Communication, evidentiary discipline

RESUMO

O artigo reflete sobre a presença de estudos de caso na pesquisa comunicacional, relacionando-os ao paradigma indiciário. Explicita como características desse modelo epistemológico: o estudo de casos; a busca de indícios para percepção de fenômenos mais complexos; a distinção entre indícios essenciais e acidentais; e a articulação entre indícios para elaboração de inferências. Sobre os indícios articulados, considera a construção de modelos interpretativos em dois níveis de inferências: sobre regras internas de funcionamento do caso e sobre sua inserção em contextos de interesse do pesquisador.

Palavras-chave: campo da comunicação, paradigma indiciário, modelos epistemológicos, inferências

ABSTRACT

Th is article is a refl ection upon the presence of case studies in research on the fi eld of communication, relating them to the evidentiary paradigm. It considers as traits of this epistemological model: case studies; the search for evidence in order to grasp more complex phenomena; the distinction between essential and accidental evidence; and the articulation among diff erent pieces of evidence in order to build inferences. As for the articulated evidence, it considers the construction of interpretative models on two levels of inference: about the internal working rules of a case and about its inclusion into contexts that might be of interest to the researcher.

Key words: fi eld of communication, evidentiary paradigm, epistemological models, inference

Introduction

I´ve debated, with students, a Jean Piaget´s (1971) text which the author examines the social sciences starting from the epistemological models they adopt in their knowledge construction, categorizing the disciplines as nomothetic(1), historical, normative and philosophical. Two points are interesting on this debate. The problem of "situating" the communication studies; and of knowing if we still can characterize a discipline, as a whole, inside an unique epistemological model. A simple answer to the first question is that the communication studies would probably be in a scope not related by Piaget, of the interpretative disciplines(2). But exactly, the perspective we have about the second question is that of recognizing, today, that each one of the human and social sciences unfold themselves, on their own researches and on the interfaces with the others, in a variety of epistemological models – in function of the specific objetives of each research, of the disciplinal subaries specialization, of the theoretical approaches which adopt and/or construct and the relations that they build with the researched social reality(3).

More than "categorizing" disciplines, it´s about reflecting the usages that they make of certain knowledge production models. The current article´s title doesn´t correspond to the affirmation that "Communication is an evidentiary discipline", but that it refers to the intention of examining some conceptual and/or methodological questions when the field researches assume that perspective: Communication "when" evidentiary discipline.

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An important nomothetic paradigm contribution, on the knowledge construction, is to provide verifiable perceptions about procedural regularities into the social phenomena. In the communication area, however, hardly ever we find nomothetic researches. We are going to search for our general abstract propositions, with which we are going to maintain the researching work, in three main sources:

a) laws and regularities expressed on nearby areas´theories– especially sociology and linguistics, but also occasionally on another man´s nomothetic sciences (demography,economy,psychology...);

b) knowledge about the world, derived from another observation and analysis ways, in non-nomothetic disciplines (normative, ethnographic,historical,interpretative...) that, approaching or not communication questions they achieved to constitute recognition spaces about human and social phenomena sufficiently wide-ranging to be used as established knowledge and as theoretical-methodological foundation transferable to Communication questions;

c) wide-ranging propositions derived from essayistic elaborations or philosophical speculation – generated directly "in the area" or starting from nearby areas when they think about questions of their interest, but that merge with concerns in the communication area.

It´s sure that these aports are relevants and they´ve provided pertinent foundation to researches in the area. On the other hand, a strict dependence regarding such aports presents problems. The perceived regularities - which in fact exist and apparently were the first that impressed the researchers from the area – seem today insufficient on their wide-ranging exposition to, by themselves, cope with the phenomena´s complexity. They offer "general" affirmations where, today, we need to perceive fine distinctions.

