The Journal of Ancient Philosophy is an e-journal published by the Department of Philosophy of the Universidade de São Paulo (USP, Brazil). It was founded in 2007 and publishes articles, reviews and textual notes on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as translations of classical texts into Portuguese or Spanish. The journal also intends to provide information about Latin American symposia, meetings and conferences on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. It is published twice a year, in May and October. The purposes for which the Journal of Ancient Philosophy was created are to foster classical studies in Latin America, providing scholars a vehicle for the publication of researches and discussions, and to promote international dialogue across different languages and approaches. It is open to all scholars worldwide to submit contributions for inclusion in this Journal. The accepted languages are: Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, German and Italian. Every contribution is evaluated by a double-blind, peer-review process. This Journal considers plagiarism as a very serious offense against academic research, and consequently will take all measures to protect its publications from it, aiming at ensuring originality in any paper published by this Journal. This Journal will not condone plagiarism under any circumstances. Please report to www.fapesp.br/6566 for a theoretical assessment of plagiarism, and www.fapesp.br/6574 for practical and general information on sound academic practices of quotation and publication. We fully agree with the proposals put forward by Fapesp in these documents. Likewise, submissions that have their origin in artificial intelligence (AI) programs are not considered academically relevant. As we know, such programs are not capable of bringing original contributions to the field of study to which the Revista de Filosofia Antiga is dedicated. All contributions originating from AI tools will be disregarded. Abstracted / Indexed in: Philosopher's Index, Catálogo LatinIndex, EBSCOhost, Portal de Periódicos da CAPES, Qualis CAPES This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas
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Aristotle’s Definitional Method and the Search for the Supreme Human Good in the Nicomachean Ethics
This article examines the method of philosophical inquiry Aristotle employs in the opening chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics, with particular attention to NE I.2, 1094a18-22. Against the dominant dialectical reading and in critical dialogue with Carlo Natali's 'definition-oriented' model, the article argues that the opening texts of NE I are better understood in light of Posterior Analytics B.10, 93b29-32 such as interpreted by David Charles. On this reading, Aristotle neither establishes the existence of the Supreme Human Good nor presents its real definition, but fixes the conceptual target of the inquiry without existential commitment.
Copyright (c) 2026 Eduardo Wolf https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
A ontologia na prosa filosófica de Sêneca: o problema do gênero supremo
In this article, I aim to analyze the ontology proposed by Seneca in Letter 58 of the Epistulae Morales. Seneca argues that quod est (τὸ ὂν; being) is the highest genus, rejecting the Stoic claim that posits quid (τὸ τι; something) as such. Seneca argues that some Stoics take into account things that do not exist in nature, such as Giants and Centaurs. Given that his testimony is considered a key piece of evidence in the reconstruction of Stoic ontology, in this article I propose that the interpretation of this text should not be considered in isolation, but in light of Seneca’s overall argument.
Copyright (c) 2026 Thais Portansky https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Mimese e o julgamento do belo em Leis II, 669a7-b3
Em Leis II, 669a7-b3, o Estrangeiro Ateniense propõe três critérios para a avaliação de obras miméticas, das quais fazem parte as artes musicais (μουσική). Uma pessoa que pretende ser um juiz justo destas obras deverá saber três coisas: i) o que a obra é (ὅ τέ ἐστι); ii) se ela está correta (ὡς ὀρθῶς); e iii) se é de boa qualidade (ὡς εὖ). O último critério, que visa julgar a qualidade da obra, traz consigo uma ambiguidade interpretativa: ele pode ser tomado como critério exclusivamente ético (que se ocupa de avaliar a qualidade moral de determinada obra), como exclusivamente técnico (que julga a execução artística aplicada) ou como simultaneamente técnico e ético. Neste sentido, este artigo pretende investigar tais possibilidades de leitura, reconstruindo o arcabouço conceitual e argumentativo do Livro II de Leis, a fim de compreender melhor a passagem e defender que, no contexto do diálogo, as avaliações ética e técnica podem se sobrepor.
