Haven, London: Yale University Press: 212-3, 213-4, n. 43, 216; Steel, C. (2003), "Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus' Parmenides and the Origin of Negative Theology", In Pickavé, M. (ed.) *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter: 587; Polansky, R. and Cimakasky, J. (2013), "Counting the Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Apeiron* 46 (3): 231-2. Gill views the passage 155e4-157b5 as an appendix to the first two hypotheses, thereby identifying this passage as the third hypothesis and counting a total of nine hypotheses; see Gill, M. L. (2012), *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 48-50,

hypotheses differ from one another? Some scholars have suggested that they differ in subject[4], whereas others have claimed that they differ in the manner of predication.[5]

To engage with these questions and illuminate Plato's thinking, I delve into the transitional section of the *Parmenides* (136a4-c5). I agree with Meinwald that this contains crucial methodological remarks that play a key role in structuring the exercise. In analyzing this section, I begin by noting that in addition to diairesis (διαίρεσις), another method of division is used, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus (χιαστή). In answer to the first question, I pursue an alternate proposal that Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses (Section 1). In answer to the second question, I disagree with Meinwald, who proposed that the eight hypotheses differ in terms of predication (Section 2). In her view, the qualification pair *pros heauto–pros ta alla* qualifies the predicates differently, resulting in two kinds of predication. I argue that the qualification pair should be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*, which qualifies the subject instead of the predicate, thus constituting four subjects of eight hypotheses (Section 3). On this basis, I conclude that the eight hypotheses differ in that the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same, and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ (Section 4). In the Appendix, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato's use of chiasmus (Section 5). Chiasmus, as the universal scheme of the exercise, can be applied not only to the opposite Forms One–Many but also universally to those such as Similarity–

55-6; (2014), "Design of the Exercise in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Dialogue* 53: 499-502, 516. In an unpublished transcript of "Plato: Parmenides [Z]", Heidegger enumerates nine hypotheses and refers to the passage 155e4-157b5 as an appendix by stating that "Vorblick auf den Gang der Untersuchung: 9 Gänge: für die positive und die negative Hypothesis je zweimal These und Antithese; das sind 8 Gänge. Der 3. Gang scheint nicht recht underzubringen, er gilt als ein 'Anhang' (155e4-157b5). Aber dieser angebliche Anhang ist das Kernstück des ganzen Dialoges (schon an der gehobenen Sprache kenntlich!), der höchste Punkt, zu dem Plato positiv gelangt ist; hier gibt er die Bestimmung des Seins als μεταβολή." See Heidegger, M. (1930-31), "Plato: Parmenides [Z]", Marcuse H. Unpublished Transcript, Frankfurt am Main: Universitätsbibliothek Johann-Christian-Senckenberg Archivzentrum, Nr. 3,19 (0020.01): 8. Inspired by Heidegger, Gonzalez suggests that the third, τὸ τρίτον, plays a special role in the construction of the exercise by encompassing all the opposed hypotheses, i.e., I-II, III-IV, V-VI, VII-VIII. By giving the third the special constructive function, Gonzalez still recognizes eight hypotheses, i.e., eight deductions in his words; see Gonzalez, F. J. (2022), "'Let us say the third': The meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's Parmenides", in L. Brisson, A. Macéet and O. Renaut (eds.) *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, Baden-Baden: Academia: 379-392.

[4] Proclus 1039.18-1040.17; Dodds, E. R. (1928), "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One", *Classical Quarterly* 22: 136-7; Cornford 1939: 107, 112-3; Halfwassen 1992: 300-1; Kutschera 1995: 51.

[5] Meinwald 1991: 78-9, 2014: 466-8; Peterson 1996: 171-2; Coxon 1999: 116-7. In addition, Gill offers an interpretation by maintaining that the hypotheses differ in terms of the perspective, from which the same subject, 'the One', is investigated; see Gill 2012: 50-1, 65-6; 2014: 503.

Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing. Thus, I ultimately show how the chiasmus, as the foundational schematic, structures the exercise of One–Many in the *Parmenides*; this approach also promises to illuminate the exercise of Being–Nonbeing in the *Sophist*.

1. *Plato's Division of the Exercise: An Application of Chiasmus*

After encountering many difficulties concerning the theory of Forms, in the transitional section of the *Parmenides*, Plato's character Parmenides notes that to understand Forms, gymnastic training (dialectic exercise) is required. The exercise consists of multiple hypotheses, deriving apparently contradictory consequences from two contradictory antecedents. Plato's character Parmenides explains the design of the exercise as follows:

> (1) Οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλι σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· (2) καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. (3) καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· (4) καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. (*Parm*. 136a4-c5)[6]
>
> (1) "Well," Parmenides said, "if you will take the hypothesis that Zeno hypothesizes as an example, if Many are, what must follow for the Many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the One and for the One in relation to itself and in relation to the Many. Conversely, if

[6] I use the Greek text of the *Parmenides* edited by Burnet, I. (1901, Oxford: Oxford University Press) and refer to the English translation by Gill, M. L. and Ryan, P. (1997, In Cooper, J. M. [ed.] *Plato Complete Works*, Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company: 359-397) and the German translation by Schleiermacher, F. and Kurz, D. (2011, Darmstadt: WBG). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. In the previous passage (135d8-e4), Parmenides emphasizes that in the exercise one should not investigate the visible things, but should inquire about those things that one would most grasp by reason and take to be Forms ([...] ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι, 135e2-4). On this account, most scholars agree that the subject of inquiry is a Platonic Form; see Sayre (1996: 99, 103, 119-120), Allen (1997: 210-1), Peterson (2003: 250-1, 2019: 247), Rickless (2007: 99, 2020: 16), Gill (2014: 496n1, 502). Meinwald uses the capitalization 'the One' to refer to the Form of the One. While the above scholars take a logical-metaphysical approach to interpreting the One and the Many, Brission (2002: 5-7, 13-14) and Fronterotta (2019: 3-5) take a cosmological approach, seeing the One as the whole world or cosmos and the Many as the sensible particulars. Due to space limitations, I will not enter this debate here. I take the logical-metaphysical approach and subscribe to the widely accepted view that the One and the Many are Platonic Forms. Thus, I use capitalization to refer to the Form, e.g., One, Many, Similarity, etc., both in my translations and throughout the paper.

> Many are not, you must inquire what will follow for the One and for the Many both in relation to [itself/]themselves and in relation to each other. (2) And again, if you hypothesize, if Similarity is or if it is not, what will follow from each hypothesis for the things hypothesized themselves and for the Others both in relation to [itself/]themselves and in relation to each other. (3) And the same scheme is applied to Dissimilarity, to Motion, to Rest, to Generation and Destruction, and to Being itself and Nonbeing. (4) And in one word, in the case of whatever you hypothesize as Being or as Nonbeing or something that has another property, you must inquire about the consequences in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whatever you select, and it is likewise with several [of the Forms] and all [of the Forms]. And again, [you must inquire about] the Others in relation to themselves and in relation to another whatever you always select, whether you hypothesize that what you hypothesize is or is not. When you are completely trained, you will authoritatively see the truth."