The nearby areas´ theories,even when they deal directly with communication, they do it with attribution of greater relevance to usual questions from the area itself, before which the communication phenomena are co-stars– what doesn´t help in the disemboweling effort of the "communication object" and of the relevant questions to the field.

The derived perspectives from essayistic or speculative formulation – recognizing their relevance in macro appropriations – don´t make feasible the distinction elaboration among specific phenomena inside the wide-ranging grasp , nor are suitable for, typically the construction of expressed relations between abstract proposition and specific concrete reality.

Such limits suggest the possibility that, next to these references scopes, the area develops other theoretical elaboration spaces as well, not primarily turned to the formulation of wide-ranging regularities, but, closer to the phenomena of its interest, trying to develop there, on the concrete nature of "particular" , foundantion related to the construction of the studies field.

With a double concern, of communication field construction by disemboweling of its object, directly into the society´s scope, and the search for space in which articulations are developed

between specific reality and theoretical generation, Carlo Ginzburg´s case studies and the "evidentiary paradigm" seem to compose a well-adjusted epistemological model to the area´s necessities.

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Case studies

In the projects sent to the fomentation agencies, in newspapers´ articles, on the debates at congresses, in the candidates´ projects for post – graduation, we notice a significant number of case studies – showing up that that research modality has interested the researchers from the area.On the other hand, I haven´t found many systematized reflections about the epistemological meaning of that studies scope to the communication field, nor methodological indications derived directly from communication researches.

Howard Becker observes, about case studies, that "the method supposes that it can be acquired knowledge appropriately from the phenomenon starting from the intense exploration of an unique case." (1993:117)

In contrast to the case studies, the researches of nomothetic clipping involve the search and the establishment of wide-ranging laws and regularities, which are manifested on different objects and situations (which are joined exactly by such detected regularities) . They work with few variables and are based on a "reduction" of the objects and situations, abstracting the elements considered singular or episodic with reference to the interest regularities – exactly for not having relevance to the "constitution" of the observed regularity.

In communication, the nomothetic research shortage seems to derive from the difficulty of eliminating singular traits and of concetrating the concern in common elements to a class of events (what would permit the determination of wide-ranging regularities) – difficulty resulting from the interactional phenomenon´s complexity. Among the communication processes, their objects, their circumstances and their context, there are relations that, if omitted, would prevent the clear perception of the phenomena.

Besides, the communication phenomena, into the contemporary society, present a very dynamic diachrony – not only as a result of the technological advances, but also of the social interactional processes that are correspondingly diversified.

The case studies, therefore, are particularly suitable for the knowledge production in current conditions of the discipline constitution. We find " a dynamic variety of phenomena" that clearly requests a grasp of its properly communication aspects, and "we don´t have the use of a sufficient provision of great rules" of own basic to the field, with transverse theoretical formalizations to the object generalities, nor sufficiently consensual, that permit to make preliminary reductions.

Turned to the singular phenomena analysis, the case studies seem to may be directed to at least four articulated purposes:

a) to produce rigorous and diversified knowledge about a phenomena plurality that are intuitively perceived as of interest to the area.

b) to ensure articulation elements and tensioning among reality situations and previous wide-ranging abstract propositions (particular situations versus established knowledge);

c) by own logic of the evidentiary processes, to produce propositions of growing abstraction "from concrete realities";

d) to be characterized as scope of greater success probability on the "disemboweling" of communication questions directly related to the phenomena "into the society" (see Braga,2004)

However, the absence of a clear reflection and of debates about the epistemological case studies possibilities to the constitution in the knowledge area leads to the risk of some potential aports don´t get fully achieved. That may happen because the own nature of the analysis modality (focused on singular situations) leads to the dispersal of the studies amid the objects varieties; or because, in the absence of closer theories to the communication field, the nearby areas´ theories that are set as auxiliary of our research perform a diverting attraction, when it´s about elaborating more general theoretical statements.