Copyright (c) 2026 Ana Clara Meneguzzi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
De Anima III.7: tradução comentada com enfoque na psicologia moral de Aristóteles.
Todo o terceiro livro do De Anima de Aristóteles é bastante difícil e repleto de problemas filosóficos e de transmissão textual, e dessas dificuldades o capítulo 7 não está isento. Além disso, o Capítulo 7 apresenta sérios problemas de coesão que levaram editores e intérpretes a questionar sua unidade, sua importância filosófica e sua autoria. O presente artigo, partindo de uma conjectura acerca da unidade do Capítulo 7, tem por objetivo examinar suas dificuldades filosóficas e textuais seção por seção, oferecendo, em conjunto com a discussão, uma tradução para o português brasileiro com atenção à psicologia moral aristotélica ali apresentada. Argumenta-se que o capítulo deve ser tratado com grande cautela enquanto evidência para interpretações de amplo alcance sobre o modo como Aristóteles concebe a phantasia na formação do desejo, mas que, a despeito de seu caráter fragmentário, encerra realizações filosóficas relevantes e coerentes.
Copyright (c) 2026 Fernando Martins Mendonça https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The Aristotelian Definition of Motion: A Translation of Physics III 1 with Commentary
This work seeks to offer a detailed examination of Aristotle’s notion of change through a Portuguese translation of the first chapter of Physics III, accompanied by commentary on each of the expository and argumentative stages of the chapter. The commentary includes a defense of the translation choices, a focused discussion of issues related to textual transmission, and, above all, the substantiation of interpretative hypotheses, as well as a critical appraisal of alternative hypotheses in the secondary literature.
Aristotle; change; potentiality; actuality; capacity.
Copyright (c) 2026 Breno Zuppolini https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Revisiting the “longer way” and the “shorter way” in Plato’s Republic
At some moments of the Republic, character Socrates refers to two “ways” to reach some important objectives explained in the dialogue, a shorter one and a longer one. The present article explains what these two paths are, by presenting i) the previous context for the “paths” in the text of the Republic; ii) the objectives attributed to the ongoing discussion; iii) how the notion of “paths” emerges in the text; iv) the characterization of both, the shorter and the longer way; v) the explanation why the discussion must follow the shorter one; vi) the assessment of some of the main interpretations of the issue in the scholarship. The paper concludes that Socrates and his interlocutors could not follow the longer way because it is not available for them.
Copyright (c) 2025 Andre Luiz Braga da Silva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Beyond technē: Thrasymachus, legitimacy, and the appearance of justice: a reply to Menezes
This paper offers a new interpretation of Thrasymachus’ thesis in Republic I (338c–341a). Against readings that reduce his position either to sophistic cynicism or to a purely technical account of rule, I argue that Thrasymachus advances an implicit theory of legitimacy. Through a close reading of Socrates’ Polydamas parody (339a) and the technē exchange (340d–341a), I develop what I call the Principle of Appearances (PA): political power survives only when coercion presents itself as truth. This performative dimension clarifies why Thrasymachus demands the ruler’s infallibility and why law (nomos) appears as the advantage of the stronger. The paper situates this paradox of legitimation within the genealogy of political realism, from Plato’s dramatic text through Machiavelli’s verità effettuale della cosa to Bernard Williams’s Basic Legitimation Demand. The conclusion is that justice, for Thrasymachus, is not simply kratos or technē, but the linguistic and symbolic form by which domination sustains itself as acceptable order.
Copyright (c) 2025 Gábor Szabó https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Intelectualismo socrático no tratado aristotélico Magna Moralia: tradução dos excertos e comentários
This article consists of a compilation of passages from the Aristotelian treatise, known by the Latin title Magna Moralia, in which the moral theses attributed to Socrates, generically recognized as “Socratic intellectualism,” are critically examined. The Portuguese translations of the excerpts are accompanied, on the one hand, by explanatory notes of a philosophical nature and, on the other, by philological and grammatical comments. In the introduction, we present a brief history of the treatise and an overview of Aristotle's contribution to the debate on the Socratic problem.