This passage, which Meinwald calls 'methodological remarks', shows that Plato designs the exercise to feature four steps. (1) Plato invokes the Form of the Many as a paradigm and (2) takes the Form of Similarity as another example. (3) Plato generalizes the thesis by noting that the scheme that is applied to Many and Similarity is also applicable to Dissimilarity, Motion, Rest, Generation, Destruction, Being, and Nonbeing. (4) Plato ultimately establishes the universal scheme of the exercise, which can be used to hypothesize that each of the disjunctive Forms, namely, a Form and its Opposite, such as Similarity–Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing, is and is not (136b1-6). Since the scheme is used to hypothesize that the Many are and are not, it is equally applicable to hypothesizing that the opposite of the Many–the One–is and is not. Thus, the exercise of the One can be reconstructed as follows. If the One is, what follows for the One in relation to itself and to the Others, and what follows for the Others in relation to the One and to themselves? If the One is not, what follows for the One in relation to itself and to the Others, and what follows for the Others in relation to the One and to themselves?

As Meinwald aptly notes, the methodological remarks quoted above play a key role in structuring the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*.[7] Meinwald and other scholars have observed that these methodological remarks contain three pairs of opposites, which can be reconstructed as follows.[8] In the exercise of the One, (1) positive and negative antecedents are opposed to each other (if the One is–if the One is not). (2) Regarding the subject of the inquiry, the One and the Others are opposed to each other (τὸ ἓν–τὰ ἄλλα). (3) Regarding the subject's relations, e.g., the relations of the One to itself and to the Others, these relations are

[7] Meinwald 1991: 38-9, 48, 132; (1992), "Good-bye to the Third Man", In Kraut, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 369; 2014: 469-470. See also Sayre 1978: 136, 141; 1983: 37-41; 1996: 103-9.
[8] Meinwald: 1991: 38, 48; Sayre 1983: 41; 1996: 119; Horn 1995: 96-7.

opposed to each other (πρὸς ἑαυτὸ [i.e., πρὸς τὸ ἓν]–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα).[9] Meinwald noted that "by the possible combinations of one member from each of these three pairs" (2014: 470), multiple hypotheses are generated.[10] In my view, the combinations cannot simply be performed in any manner whatsoever; rather, they must comply with a general method to ensure the universality of the scheme.[11] The general method that Plato uses to construct the exercise is a special method of division, that is, cross-division or chiasmus.

Chiasmus (χιαστή) is the technical term that Porphyry invents for designating cross-division.[12] In commenting on Aristotle's *Cat*. 2, 1a20-b6, Porphyry declares that Aristotle makes a fourfold division by means of chiasmus: "According to which method [order] did Aristotle make the division? I say according to the chiasmus" (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ ποίαν τάξιν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐξέθετο; κατὰ τὴν χιαστὴν λέγω, 78.35-6).[13] Porphyry reconstructs the chiasmus in two steps. First, Porphyry sets up two pairs of opposites according to Aristotle's dictum. He identifies Aristotle's formulation, 'that which is in a substrate' with accident (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι = συμβεβηκός); correspondingly, 'that which is not in a substrate' refers to substance (οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι = οὐσία).[14] Substance and accident are opposed in such a way that the former is not in a substrate and the latter is in a substrate. Porphyry further identifies 'that which is said of a subject' with the universal (καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι = καθόλου); correspondingly, 'that which is not said of a subject' refers to the individual (οὐ καθ'

[9] Meinwald supposes that πρὸς ἑαυτὸ–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα qualify the predicate, whereas Gill proposes that the two relations qualify the subject. On this point, I follow Gill's interpretation that the two relations qualify the subject, thereby referring to the relations of the subject to itself and to the others; see Gill 2012: 52-3, 53, n. 20, 164, 164, n. 62; 2014: 504-5, 505, n. 19. See also Sayre 1996: 113-4; Rickless 2007: 102-3. I provide the corresponding account in due course.

[10] See also Meinwald 1991: 38.

[11] Scholars have realized that a general schematic underlies these combinations. Given the presence of two elements in each of the three pairs, the intersections among these three pairs form a 2 x 2 x 2 structure. Meinwald expresses these 2 x 2 x 2 combinations in an abstract way, and Scolnicov improperly concretizes them into a dichotomy; see Scolnicov 2003: 28, Fig. 2; Meinwald 2014: 473; Peterson 2019: 250.

[12] See Porphyry (1887), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 78.34-79.11, Busse, A. (ed.), Berlin: Reimer. See also Liu, X. (2020), *Sein, Logos und Veränderung – Eine systematische Untersuchung zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter: 15-18, 16, n. 16, 16-17, n. 17, 17, n. 18.

[13] In Porphyry's dictum quoted above (78.35-6), diairesis refers to division in the general sense, while chiasmus specifically refers to cross-division. These are not the same things. For the difference between diairesis and chiasmus, see Liu, X. (2021), "On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato's and Aristotle's Methods of Division", *Plato Journal* 22: 42-5.

[14] See Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 79.12-34; Liu 2020: 79-80, n. 90. In particular, ὑποκείμενον is said in two different ways. In the ontological context, i.e., 'being in a ὑποκείμενον', ὑποκείμενον refers to something that underlies the accident in reality, so I translate it as substrate. In the logical context, i.e., 'said of a ὑποκείμενον', ὑποκείμενον refers to something that underlies the predicate in the judgment, in which case I translate it as subject. See also Liu 2020: 80, 80-81, n. 91.

ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι = μερικόν).[15] Universal and individual are opposed in such a way that the former is said of a subject and the latter is not said of a subject. Thus, Porphyry establishes the two pairs of opposites by replacing Aristotle's own formulations 'not being in a substrate–being in a substrate' and 'said of a subject–not said of a subject' with his own terms, i.e., 'substance-accident' and 'universal-individual' (λέγω ὅτι ἡ οὐσία συμβεβηκὸς ἀντιδιαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐπὶ μέρους, 79.1-2). Then, these two pairs are cross-combined, thus constituting a 2 x 2 chiasmus. Although Porphyry does not include a diagram, his two successors, Ammonius and Philoponus, draw a diagram in their commentaries.[16] Boethius preserves a Latin version, which is exactly the same as the original diagram drawn by Ammonius and Philoponus.[17] I present the original below in Diagram 1*.

Diagram 1*



To clarify this issue, I also modify the original Diagram 1* and draw an alternative Diagram 1, as shown below.

Diagram 1



There are no essential differences between the two diagrams; nevertheless, the two exhibits certain differences, which warrants explanation. First, instead of using the term

[15] See Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 80.1-27; Liu 2020: 81.
[16] See παραδείγμα presented in *Ammonii In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius* 25.13ff (1895, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer) and διάγραμμα presented in *Philoponii (olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 28.25ff (1898, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); see also Liu 2020: 16, n. 17.
[17] See *figuram* preserved in *Boethii In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor*, In *Manlii Severini Boethii Opera Omnia*, *Patrologia Latina* 64: 175B-C (1891, Migne, J.-P. [ed.], Paris: Garnier: 159A-294C).