Beside these risks, of dispersion and of centrifuge derivation other guidings of case studies may result in reduced contribution to developments in the knowlege area constitution. One of these "diversions" happens when the studied case serves only to confirm a theory: it´s said abstractly

"about an object", based on theories aprioristicly chosen, showing that it conforms to the perspectives by these expressed.

Another diversion occurs when the case is worked only in the empirical grasp of the singular thing – providing its "descriptively" working, without making inferences, or just making technique inferences. "All" the perceived angles are detailed, intuitive or systematically raised(4), without establishing relevance orders, or just of impressionistic way, not expressly justified. Although that may have a practical usefulness, it doesn´t represent knowledge advance. Here, there isn´t neither the object´s tensioning by theoretical perspectives nor these by the object. It´s about opposite risks: in the first alternative, it´s not given enough attention to the case in its empirical singularities; in the second, the effort of advancing from the empirical verifications to the theoretical development is not made.

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The four designated risks (dispersal, centrifuge derivation,empirism and apriority) can be faced through some relative guidings to the evidentiary paradigm.

The evidence and the evidenced thing

The article *Sinais, raízes de um paradigma indiciário*, from Carlos Ginzburg (1989: 143- 179), offers a deepened reflection about the history and characteristics of the evidentiary paradigm.We infer from the author´s perspectives, related them to considerations about case studies (in Howard Becker, 1993) and the research methods (in Peter Burke,2000), that the following strategies may be faced as central: the singular case studies; the search for evidence that remits to phenomena not immediately evident; the distinction between essential and accidental evidence; the mutual tensioning between theory and object, the articulation work among selected evidence, and the derivation of inferences.

The own work´s logic with singular situations relates directly the evidentiary paradigm with the case studies. Ginzburg observes, in different ways of knowing that are traditionally characterized as evidentiaries, "a guided attitude to *the analysis of individual cases*, reconstructible only through clues,symptoms,evidence" (1989:154 – our italicize)

These ways of traditional knowings present as basic substrate their involvement with the experience´s concrete nature.

Despite the proximity with the concrete, the evidentiary doesn´t correspond to privilege exclusively the empirical. The paradigm´s basis is not to reap and to describe evidence – but to select and organize to make inferences. An empiricist perspective would only stay into the information accumulations and facts concerning the singular object. Diversely, the evidentiary paradigm implies to make propositions of general order from the singular obtained facts.

A relevant question is that articulation among the empirical facts and general orders propositions. "what characterize that knowing is the capacity for, from apparently negligent facts, *rebuild a complex reality not directly experimentally"* (idem:152 our italicize).

After referring the primitive hunting processes as probable origin of that knowledge model, Ginzburg observes its historical development through varied practical knowings and of knowledge disciplines – always based on the fundamental relation between evidence and more general perception.

So it shows how it reached, from concrete evidence, in specific circumstances, to a superior order knowledge to the descriptive, leading it to the perception of more complex realities about the singular phenomenon.

If reality is opaque, there are privileged zones – signs, evidence – that permit to decipher it. That idea, that constitutes the essential evidentiary paradigm´s point (...), got into the most varied cognitive scope, modeling deeply the human sciences (Ginzburg, 1989:177).

There is always a relation among evidence and an angle of things to which that evidence will be "revealing". But not automatically: it´s necessary to make articulations among clues and to make inferences. Then, two perception levels are necessary. To perceive the evidence itself (that is : that an apparently irrelevant fact may be significant) and to develop relations with a searched proposition: to make inferences. It involves to distinguish between essential and accidental evidence.

Essential and accidental

As the evidence are the perceptible elements of the case to be studied, it´s about, logically, making extensive and detailed raising of the traits that characterize the object. However, the proliferation of facts, processes and details makes evident that a task that was exhaustively descriptive claimed would be impossible. We wouldn´t stop adding facts, from the most obvious to the most insignificant.