Copyright (c) 2025 Daniel Rossi Nunes Lopes https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Philosophers on Stage: From Aristophanes’ Socrates to Timon of Phlius’ Parody to Construct a New Philosophy
Abstract. This article aims to illustrate some intersections between Greek philosophical satire and ancient Greek philosophy by discussing the Pyrrhonian satire of Timon of Phlius against the philosophy of Socrates and his followers. Timonian mockery operates not only through literary strategies such as ὀνομαστὶ κομῳδεῖν, a hallmark of Aristophanic Old Comedy, but also through caricatures of Socrates’ ideas and their reception, captured by the term “Philosophenspott”. Analysing this philosophical mockery opens new avenues for studying how ancient authors, including Timon, used satire both to undermine rival doctrines and also to articulate their own doctrines
Copyright (c) 2026 Giovanni Taglialatela https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Il Fedro o del νοῦς. Sulla possibilità di un’emotività intellettiva.
This contribution focuses on Plato's Phaedrus palinode; in particular, it aims to draw attention to the fact that the life of the intellect (the charioteer) manifests itself physiologically through the body of the lover. The intellect of the palinode is not a mere faculty, but an agent capable of feeling dismay and desire, emotional states that are mirrored in the physiology of the body. Insisting on this physiological aspect of the intellect's workings can be very useful because it helps to dismantle the widespread representation of Platonic thought known as austere dualism.
Copyright (c) 2025 Stefano Pone https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
La divinazione come capacità noetica: Platone, Aristotele, Cratippo.
The purpose of the contribution is to rediscuss the widespread idea that in ancient thought divination is incompatible with intellection. To that end, Plato, Aristotle and Cratippus of Pergamum will be considered. In particular, Plato's Symposium, Phaedrus and Timaeus, in which the link between nous and divination, albeit not explicitly stated, is nevertheless present; Aristotle's De philosophia, in which divination is linked to noetic faculty. Finally, the theory of divination of Cratippus of Pergamum, which can be derived from Cicero's De divinatione. Plato, Aristotle and Cratippus constitute a line of thought a line of thought based on the primacy of nous as the supreme cognitive faculty and, as a consequence, the only power capable of exerting divination.
Copyright (c) 2026 stefano pone https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Reincarnation in the Speech of Aristophanes
This article examines Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, focusing on its myth of humanity’s division and the search for wholeness. Traditional interpretations view the myth either as a folktale (Dover) or as a tragic denial of true fulfillment (Hyland). However, these readings leave unresolved the puzzle of why present-day humans, not literally split by Zeus, nonetheless search for lost halves. The paper proposes that the speech presupposes reincarnation: we are not mere descendants of the primordial spherical beings but reincarnations of them, carrying forward both their division and their longing for completion. Two textual features support this reading. First, Aristophanes’ cosmology—describing proto-humans as spherical, like heavenly bodies—evokes Pythagorean doctrines of a spherical, rotating earth, often linked in Plato’s myths to reincarnation and the cycle of rebirth. Second, the comparison of proto-human reproduction to cicadas suggests symbolic resonance with metamorphosis and rebirth, as cicadas were culturally associated with immortality and reincarnation. By situating Aristophanes’ speech within the broader context of Platonic cosmological myths, the article argues that reincarnation resolves the apparent contradiction of the myth and provides an implicit eschatology: through love, one may rediscover one’s other half and potentially escape the cycle of rebirth.
Copyright (c) 2025 Ryan Christensen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Fate in Porphyry's Letter to Marcella: Providence, free will and the ascent of the soul.