μερικόν employed by Ammonius and Philoponus, I use Aristotle's term, the synonym καθ' ἕκαστόν, to signify the individual because καθ' ἕκαστόν and καθόλου (i.e., καθ' ὅλον) are similar in construction to κατὰ τινος and can be regarded as a prepositional pair. Second, I switch the positions of καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς in Diagram 1* so that in Diagram 1, καθόλου is located in the position of συμβεβηκὸς and συμβεβηκὸς in the position of καθόλου. My reason for this switch is that I use Diagram 1 (which is concerned with the classification of things) to illuminate Diagram 2 (which is concerned with the exercise of the One). As Diagram 2 below shows, in the exercise of the One, it is more natural to arrange the pair of prepositional structures πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα vertically up and down than to place them left and right on the same horizontal line. The same reasoning holds for καθόλου–καθ' ἕκαστόν, which can be regarded as prepositional structures analogous to πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. As with the position of πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα (see Diagram 2 below), I arrange καθόλου–καθ' ἕκαστόν vertically up and down (see Diagram 1 above), thereby switching the positions of καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς. Third, as Diagram 1* shows, Ammonius and Philoponus (as well as Boethius) draw six lines. A 2 x 2 chiasmus requires two pairs of opposites to cross each other. Two pairs of opposites are cross-combined, thus producing six possible combinations, which are represented by the six lines drawn in Diagram 1*. The cross-combination of two pairs of opposites generates six possible combinations, two of which are invalid because the opposites in each pair cannot be combined.[18] Given that an accident is in a substrate and a substance is not in a substrate, they cannot be combined. Given that the universal is said of a subject and the individual is not said of a subject, the two cannot be connected. Ammonius and Philoponus fully realize that two of the six combinations are invalid and thus append ἀσύστατον to the two horizontal lines that ostensibly combine substance with accident and the universal with the individual, which are marked in red in Diagram 1*. In Diagram 1, καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς reverse their positions, so the ἀσύστατον-lines would have been two vertical lines, which are absent. To indicate that the opposites in a pair cannot be combined, I do not draw ἀσύστατον-lines in the chiasmus shown in Diagram 1, nor do I include ἀσύστατον-lines in other instances of the chiasmus.

[18] Aristotle, *Gen. et Corr*. B3, 330a30-b1; Liu 2020: 254-5. See also Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 79.4-8; Ammonius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces* 95.6-96.9 (1891, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius* 25.5-26.20; Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 44.1-45.32 (1907, Kalbfleich, K. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Philoponus (olim Ammonius), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 28.1-29.13; Olympiodorus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 43.3-44.34 (1902, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Elias (olim David), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 147.30-148.18 (1900, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Liu 2020: 17, 17, n. 18.

As Diagram 1 shows, the two pairs, 'substance–accident' and 'universal–individual', intersect each other, thereby producing four valid combinations. The four combinations characterize four kinds of things: the universal substance, the universal accident, the individual substance, and the individual accident.[19] Porphyry explicitly points out that in *Cat*. 2, Aristotle classifies things into four kinds using a 2 x 2 chiasmus; Ammonius and Philoponus take this step further by drawing a diagram for chiasmus. Following in the footsteps of Porphyry and the Alexanderian commentators, I propose that in the *Parmenides*, Plato uses the same kind of 2 x 2 chiasmus to divide the exercise of the One into eight hypotheses. The exercise of the One includes opposite antecedents. Regarding each antecedent, Plato performs a 2 x 2 chiasmus. The two subjects of the inquiry 'the One–the Others' (which appear as 'for the One–for the Others') and the two subjects' relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' cross each other, thus establishing a 2 x 2 chiasmus, as illustrated in Diagram 2:

Diagram 2



Under opposite antecedents, two chiasmata emerge. They are constructed in the same way and exhibit the same 2 x 2 structure. They differ in terms of their antecedents: one has a positive antecedent (see Table 1), and the other a negative antecedent (see Table 2).

Table 1 (If the One is)

	The One	The Others
In relation to the One	Hypothesis I	Hypothesis III
In relation to the Others	Hypothesis II	Hypothesis IV

[19] See also Liu 2020: 79-81; 2021: 43.

Table 2 (If the One is not)

	The One	The Others
In relation to the One	Hypothesis VI	Hypothesis VII
In relation to the Others	Hypothesis V	Hypothesis VIII

Using the 2 x 2 chiasmus, Plato divides the exercise into eight hypotheses. Thus, the exercise of the One comprises eight hypotheses, as described below.

If the One is, what follows

(I) for the One in relation to the One/itself (137c4-142a8);

(II) for the One in relation to the Others (142b1-157b5);

(III) for the Others in relation to the One (157b6-159b1);

(IV) for the Others in relation to the Others/themselves (159b2-160b4).

If the One is not, what follows

(V) for the One in relation to the Others (160b5-163b6);

(VI) for the One in relation to the One/itself (163b7-164b4);

(VII) for the Others in relation to the One (164b5-165e1);

(VIII) for the Others in relation to the Others/themselves (165e2-166c5).

A thorough examination of whether and to what extent the development and unfolding of the exercise corresponds to the scheme is beyond the scope of this paper[20], so it must suffice to say that chiasmus determines the number of hypotheses and structures the exercise. Each chiasmus in this context is a fourfold division (2 x 2).[21] By performing two fourfold divisions,

[20] Sayre has established a similar scheme; see Sayre 1978: 140; 1983: 44; 1996: 119. Doing so, Sayre does not consider chiasmus but rather analyses the text in detail. Sayre's detailed textual analysis fully proves that the content of the exercise matches the eightfold, chiastic structure that I propose; see Sayre 1978: 136-141; 1983: 42-9.

[21] A chiasmus does not have to be fourfold (2 x 2). A chiasmus emerges from two sequences of elements (called a 'tuple' in mathematics) that cross each other. When an *m*-tuple and an *n*-tuple cross each other, an *m* x *n* chiasmus occurs. In the *Statesman* (302c4-e8), Plato constructs a 3 x 2 chiasmus by cross-combining the triple 'one–few–many' with the pair 'lawful–unlawful', thereby identifying six types of

Plato establishes eight hypotheses (4 x 2); accordingly, the hypotheses cannot be counted as nine but must rather be regarded as eight. Furthermore, the chiasmus structures the exercise by establishing the subjects of the hypotheses. To draw this conclusion, I make a clear distinction between the subject of the hypothesis and the subject of the inquiry. By 'the subject of the inquiry', I refer to the subject matter of the inquiry comprising the eight hypotheses, that is, the One and the Others. By 'the subject of the hypothesis', I refer to the grammatical subject identified in the deduction and consequence of each hypothesis, which takes the form of a question and answer in each hypothesis. If the One is, e.g., the deduction of Hypothesis I is formulated as the question 'what follows for *the One in relation to itself*?' The consequence of Hypothesis I is expressed as the answer '*the One in relation to itself* is neither H nor con-H (abbreviation of the contrary of H) for many values of H'. Thus, the subject of Hypothesis I is *the One in relation to itself*. In general, the subject of the hypothesis as a whole is composed of a subject of the inquiry (namely, the One or the Others) and its relation to itself or to its opposite (namely, its relation to the One or to the Others). On this account, a 2 x 2 chiasmus constitutes the subjects of the hypotheses by cross-combining the two subjects of the inquiry 'the One–the Others' with those two subjects' relations, i.e., 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others'. Using the 2 x 2 chiasmus, the four subjects of the hypotheses are established: the One in relation to itself, the One in relation to the Others, the Others in relation to the One, and the Others in relation to themselves. These four subjects are distributed under opposite antecedents; thus, eight hypotheses are generated. In this manner, Hypotheses I and VI share the subject 'the One in relation to itself', Hypotheses II and V share the subject 'the One in relation to the Others', Hypotheses III and VII share the subject 'the Others in relation to the One', and Hypotheses IV and VIII share the subject 'the Others in relation to themselves'. According to the 2 x 2 chiasmus, therefore, the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same. Notably, some scholars, in their reconstructions of the structure of the exercise, have applied 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' to each of the hypotheses (as Rickless, Polansky, and Cimakasky have done) or applied them to the third hypothesis (as Gill has done). As said, 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' are cross-combined with 'the One–the Others' to establish four subjects for the eight hypotheses; thus, it is impossible for the two relations to be applied to each of the eight hypotheses.

constitutions; see Liu 2021: 28-31. In *History of Animals* (487b34-488a2), similarly, Aristotle establishes a 3 x 2 chiasmus by cross-combining the triple 'walking–flying–swimming' with the pair 'gregarious–solitary', thus classifying animals into six classes; see Liu 2021: 41-2. Many thanks to George Rudebusch for suggesting the use of the mathematical terms *m*-tuple and *n*-tuple in this context, which express the meaning of the *m x n* chiasmus more precisely.

