As Duas Definições de Prazer na Ética Nicomaqueia de Aristóteles

Abstract

The purpose of the text is to show how Aristotle, in formulating the first definition of pleasure in direct opposition to Plato's definition, poses for himself a conceptual trap to be overcome with the formulation of the second definition of pleasure. The first definition of pleasure - unimpeded activity of the natural state and not a restorative process of a weak state – poses the following trap: if eudaimonia is also an unimpeded activity of the natural state, what would prevent the whole identification of this with pleasure? It occurs that Aristotle does not advocate a radical hedonistic position, despite having argued dialectically that pleasure would, in some way, be the supreme good. Given the problem, we will show how the second definition of pleasure – activity following another activity - is necessary to avoid a possible radical hedonism aroused by the first definition. In so doing, the logical link between the Treaties will be evident, what is contrary to the interpretation of most commentators.