This article examines Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella to elucidate his Neoplatonic conception of fate, Providence, and free will, focusing on their roles in the soul’s ascent to the divine. Although the term heimarmenē (fate) is absent, Porphyry frames human life as a cosmic journey within a Providential order, where the soul, guided by virtue and "right philosophy," navigates trials to achieve union with the divine. Integrating Platonic henology and Aristotelian ontology, Porphyry presents fate as a dynamic force subordinate to Providence, allowing individuals to exercise free will in overcoming bodily passions. Through metaphors of gold and iron chains, he contrasts the seductive pull of pleasure with the liberating potential of suffering, emphasizing intellectual purification and adherence to divine law as pathways to divinization. The Letter serves as both a personal exhortation to Marcella and a philosophical treatise, underscoring the interplay of divine guidance and human agency. This analysis highlights Porphyry’s non-fatalistic view of destiny, where Providence ensures cosmic rationality while free will empowers the soul’s ascent, offering insights into Neoplatonic soteriology.
Copyright (c) 2026 Jacob Buganza https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Teleology in the coordination of the whole in Metaphysics Λ10
This article aims to offer an alternative reading of the opening passage of Metaphysics Λ10. The passage in question, corresponding to 1075a11-25, is often interpreted as an Aristotelian attempt to present the Prime Mover as a unifying cause of the universe, while also paving the way for a cosmic teleology in Aristotle’s philosophy. The reading proposed here suggests that, in this passage, Aristotle is not necessarily arguing for the relation of all things with the Prime Mover, so that the imitative aspect would not play a fundamental role in the argument as well. The article also examines the role of Λ10 within the context of Aristotelian teleology, offering brief considerations on how this teleology tends to be interpreted, and discusses the relationship between teleology and the imitation of the Prime Mover.
Copyright (c) 2025 Renan Eduardo Stoll https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Plato’s Conception of Pleonexia as Structural Excess
This paper reconstructs Plato’s conception of pleonexia as a flaw. Drawing on material from the Laws, Timaeus, Symposium, and Republic, it argues that Plato understands pleonexia as an excess that disrupts proportion and undermines natural order—whether in bodies, seasonal cycles, cities, or souls. The paper concludes that Plato’s account offers conceptual resources for countering the pleonectic worldview defended by figures like Callicles in the Gorgias.
Copyright (c) 2025 Christen Zimecki https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Εργου καιρον: notas de Marx sobre a divisão do trabalho em Platão
In Karl Marx's Capital we can read a long note dealing with a passage from Plato's Republic, more specifically from Book II in the part where Socrates is founding the city in the speech (369c-370d). Marx uses the passage to exemplify the ancients' point of view regarding the social division of labor. Marx's aim is to establish a critique of the capitalist mode of production and the division of labor among moderns as it presents itself in the manufacturing system of bourgeois society. According to Marx, there is an appropriation of capital over social labor time, transforming full-time workers into partial and unilateral workers from the decomposition of a craft activity into its various fragmented operations. In this way, the worker loses his autonomy and his ability to know the totality of the craft to become a mere cog in a total mechanism that belongs to him. Our aim is to analyze the passage in which Marx speaks of the division of labor in Plato's Republic and the opportune time to do the work so as not to lose it [ἔργου καιρὸν διόλλυται]. For Plato, the division of labor is necessary for the social development of human beings and the role of each person within the city. From this perspective, we intend to investigate the passage within Plato's work itself and relate it to Marx's interpretation. Finally, we will briefly explain the importance of omnilateral education in the field of professional and technological education and how Plato and Marx are essential thinkers for the improvement of future research on the subject.
Copyright (c) 2025 Luiz Maurício Bentim da Rocha Menezes https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Laura Liliana Gómez Espíndola, Aristóteles. Necesidad y responsabilidad moral, Cali: Universidad del Valle – Programa Editorial, 2024, p. 334.