Chiasmus provides strong evidence to prove that in Plato's design of the exercise, each of the eight hypotheses examines the consequences of the One or those of the Others–either in relation to the One or in relation to the Others and that none of the hypotheses examines the consequences of the One or those of the Others–both in relation to the One and in relation to the Others.[22]

That the 2 x 2 chiasmus establishes four subjects of eight hypotheses is evident not only in the methodological remarks but also in the intermediate and final summaries. In these two summaries, the four subjects of the hypotheses are the grammatical subject of the consequence, formulated as '*the subject of the hypothesis* is negated or affirmed for many values of H', while in the methodological remarks, they appear to be the grammatical subject of the deduction, expressed as 'what follows for *the subject of the hypothesis*'. Echoing the methodological remarks that elucidate the eight deductions, the final summary summarizes the eight consequences as follows:

> […], ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. (*Parm*. 166c3-5)
>
> […], whether [the] One is or is not, it and the Others in relation to [itself/]themselves and to each other are all things in all ways and are not as well as appear and appear not.

In the final summary, the four subjects of the hypotheses are distributed under opposite antecedents, appearing as the grammatical subjects of the eight consequences. Since the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses are the same (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII), the final summary can be reconstructed as follows. (a) Whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to itself (Hypotheses I–VI) and the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis IV) are nothing in the sense that they are neither H nor con-H (οὐκ ἔστι). (b) Whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to the Others (Hypotheses II–V) and the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis III) are all things in all ways in the sense that they are both H and con-H (πάντα πάντως ἐστί). (c) If the One is not, the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis VII) appear to be both H and con-H (φαίνεται). (d) If the One is not, the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis VIII) appear to be neither H nor con-H (οὐ φαίνεται).

The intermediate summary explicates the first four consequences, which are derived

[22] Rickless 2007: 109-110; Polansky and Cimakasky 2013: 242; Gill 2014: 515. Rickless constructs an eightfold structure by answering "three separate and independent questions" (2007: 110). The eightfold structure that Rickless constructs seems to be similar to the chiastic structure that I propose. However, there is an essential difference between these two structures; that is, Rickless applies 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' to each of the eight hypotheses. See also Rickless 2020: 16-18.

from the positive antecedent, as follows:

> Οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα, καὶ **τἆλλα** ὡσαύτως. (*Parm*. 160b2-3)
>
> Thus, if [the] One is, the One is all things and not one in relation to itself and to the Others, and the Others likewise.

Consistent with the final summary, the intermediate summary should appear as follows: if the One is, the One in relation to itself (Hypothesis I) and the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis IV) are nothing in the sense that they are neither H nor con-H, while the One in relation to the Others (Hypothesis II) and the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis III) are all things in all ways in the sense that they are both H and con-H. On this basis, what Plato literally demonstrates in the intermediate summary can be reconstructed as follows: Since it is nothing, the One in relation to itself is not one, as Hypothesis I shows (τὸ ἓν […] οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι […] πρὸς ἑαυτὸ); since it is all, the One in relation to the Others is all things, as Hypothesis II shows (πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν […] πρὸς τἆλλα). The same reasoning holds for the Others (τἆλλα ὡσαύτως): the Others in relation to the One are all things, as Hypothesis III shows; the Others in relation to themselves are nothing, as Hypothesis IV shows. As Meinwald properly notes, we should accept Heindorf's emendation.[23] The 2 x 2 chiasmus requires two pairs of opposites; thus, the two relations πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα alone are insufficient, and the two subjects τὸ ἓν–τὰ ἄλλα must be present. In Burnet's edition, however, τὰ ἄλλα, as one of the two subjects, is absent. To complete the two subjects, τἆλλα must be added.

To summarize this section, Plato divides the exercise into eight hypotheses using chiasmus, which establishes the four subjects of the hypotheses by cross-combining the two subjects with the two relations (2 x 2). The four subjects of the hypotheses are distributed under opposite antecedents to generate eight hypotheses (4 x 2), as observed in the methodological remarks (136a4-c5) and intermediate (160b2-3) and final summaries (166c3-5). Meinwald appropriately notes that these three passages echo one another and indicate the structure of the exercise[24]; she also properly maintains that the two relations play a crucial role in structuring the exercise.[25] However, she does not realize that the two relations contribute to the establishment of the subjects of the hypotheses and instead improperly identifies them with two kinds of predication.

[23] Meinwald 1991: 48-9, 142-4, 178n4.
[24] Meinwald 1991: 47-9, 2014: 470-1; see also Miller 1986: 74; Allen 1997: 215.
[25] Meinwald 1991: 47-9, 152; 2014: 471-3.

2. Pros heauto–Pros ta alla*: Qualification of the Predicate*

Regarding my proposal that Plato uses chiasmus to generate eight hypotheses, it is reasonable to consider how these hypotheses differ from one another. Meinwald proposes that they differ in terms of predication and that the qualification pair *pros heauto–pros ta alla* qualifies the predicate differently, thereby referring to two kinds of predication. Meinwald regards the former as 'tree predication' and the latter as 'ordinary predication'.[26] Ordinary predication highlights the feature of the subject so that an individual as the subject is predicated by the feature that the individual has, e.g., 'Aristides is just'. Tree predication reveals the internal nature of the subject in such a way that a species as the subject is predicated by the genus to which the species belongs, e.g., 'Justice is a virtue'. Although scholars have criticized Meinwald, few have gone deep into her main arguments. I delve into the main arguments to explore how she improperly constructs *pros heauto–pros ta alla* as entailing two kinds of predication.

2.1. Pros heauto *Predication*

To identify *pros heauto* as tree predication, Meinwald gives attention to the argument concerning Difference and Identity in Hypothesis I (139b4-e6). From this argument, Plato draws four negative consequences step by step: The One is not different from itself (139b5-7), the One is not identical to another (139b7-c3), the One is not different from another (139c3-d1), and the One is not identical to itself (139d1-e6). Meinwald focuses on the third consequence.

Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. […] Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· […]. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον. (139c3-d1)[27]

[The One] will not be different from another, so long as it is one. For, to be different from something does not belong to one but [belongs] only to different-from-another and to nothing else. Thus, [the One] will not be different by being one. If [the One] is not [different] by being one, it will not be [different] by itself; if it is not [different] by itself, [the One] itself is not [different]. If [the One] itself is in no way different, it will be different from nothing.