So it´s necessary (as usual, in science) to operate selections - to "reduce" the object and its most significant elements. That abstraction gesture presents difficulties. The nomothetic sciences make a systematic and generalized reduction of assumed elements (by a theory) as irrelevant. Saussure establishes his linguistics in a radical abstraction gesture, separating the languague from the speech (in this last one we find the singular proliferating facts) and so,being able to research regularities of the linguistics code.

In the singular study, as it´s evident, we can´t have "general" aprioristic rules that determine the "eliminations" to be done(5). So, we have to derive *ad-hoc* criteria and therefore tentative, to make the separation between essential and accidental evidence.

The distinctions among evidence depend on at least three determinants:

  a) the research problem – that is , the kind of perception that we search regarding our case;

  b) the object´s structures and processes or situation - its "logics" of internal articulation, development , relations with the context;

  c) the available knowledge about the kind of object and about the scope in which this is processed – what mainly involves, but not exclusively, the theoretical knowledge.

Those three determinants are mutually affected. Even the singular situation logics in exam, which would seem at first glance"objectives" (because they´re part of the object itself), they´re not exclusively determinants – a complex object works according to multiple logics, related to internal aspects and differentiated contextual. According to our research question, we´ll be interested in pointing out some of those logics and we´ll give less relevance to others. According to the available theories, we can perceive some procedurals and even we can have access to others, historical or conjuncturally "unthinkable".

That situation demands tentative processes, through the gone and comings among the three determinants, using indications of each one of them to question and to test the others – in a mutual tensioning process.

So we´ll be looking for discovering relations among evidence (not defined yet as valid to the research: we could call them "candidates evidence" and the evidenced thing – also not calculated yet, once it depends on the selection and articulation processes of the evidence.It leads to risks and problems to the research rigor – there aren´t biunivocal evident relations between evidence and evidenced situation. A same evidence can be a clue to different interpretative possibilities; and a complex situation "presents" different evidence, without clear distinction between essential and accidental. So, we risk to attribute relevances not pertinent and we risk to take an evidence as a mistaken clue to an unsustainable inference.

Ginzburg studies common procedurals between Giovanni Morelli´s method (in the end of the 20th century) in order to attribute the authorship of old works of art, and Sigmund Freud´s psychoanalysis (relating it also to the use of clues to unmask police mysteries, in Conan Doyle´s work). Morelli proposes to examine,on the sets "the most negligents details " (Ginzburg, 1989:144) like a drawing of the ears lobe, the nails, the shape of the toes. In these details, the painter would express personal style less influenced by concerning school characteristics – and less attentively observed by an imitator.

It´s interesting to point out the emphasis into the "negligent". When we are searching for the essential elememts, that could look like a contradiction. However we perceive here, extactly, the interventions of factors that exceed the mere emprirical concrete nature of the object itself. When Morelli proposes to "examine the most negligent details", he´s suggesting that, in function of its "case"problematization - to distinguish copies and authentics, to make correct authorship attribution – a different fragmentation between essential and accidental from the usual. The "most obvious" fragmentation was determined by "another" problem – of designating in a set of pictures previously assumed as authentics, certain evidence that exceed the set and are demarcated in a relevant way as the author´s style characterizing elements gesture. In the Freudian psychoanalysis, the search for "unnoticed" elements (that appear as direct unconscious emanation) is essential to discover deep structures of the individual´s psyche – while the most evident traits of personality,

being conscious, can be intentionally "worked" to get adjusted to the accepted cultural standards. This last evidence would be clue to another question – of cultural behavior expressed by the individual into society – for example, in the social psychology researches.

Besides this research work for relevance among the clues and the research objectives, we have also to underline that the evidence doesn´t send "in a direct way" to the reality to be captured. It´s from the set of evidence related by the research that can be inferred logics, processes and structures that characterize the case. Occasionally some evidence may look irrelevant – and they just acquire evidentiary value by their articulation with the others.