El libro de Laura Liliana Gómez Espíndola sobre los conceptos de “necesidad” y de “responsabilidad moral” en Aristóteles constituye el resultado coherente de un recorrido de investigación que tiene como antecedente notable la publicación en el año 2016 de un libro sobre los mismos ejes problemáticos, pero en el pensamiento del estoicismo.[1] La vuelta a Aristóteles, según dice la autora en la Introducción del libro, obedece a la voluntad de establecer hasta qué punto la filosofía práctica del estagirita permite superar los riesgos del determinismo extremo; esto es, los riesgos de que, en un mundo en el que los fenómenos naturales parecen estar gobernados por una causalidad necesaria, se desdibujen los márgenes de la voluntad humana con relación a la posibilidad de tener el control de sus propias acciones.
Copyright (c) 2025 Luciano Ciruzzi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
L’argomento del terzo uomo (TMA) e Platone
After a historiographical reconstruction of the Third Man Argument (TMA), anciently interpreted against the Platonic doctrine of ideas, the third and fifth aporia of Parmenides as well as the aporia of Republic and that of Timaeus are analyzed, only in the modern era interpreted as four other forms of the TMA. My intent is to show on the contrary that Plato has never really taken into account the TMA due to its dialectical inconsistency and constructs his aporias in order to clarify mainly and at different levels the reason why the idea/form is one and can only be but one, unlike the non-eidetic multiplicity.
Copyright (c) 2025 Vittorio Ricci https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Hylomorphism from Aristotle to Descartes – a review of a recent book on the history of hylomorphism
Copyright (c) 2025 Marco Zingano https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Has εὐβίοτος in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ix Been Mistranslated?
The term, εὐβίοτος, “living well” and its cognates appear in Aristotle’s observations of bird life in Historia Animalium ix. This research note compares the way Aristotle’s term was rendered in Greek, Latin, and Arabic manuscripts, and in modern and contemporary translations in English, French, and German, to argue that it has been rendered infelicitously, beginning with the 15th-century humanist translators, George of Trebizond and Theodore Gaza. The liberties taken in over-interpreting Aristotle’s term might have obscured what he was trying to communicate about bird capabilities.
Copyright (c) 2025 Chelsea Harry https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Experiencing failure: the twofold cause of error in Stoicism
According to Stoicism, nature has endowed us with reason, enabling us, through the function of kataleptic impressions, to perceive the world truly. Yet most people deviate from this ideal. To explain this, the Stoics identify two causes: (a) the persuasiveness of impressions and (b) the teachings of our associates. While both Galen and Posidonius challenge the validity of these causes, and many scholars highlight their complexity, this paper aims to provide a deeper Stoic foundation for them. As I will propose, addressing these two causes requires a comprehensive analysis of several aspects of Stoic ontology, epistemology, and causation. This paper argues that the persuasiveness of impressions is rooted, on the one hand, in the intricate causal structure of the Stoic world and the similarities between the causal interactions our soul establishes with virtue and preferable externals, and, on the other hand, in the resemblance between the affections experienced in both passions and virtuous emotions—specifically, the experience of expansion and contraction of the soul when we gain or are deprived of something. Furthermore, I will contend that the influence of associates affects our evaluative judgments due to the causal power of beliefs, which is continually reinforced by the persuasiveness of relevant impressions. To support these conclusions, a detailed examination of both the Stoic theory of causation and the status of sayables in Stoic ontology is essential.