According to Plato, the One cannot be different from another because to be different from another does not belong to one thing or anything else but rather belongs only to different-

[26] Meinwald 1991: 47, 70-5, 78-9; 1992: 378-381; 2014: 466-9.
[27] I translate this passage by reference to the translations of Gill and Ryan as well as Cornford and make some modifications.

from-another. In my view, Gill and Ryan have translated ἕτερον ἑτέρου appropriately as 'different-from-another', which refers to one of the five greatest Kinds, namely, ἕτερον. In the *Parmenides* (146d1-2, 164c1-2), Plato identifies ἕτερον as ἕτερον ἑτέρου; he also elucidates the πρὸς τι structure that is inherent in ἕτερον. In the description of ἕτερον proposed by Plato in the *Sophist* (255d1), τὸ δέ γ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, the first ἕτερον refers to one, while the second refers to another that remains alongside and is opposed to the one. Ἕτερον always includes two elements, one and another, which are related to each other. Thus, ἕτερον signifies the relation of one to another, which is formulated as ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον in the *Sophist* and equivalently expressed as ἕτερον ἑτέρου in the *Parmenides*. Thus, the expression ἕτερον ἑτέρου is used to designate ἕτερον, namely, Difference. On this basis, I reconstruct the argument as follows. According to the principle of participation (P), the One is different from another not by participating in any other Form (ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί) but merely by participating in Difference (μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου). Therefore, the One cannot be different by being one (a), that is, by itself (b). Recall the antecedent of Hypothesis I: if One One (εἰ ἓν ἕν, 142c3), that is, if there is only the One, it cannot participate in any other Form, e.g., Difference. The One cannot be different by participating in Difference (according to the antecedent of Hypothesis I), nor can the One be different by being one (inconsistent with the principle of participation); thus, it cannot be different in any way (c).

(P) The One is different only by participating in Difference.
(a) The One cannot be different by being one (Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον).
(b) The One cannot be different by itself (Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται).
(c) The One cannot be different (εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό).

Despite interpreting (a) and (b) properly, Meinwald ignores the principle of participation (P), on which the whole argument is based. Moreover, Meinwald improperly adds πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό (1991: 66). Namely, if πρὸς ἑαυτὸ could be added to οὐδὲ αὐτό, the result would be 'the One is not different in relation to itself'; in other words, 'the One is not different from itself', which is the first consequence of the argument concerning Difference and Identity in Hypothesis I. The present topic, meanwhile, is the third consequence of the same argument, that is, 'the One is not different from another'. Meinwald constructs the *pros heauto* predication by adding πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό. Since the addition of πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό is improper, the construction of the *pros heauto* predication is also invalid.

Meinwald uses the *pros heauto* predication to interpret Hypothesis I. However, her

interpretation is problematic. In her view, the *pros heauto* predication, as a tree predication, explicates the nature of the subject in such a way that a species as the subject is predicated by the appropriate genus. In Hypothesis I, the tree predication appears in the negative form, such that no genera are predicated of the One. According to Meinwald, the negative formulation of the tree predication reflects the metaphysical fact that the One cannot be subordinate to any of the genera because the One is the principle of the genera and thus transcends all of them.[28] Viewing the One as the principle, Meinwald first puts the One that transcends all of the genera into the species-genus tree and then denies that the One belongs to the tree. Plato would acknowledge the One to be the principle; nevertheless, he would not locate the One in the species-genus tree because it, as the principle, does not belong to but rather remains beyond the tree and cannot be allocated to the species-genus tree initially or be explained by tree predication.

In applying the *pros heauto* predication in Hypothesis I, Meinwald has particular difficulty explaining the phrase 'the One is not one *pros heauto*'. The nature of the subject is supposed to be revealed by the *pros heauto* predication, according to which the nature of the One is not one. This conclusion is absurd. Peterson defends Meinwald's interpretation by explaining that 'the One is not one *pros heauto*' in the sense that "it is not the case that the One is by definition one" (1996: 190); put briefly, the One is not one by definition.[29] This claim is true, but it is not what Plato meant. Indeed, the Sophist is not Sophist by definition, and the Statesman is not Statesman by definition since Plato does not use self-predication to produce a definition. Rather, Plato defines the Sophist or Statesman by dividing a certain genus, expertise or knowledge, into multiple differentiae, so the Sophist or Statesman is ultimately defined as a combination of a genus with multiple differentiae. It is true that self-predication does not serve as a mode of definition; in the *Parmenides*, however, Plato is not concerned with definition. Peterson defends Meinwald's interpretation by eliciting a definition, which Plato does not consider here; Meinwald interprets 'the One is not one' by adding *pros heauto*, which does not exist in Plato's text (τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν [οὔτε ἔστιν], 141e12). Meinwald's interpretation and Peterson's defensive argument do not have any textual evidence, nor do they align with Plato's original meaning.[30]

Fundamentally, Meinwald's predicative interpretation of *pros heauto* is especially

[28] Meinwald 1991: 131-142; 2014: 483-5.
[29] See also Peterson 1996: 188.
[30] Meinwald has responded to the question of how 'the One is not one *pros heauto*' should be understood; see 2014: 483-4. Her response does not seem as strong as Peterson's defensive argument, and so I do not mention it.

inappropriate for interpreting Hypothesis I, according to which the One is negated by multiple pairs of predicates, such as whole–part, static–moved, and identical–different. Plato not only negates multiple pairs of predicates but also completely rejects the possibility of predication, as seen in the radical consequence that 'the One is not one'. This radical consequence can be derived directly from the antecedent of Hypothesis I; that is, there is nothing other than the One, so it cannot participate in any other Form. In the corresponding logical sense, the One cannot be attached to any predicate even though the predicate is one itself, for the single, indivisible One cannot be split into subject and predicate. Given that Plato completely rejects the possibility of predication by deconstructing the structure of predication, how could one interpret Hypothesis I in terms of predication?

2.2. Pros ta alla *Predication*

In the passage selected from Hypothesis V, Meinwald distinguishes between two uses of *pros ti* (1991: 57-63). Based on the second use of *pros ti* (2), she constructs the *pros ta alla* predication.

> (2) Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι **ἀνομοίῳ** τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη. Δῆλον. Εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, **πρὸς ἣν** τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν. (161b1-4)
>
> If they are unlike the One, obviously, the unlike things would be unlike by Unlike[ness]. Obviously. Thus, if the One would have Unlikeness, in relation to which the Others are unlike it.

As Meinwald notes, Plato uses the dative to designate participation in the Form (2014: 476). In the *Phaedo*, Plato uses the dative τῷ καλῷ to reference participation in the Beautiful; accordingly, all beautiful things are beautiful by participating in the Beautiful (τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά, *Phaed*. 100d7-8). Similarly, unlike things are unlike by participating in Unlike[ness] (ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη, *Parm*. 161b1-2), with ἀνομοίῳ referring to participation in Unlikeness. To designate participation in the Form F-ness, Plato uses not only the dative of a term (which signifies F-ness) but also *pros* with the accusative of a term (which signifies F-ness). *Pros* with the accusative πρὸς ἣν, that is, πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα, is used in the same sense as the dative ἀνομοίῳ, so πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα refers to participation in Unlikeness. On this account, (2) can be formulated as follows: Unlike things are unlike by participating in Unlikeness (ἀνομοίῳ), so the Others are unlike the One by participating in Unlikeness (πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα). The same reasoning holds for the argument concerning Inequality. In Plato's dictum, "Aren't the unequal things unequal by the Unequal? How [are they] not? Thus, the One participates in Inequality, in relation to which the Others are unequal

to it?" (τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ **τῷ ἀνίσῳ** ἄνισα; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, **πρὸς ἣν** τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα; 161c8-d1), *pros* with the accusative, πρὸς ἀνισότητα, is equivalent to the dative τῷ ἀνίσῳ and refers to participation in Inequality. Thus, the argument can be reconstructed: Unequal things are unequal by participating in the Unequal (τῷ ἀνίσῳ), so the Others are unequal to the One by participating in Inequality (πρὸς ἀνισότητα).