Copyright (c) 2025 Panagiotis Poulakidas https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Aristotle, Metaph. Γ4 1008b2-1009a5 Revisited: πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς (Appendix with new text, translation and commentary)
In this paper I offer a new reading of the final arguments of Metaphysics Γ4, from a cognitive approach. Against a number of different positions, I argue that the passage 1008b2-1009a5 provides arguments that are not contained in the preceding proofs of the chapter. Furthermore, I try to show that these arguments are not dislocated but that, under this approach, they are revealed to be articulated under the same subject relative to mental states and contents, and also by the same objective: to preserve the cognitive thesis with which Aristotle characterizes the principle of non-contradiction in Γ3 1005b11-14. Given the discrepancies between the editors of the text and the difficulties arising from textual paradosis, I have once again revised manuscripts J, E and Ab. The results of that examination include lectiones never before noted, one of which (from ms. J) improves, in my judgment, the difficult argument presented between lines 1008b3-10. The final part of this study offers the results of my examination in the form of a new text of the entire passage, with translation and commentary
Copyright (c) 2025 Eduardo Mombello https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The First Approach to Essence in Aristotle's Research on Substance (Metaphysics VII 4 - Portuguese Translation with Notes)
The concept of essence plays a crucial role in the research on substance that takes place in Book VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Chapter VII 4 contains the first approach to it in Book VII. In this difficult text, essence is examined from an abstract point of view that sets the basis for the remaining discussions of the subject throughout Book VII. My purpose here is to place Metaphysics VII 4 under a new light by means of a new Portuguese translation with explanatory notes. The translation avoids such interventions in the transmitted text as have been frequently made by contemporary editors. It also aims at keeping as much as possible the reading of manuscripts E and J. The comments are intended to justify the choices made as to the edition and the translation of the text and also to clarify the content of the chapter.
Copyright (c) 2025 Raphael Zillig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Três traduções recentes de Aristóteles para a língua nacional: uma da Metafísica e duas da Ética Nicomaqueia
Copyright (c) 2024 Marco Zingano https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Aristóteles, Primeiros Analíticos II, 23-27: tradução e notas
This is an annotated translation of the last five chapters of the second book of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. My aim is to provide Portuguese-speaking readers with a clear text, supplemented by materials that elucidate and contextualize Aristotle’s work, addressing a notable gap in the Lusophone bibliographical universe. To achieve this, I have based my translation on Ross’s edition of the Aristotelian text and compared it with various existing translations and commentaries.
Copyright (c) 2024 Tomás Troster https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Sobre la posibilidad de una noción de campo perceptivo en Aristóteles: notas sobre De sensu 7
Argumento a favor de una interpretación alternativa de la analogía entre sustrato sensible y facultad sensitiva ubicada en De sensu 7, 449a5-20, en el contexto de una discusión en torno a si es posible percibir simultáneamente dos cosas. Mientras que la lectura estándar propone limitar el alcance de la analogía a un argumento que explica cómo se constituye la captación de objetos sensibles particulares en nuestra experiencia perceptiva, yo sostengo que, además de ello, la analogía puede ser explicativa del surgimiento de algo así como un campo perceptivo i.e. la totalidad compleja, continua y unitaria de la apariencia perceptiva que sirve como correlato a nuestro estado de vigilia. Para ello, el giro interpretativo crucial tiene que ver con el locus de las cualidades sensibles, mientras que la interpretación estándar considera necesario que se trata de cualidades sensibles que inhieren en el mismo sustrato material, en mi lectura el pasaje también puede leerse a la luz de la captación de cualidades sensibles separadas que están en sustratos numéricamente distintos.
Copyright (c) 2024 Claudio Vera del Canto https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
I offer here a translation into Portuguese of De genitura of the Hippocratic Collection, the first part of De genitura/De natura Pueri, which is the first text the tradition transmitted entirely about the origin of the semen and embryology. The translation is introduced by a brief description of the author and the text and accompanied by footnotes which are intended to clarify the text and the context.
Copyright (c) 2024 Silvio Marino https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Les conséquences tragiques pour Parménide d'une erreur d'Aristote
The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an "error" of Aristotle, inherited by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the "opinions of mortals". In 1795 G.G.Fülleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two "parts", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected.
Copyright (c) 2024 Nestor-Luis Cordero https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
A new collation and text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8]
In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.
Copyright (c) 2024 Victor Gonçalves de Sousa https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0