In my view, Meinwald is correct in noting that πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα and πρὸς ἀνισότητα are used to designate participation in Unlikeness and Inequality, respectively (1991: 56-63). She also properly notes that *pros ti* in this case is associated with predication because it refers to participation. According to the theory of Forms, participation points to the metaphysical fact that an individual participates in the Form; e.g., Socrates participates in Justice. The metaphysical fact–the participation of Socrates in Justice–can be articulated through the statement 'Socrates is just'. Thus, the theory of Forms highlights the correspondence of the statement 'Socrates is just' to the metaphysical fact that Socrates participates in Justice. Based on the correspondence of predication to participation, *pros ti* is associated with predication insomuch that it refers to participation. Thus, *pros ti*, that is, A *pros* F-ness, refers to the participation of A in F-ness, which is represented by the statement 'A is F'. Applying this scheme to the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality, one can arrive at the same conclusion as Meinwald, namely, that *pros ti* is associated with participation and predication. The Others *pros* Unlikeness and *pros* Inequality refer to the participation of the Others in Unlikeness and Inequality, respectively, which are articulated by the statements 'the Others are unlike [the One]' and 'the Others are unequal [to the One]'. Meinwald properly notes that in the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality, Plato uses πρὸς τι, that is, πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα at 161b3 and πρὸς ἀνισότητα at 161d1, to reference the metaphysical fact of participation and the logical correspondence of predication. Meinwald may be correct to regard the statements 'the Others are unlike [the One]' and 'the Others are unequal [to the One]' as ordinary predications in the sense that the Others exhibit the features of Unlikeness and Inequality. However, Meinwald errs when she mixes πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα and πρὸς ἀνισότητα, which appear in the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality in Hypothesis V, with πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, which is presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII, and thereby improperly identifies πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in these hypotheses as referring to ordinary predications. If πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα were used in the sense of πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα or πρὸς ἀνισότητα, τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in Hypotheses II and V would have referred to the participation of the One in the Others, which could be formulated as 'the One is the Others', and τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in Hypotheses IV and VIII would have referred to the participation of the Others

in themselves, which could be expressed as 'the Others are the Others'. These statements are not in line with the text.

Let us return to (2) 'the Others are unlike the One *pros* Unlikeness' (πρὸς ἓν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν). In this sentence, 'the One' can be regarded as a complement to 'unlike' because only two entities, the One and the Others, can be compared in terms of Likeness and Unlikeness. Thus, (2) can be simplified and expressed as 'the Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness'. Meinwald acknowledges this simplified formulation as proper while improperly generalizing it as 'A is B *pros* C' (1991: 70-1). Clearly, it is incorrect to generalize 'the Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness' as 'A is B *pros* C'; instead, the generalization should be corrected to 'A is B *pros* B-ness' or 'A is F *pros* F-ness', that is, 'A is F by participating in F-ness' (2*). The sentence 'A is F by participating in F-ness' expresses two meanings, i.e., the predication 'A is F' and the cause of that predication, namely, the participation of A in F-ness. That is, 'A is F' because A participates in F-ness (2**).

(2) The Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness (A is F *pros* F-ness).
(2*) The Others are unlike by participating in Unlikeness (A is F by participating in F-ness).
(2**) 'The Others *are* unlike' because the Others participate in Unlikeness ('A *is* F' because A participates in F-ness).

In the sentence 'A is F *pros* F-ness', Plato establishes the predication 'A is F' and reveals the cause of the predication using A *pros* F-ness. A *pros* F-ness refers to the participation of A in F-ness, which establishes a metaphysical foundation for the predication 'A is F'. Given that *pros ti*, namely, A *pros* F-ness, reveals the cause of the predication, it does not contribute to constructing the predication. Thus, the predication concerned is 'A is F', which is not an instance of two-place predication but rather of one-place predication. Despite properly noting that *pros ti* is associated with predication, Meinwald improperly regards the predication as a case of two-place predication and invalidly identifies *pros ti* with *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. In my estimation, *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of these hypotheses should not be identified with *pros ti* in the second use mentioned above but should rather be equated with *pros ti* in the first use.

To illuminate the first use of *pros ti*, Meinwald quotes the sentence 'the One has Unlikeness *pros* the Others' (ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ **πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα**, 161a6). That is, 'the One is unlike *pros* the Others' (1), which is equivalent to 'the One *pros* the Others is unlike' (1*). In general, 'A is B *pros* C' is identical to 'A *pros* C is B'. What *pros ti* qualifies in this

context is not predicate B but rather subject A. *Pros ti* qualifies subject A by connecting A with C, so subject A and relation *pros* C constitute the subject of the sentence. Clearly, the use of *pros ta alla* at 161a6 corresponds to the common usage of *pros ta alla* presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. Since it refers to connection, the relation (*pros*) can be signified using the word 'and'. Thus, (1*) 'the One *pros* the Others is unlike' can be equivalently formulated as 'the One and the Others are unlike'; in general, 'A and B are C' (1**).

(1) The One is unlike *pros* the Others (A is B *pros* C).
(1*) The One *pros* the Others is unlike (A *pros* C is B).
(1**) The One and the Others are unlike (A and C are B).

As shown, *pros ti* is used in two ways. In the construction of 'A is B *pros* C', *pros ti* qualifies subject A by connecting the two elements of the subject, A and C, with each other, so the relation (*pros*) refers to connection and can be expressed as 'and'. In the construction of 'A is F *pros* F-ness', *pros ti* is associated with participation and predication. The metaphysical relation of individual to Form (A *pros* F-ness) is reflected by the logical relation of subject to predicate ('A is F'), so the relation (*pros*) refers to predication and can be expressed using the copula 'is'. Thus, *pros ti* is used either in the sense of connection or in the sense of predication. Rickless referred to *pros ti* in the sense of predication as the 'Meinwald Reading' and to *pros ti* in the sense of connection as the 'Straightforward Reading'. Rickless endorsed the 'Straightforward Reading' while rejecting the 'Meinwald Reading' because in his view, Plato does not use *pros ti* in the sense of predication but rather merely in the sense of connection (2007: 102). According to Rickless, *pros ti* in the sense of connection is in accordance with its ordinary usage in the Greek language and the statements quoted from the *Parmenides*. As he properly noted, statements such as 'Simmias is taller *pros* Phaedo', 'Simmias is different *pros* Phaedo', 'Simmias is the same *pros* Phaedo', and 'Simmias is equal *pros* Phaedo' are equivalent to 'Simmias is taller *than* Phaedo', 'Simmias is different *from* Phaedo', 'Simmias is the same *as* Phaedo', and 'Simmias is equal *to* Phaedo'. *Pros* appears in different forms, namely, *than*, *from*, *as*, and *to*, because in English, different adjectives require different prepositions. In all cases, *pros* is used in the sense of connection and is used to connect the two elements of the subject with each other. The two subjects, Simmias and Phaedo, are combined using *pros* and compared in terms of height, substance (identity–difference), and quantity.[31] In

[31] Rickless 2007: 102-3.

the *Parmenides*, similarly, two Forms, the One and the Other, are combined using *pros* and compared in substance (identity–difference), in quality (similar–dissimilar), in quantity (equal–unequal), and in time (older–younger–same age). In Hypotheses I and II, Plato examines whether the One is identical to (*pros*) or different from (*pros*) itself and the Other; whether the One is similar to (*pros*) or dissimilar to (*pros*) itself and the Other; whether the One is equal to (*pros*) or unequal to (*pros*) itself and the Other; and whether the One is older than (*pros*), younger than (*pros*), or the same age as (*pros*) itself and the Other.[32] Notably, in the statements that Rickless quotes from the *Parmenides*, Plato does not use *pros* with the accusative but instead uses the dative to designate the sense of connection.[33] Given that *pros* with the accusative is used interchangeably with the dative, Rickless's interpretation is proper and valid. I agree with Rickless that in all the cases mentioned above, *pros ti* (which appears as the equivalent dative) is used in the sense of connection. Nevertheless, I disagree with him regarding the claim that *pros ti* is used only in this sense. As analyzed, Meinwald is correct in claiming that *pros ti* in the two sentences (εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν, 161b1-4; καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα, 161c8-d1) is used in the sense of predication. Rickless and Rudebusch suggested that to understand these two sentences properly, one should omit the comma before *pros*, which does not exist in the original text.[34] This approach may be a solution, but the omission of the comma cannot change the fact that *pros ti* is not used in these two sentences to connect the two elements of the subject (as other cases show) but is rather used to indicate predication.

To summarize, a relation (*pros ti*) can refer either to the relation between the two elements of the subject, e.g., Simmias and Phaedo or the One and the Other[s], or to the relation between the subject and predicate, e.g., a predicative relationship such as 'Socrates is just' or 'the Others are unlike'. It is used not only in the sense of connection to connect the two elements of the subject but also in the sense of predication to connect the subject with the predicate. Thus, I believe that Meinwald is correct in noting that *pros ti* has a wider use than Rickless supposes. Meinwald appropriately distinguishes between the two uses of *pros ti* and properly notes that *pros ti* in its second use is associated with predication. However, she errs in identifying *pros ti*, used in the sense of predication, with *pros ta alla* as presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. In my view, *pros ti*, which appears either as *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and

[32] Rickless 2007: 105-6.
[33] *Parm*. 139b4-5, 139e7-8, 140b6-7, 140e2-5, 146a9-b2, 147c1-2, 149d8-9.
[34] Rickless 2007: 104, n. 7.

VIII or as *pros to hen* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses I, III, VI, and VII, is used in the sense of connection. That is, *pros ti* qualifies the subject by connecting the subject with the subject's relation.

3. Pros to hen–Pros ta alla*: Qualification of the Subject*

Having argued with Meinwald in her philosophical context, in this section, I return to my own interpretation. With the help of chiasmus, I finally prove that *pros ti* qualifies the subject, and fundamentally argue that the qualification pair cannot be expressed one-sidedly as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* but must be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Accordingly, I note that *pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify the subject by combining two subjects with those two subjects' relations in a chiastic way.

Let us return to the first four hypotheses: if the One is, (I) what is *to hen pros heauto*; (II) what is *to hen pros ta alla*; (III) what are *ta alla pros to hen*; and (IV) what are *ta alla pros heauta*? From I–II to III–IV, the subject shifts from *to hen* to *ta alla*; correspondingly, the qualification pair changes its form from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to allo* (i.e., *pros to hen*). Meinwald appropriately notes that regarding the qualification pair, there is "a switch in singular and plural forms" (1991: 182n1) because "we have moved [from getting results for the One] on to get results for the [O]thers" (1991: 182n1). Meinwald's explanation cannot be correct, as she means that the qualification pair qualifies the predicate; if the qualification pair could have qualified the predicate, it would not change its form with the change of the subject.[35] The qualification pair changes from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to allo* because it qualifies the subject, shifting from qualifying *to hen* to qualifying *ta alla*.

Furthermore, the qualification pair, *pros to hen–pros ta alla*, qualifies the subject by connecting the two subjects with the two subjects' relations in a chiastic way. *Pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify *to hen* by connecting *to hen* with *to hen* and with *ta alla*, leading to the two combinations of *to hen pros to hen* and *to hen pros ta alla*. To avoid duplication, that is, the appearance of *to hen* twice in the combination *to hen pros to hen*, the reflexive pronoun *heauto* is used to replace *to hen* in *pros to hen*; thus, *to hen pros to hen–to hen pros ta alla* becomes *to*

[35] Even if the qualification pair could have been used as a sentential operator to qualify the entire sentence (as someone might argue), it would still not change its form with the change of the subject. The fact that the qualification pair changes its form with the change of the subject obviously proves that it qualifies the subject.

hen pros heauto–to hen pros ta alla, abbreviated as *pros heauto–pros ta alla*. Again, *pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify *ta alla* by connecting *ta alla* with *to hen* and with *ta alla*, resulting in the two combinations of *ta alla pros to hen* and *ta alla pros ta alla*. To avoid duplication, that is, the appearance of *ta alla* twice in the combination *ta alla pros ta alla*, the reflexive pronoun *heauta* is used to replace *ta alla* in *pros ta alla*; thus, *ta alla pros to hen–ta alla pros ta alla* becomes *ta alla pros to hen–ta alla pros heauta*, abbreviated as *pros heauta–pros to hen* (i.e., *pros to allo*). Thus, *pros ti* has the connective characteristic and connects the two subjects with the two subjects' relations in a chiastic way, as seen in Diagram 3:

Diagram 3



Crucially, *pros to hen–pros ta alla* has the 'in relation to' structure, which implies X in relation to Y, X *pros* Y. When subject X changes, the subject's relation, i.e., the relation of X to Y, must change correspondingly. Thus, one cannot consider the subject's relation without considering the subject. Depending on whether *to hen* or *ta alla* are taken as a subject, the subject's relation appears either as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* or as *pros heauta–pros to hen*. The form in which the subject's relation appears depends on which subject–*to hen* or *ta alla*–is qualified, but both forms are generated from the original pair *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Therefore, the qualification pair, as the subject's relation, cannot be expressed one-sidedly as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* but must be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Despite interpreting *pros heauto–pros ta alla* properly as the subjects' relations, Gill one-sidedly proposes that only *pros heauto–pros ta alla* designate the subject's relations and ignores the fact that the subjects' relations also appear in the form of *pros heauta–pros to hen*.[36] Meinwald appropriately notes that the qualification pair changes its form from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to hen*; however, she does not realize that these two forms are derived from the original pair *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Moreover, Meinwald incorrectly treats *pros heauto–pros ta alla* as two types of predication by identifying *pros*

[36] Gill 2012: 52-3, 53, n. 20; 2014: 504-5.

heauto–pros ta alla in the *Parmenides* with *kath' hauto–pros allo* in the *Sophist*.[37] As analyzed, *pros heauto* cannot be identified with *kath' hauto* because *pros heauto*, which originates from *to hen pros to hen*, qualifies the subject *to hen* by connecting *to hen* with itself, whereas *kath' hauto* highlights the essential relationship of the predicate to the subject such that the subject (whatever it is) is characterized by a predicate that belongs to the subject's nature.

4. *Conclusion*

In the second part of the *Parmenides*, Plato constructs an exercise featuring two subjects and two relations. The two subjects, the One–the Others, and the two relations, in relation to the One–in relation to the Others, are cross-combined, thus constituting a 2 x 2 chiasmus. The 2 x 2 chiasmus constitutes four subjects of eight hypotheses: 'the One in relation to itself' is the subject of Hypotheses I and VI, 'the One in relation to the Others' is the subject of Hypotheses II and V, 'the Others in relation to the One' is the subject of Hypotheses III and VII, and 'the Others in relation to themselves' is the subject of Hypotheses IV and VIII. In conclusion, the eight hypotheses differ in subject such that the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same.

I draw the same conclusion as Sayre. We both focus on three pairs but treat them differently. These three pairs are (1) the pair of antecedents 'if the One is–if the One is not', (2) the pair of subjects 'the One–the Others', and (3) the pair of relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others'. By combining (2) the pair of subjects with (3) the pair of relations, I address the fact that these two pairs are cross-combined, thus constructing a 2 x 2 chiasmus; in addition, the two 2 x 2 chiasmata are incorporated into the framework established by (1) the pair of antecedents. Sayre takes another approach by analyzing (1) the pair of antecedents and (2) the pair of subjects jointly and considering the consequences simultaneously. In this way, Sayre offers a tentative interpretation by positing that there are two subjects of eight hypotheses, that is, the One (I, II, V, VI) and the Others (III, IV, VII, VIII).[38] Sayre considers (3) the pair of relations 'in relation the One–in relation to the Others' by analyzing the eight hypotheses meticulously and fully considering their consequences. He thus discovers that the One is related to the One in Hypotheses I and VI, the One is related to the Others in Hypotheses II and V, the Others are related to the One in Hypotheses III and VII, and the Others are related

[37] Meinwald 1991: 75; 1992: 381; 2014: 480-1.
[38] Sayre 1978: 134-6, especially the scheme at 135; 1983: 37-42, especially the scheme at 41-2.

to the Others in Hypotheses IV and VIII.[39] On this basis, Sayre corrects his tentative interpretation by maintaining that there are four subjects of eight hypotheses: the One in relation to the One (I–VI), the One in relation to the Others (II–V), the Others in relation to the One (III–VII), and the Others in relation to the Others (IV–VIII). In conclusion, the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same.[40] Sayre analyses the text, whereas I use the chiastic method. Although we take different approaches, we arrive at the same conclusion; this fact fully demonstrates the propriety and validity of this interpretation. Following in the footsteps of Porphyry and the Alexanderian commentators, I pursue an alternate proposal by discussing how Plato employs a special method of chiasmus to design the exercise as a complex of eight hypotheses and structure the eight hypotheses in a chiastic way. With the help of chiasmus, I finally show that Meinwald's predicative interpretation is incorrect, not only because *pros heauto–pros ta alla* does not qualify the predicate, but also fundamentally because the qualification pair does not appear in the form of *pros heauto–pros ta alla*, but rather in the form of *pros to hen–pros ta alla*.

To summarize the eight hypotheses, whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to itself or the Others in relation to themselves are neither H nor con-H for many values of H, whereas the One in relation to the Others or the Others in relation to the One are both H and con-H for many values of H.[41] Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII positively note that when the One and the Others are combined with each other, their combination is equipped with and predicated by contrary attributes, while Hypotheses I, IV, VI, and VIII show the negative results of separating the One and the Others from each other. If I set aside all of the hypotheses that have a negative consequence and focus on all of the hypotheses that have a positive consequence, I can further conclude that a Form and its Opposite cannot be related solely to themselves but must be combined with each other. 'The One–the Others' represent opposite Forms in the sense that they are equivalent to 'the One–the Many', with 'the Others' (*ta alla*) being equivalent to 'the Many' (*ta polla*).[42] 'The Others' differ from the One but cannot be anything other than the One. Rather, 'the Others' are identified with 'the Many', which can be clearly seen in the statement that "the Others that differ from the One is [the] Many" (τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη, 158b2-3). In constructing the exercise, Plato is concerned with the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many'; this fact is most evident in the paradigm that Plato's character Parmenides

[39] Sayre 1978: 136-141, especially the scheme at 140; 1983: 42-9, especially the scheme at 44.
[40] Sayre 1978: 139-141, 147-8, especially the scheme at 140; 1983: 42-5, especially the scheme at 44; 1996: 116-9, 124-6, especially the scheme at 119. See also Kutschera 1995: 51; Scolnicov 2003: 25-9.
[41] See also Sayre 1978: 143-4; 1983: 46-7; 1996: 119, 126-133.
[42] See also Walker 1938: 493-7; Halfwassen 1992: 299-300; Scolnicov 2003: 26, Fig. 2 at 28.

invokes in the transitional section. Since Parmenides explicitly states that in the exercise of the Many, we investigate the consequences of the Many and those of the One (136a5-b1), in the exercise of the One, correspondingly, we should inquire into the consequences of the One and those of the Many.

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, Plato's character Socrates encounters the difficulty (*aporia*) posed by the question of whether the intelligible entities, that is, the opposite Forms, such as One–Multitude/Many (τὸ ἓν–πλῆθος), Similarity–Dissimilarity, and Motion–Rest, should be combined with or separated from each other (129d6-e4). In the second part, Plato's character Parmenides examines the combination and separation of the opposite Forms of 'the One–the Many'. Based on the conclusion drawn from the second part of the *Parmenides*, that is, that a Form and its Opposite cannot be related solely to themselves but must rather be combined with each other, the *aporia* presented in the first part can be solved as follows. The components of the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many' cannot be separated from each other (as the negative consequences of Hypotheses I, IV, VI, and VIII show) but must rather be connected with each other (as the positive consequences of Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII show). Moreover, the confusion regarding how it is possible for the Kinds and Forms in themselves to have contrary properties (εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν, 129c2-3) can ultimately be dispelled by the positive consequences of Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII such that the combination of the opposite Forms, the One and the Many, has contrary properties and is both H and con-H for many values of H.

5. *Appendix*

In the transitional section of the *Parmenides*, Plato designs a universal scheme for an exercise using chiasmus. Based on Plato's use of chiasmus, I reconstruct the universal scheme in the following way. Having assumed a Form, I identify 'the Form–its Opposite' as one pair of opposites and 'in relation to the Form–in relation to its Opposite' as another pair of opposites. These two pairs cross each other, thus establishing a 2 x 2 chiasmus that connects the Form or its Opposite with itself or with its Opposite in a chiastic way. As previously noted, *pros* in the sense of connection can be expressed by the word 'and'; visually, the relationship (*pros*) of the Form or its Opposite to itself or to its Opposite can be represented by a one-way arrow[43], as shown below:

[43] Many thanks to Christoph Horn for correcting me by noting that the arrows (which signify the relation of the subject to itself or to its opposite) are not two-way but should rather be one-way.

Diagram 4



The universal scheme of the exercise is the 2 x 2 chiasmus, which can, according to Plato, be universally applied to each of the opposite Forms, such as One–Many, Similarity–Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing (*Parm*. 136b1-6). As Diagram 4 shows, the 2 x 2 chiasmus makes it possible to cross-combine opposite Forms. In the *Parmenides*, the 2 x 2 chiasmus cross-combines the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many' (which function as the two subjects of the inquiry) with the two relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Many', thus establishing four subjects of eight hypotheses. In the *Sophist*, the 2 x 2 chiasmus cross-combines the opposite Forms 'the Being–the Nonbeing' (which appear as the two grammatical subjects) with the two predicates 'is–is not', thereby establishing four statements, as illuminated as follows:

Diagram 5



The 2 x 2 chiasmus generates four statements. In addition to the two Parmenidean statements, 'the Being is' and 'the Nonbeing is not', two Platonic statements are included, 'the Being is not' and 'the Nonbeing is' ([…], καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ, *Soph*. 241d5-7). The two Platonic statements, each of which is composed of a subject and an opposite predicate, reflect the metaphysical fact that the Being is cross-combined with the Nonbeing ([…] πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι, *Soph*. 240c2-3).

Chiasmus, as a special method of division, makes cross-division possible; moreover, it makes the cross-combination of opposite Forms possible. By identifying the chiasmus as the fundamental schematic of the exercise, I ultimately reveal how it structures the exercise of

One–Many in the *Parmenides*. In addition, I reveal the appropriate approach to the task of investigating the exercise of Being–Nonbeing in the *Sophist*. More will be said on this topic.

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