It´s still necessary to perceive the tensionings among the evidence themselves. "To understand an author´s sense it´s necessary to agree all the opposite passages" (Pascal, Fragment 694 – quoted by Goldman, 1970:95). It also corresponds to the detective Hercule Poirot´s proposition, an Agatha Christie´s character, as criterion to judge proposed "solutions" to a crime: a good solution must explain not only the clues that compete for an interpretation , but also the ones that seem to contradict it.

So, it´s part, of the case studies the (a) to raise evidence work; (b) to decide its relevance for the object and for the research question; and (c) to articulate sets deriving, from there, inferences about the phenomenon. It can be done through a triangular tensioning among empirical situation,theoretical basis and research problem.

Mutual tensioning between theory and empirical object

Beyond the observation processes and evidence raising, it´s necessary, naturally, theoretical foundation in a case study basis. An empiricist vision that would intend to extract knowledge directly from the observed material or situation, "with the naked eye", wouldn´t go further from the superficial descriptions, of common sense or in idiosyncratic persperctives.

On the other hand, to reach to the case study rigidly equipped of irremovable theories also doesn´t promise great knowledge advances. The tendency,there, would be of "demonstrating" that the pre-adopted theoretical vision is able to explain the singular selected case entirely. On that case, the research would be limited to illustrate the theory with one more case. Neither the theory is developed, nor the case knowledge is extended "in its singularity" – limiting the study result to an

object descprition "of that theory´s terms" or to a case characterizing in an aprioristic classifying system. If we research a singular case, beyond of its possible inscription in a theoretical scope or its characterizing based on established classifying system, we have, especially, the expectation of finding "remains": angles not yet completely explained, spaces not entirely covered by the requested theories. It´s on that space that the case study is particularly productive.That kind of reflexive effort is that can be characterized as of the mutual tensioning between theory and object.

More than applying theories and concepts to learn; to categorize or explain completely an object or empirical situation it´s about "creating a problem" of the under cosideration case starting from adopted foundation.This is the object tensioning by the theory. If we determine concepts, premises, hypotheses were adopted, which challenges and questions lead to that kind of case?

In parallel, the object can always loosen questions, it can challenge the theory in the concrete scope. Being abstraction, and being probably developed from the other questions and the world´s materials, it´s not so probable that a theory; in the social and human sciences, could fully cope with all the aspects that are unfolded from other specific cases. By the way, if the adopted theories had to "explain" completely (that is, to our satisfaction) the cases that are interesting for us , there wouldn´t be any reason to research them. That´s the way the object can always, in some way, to make tension on the adopted theories. Not in the sense of denying them, but of complementing with specific angles, of observing differences into the singularity (singular realizations not perceived yet in the general proposition), exceeding the "general" abstract proposition level and searching for perceiveing "internal variations" of this. Such tensionings permit other general hypothetical propositions to the object grasp – that, without necessarily denying the general starting proposition, can designate more interesting persperctives to the cases exam of that kind.

Besides, once our "starting theories" are, in general, received from nearby areas – it´s concerned about the communication field construction, we must search for angles of field speciality not completely worked on those supplier disciplines of general propositions. So, there is a "field" tensioning for which our researches should be particularly aware.

Models construction

The feasible articulated evidence and inferences about the phenomenon can be expressed in "an explanatory model" way of the case. The model construction, in a case study, corresponds to a "reconstructive description" of the object or situations, not based on the superficial sum of the biggest detail numbers, but, in opposite perspective to this, in a reduced number of relevant evidence (clues,symptoms) that - aticulated by the researcher – they approach the look about basic procedural logics that make the object "works", as on its internal organization (articulation among the parts); as on the relations with contexts and other situations which this is relatively in relation , in the researcher´s perspective . Jean Philippi Uzel (1997:26) affirms that "each particular case contains itself a *sui-generis* rule that asks to be inferred". We can consider that, on that models construction level, what the researcher intends is exactly to set out the internal working"rule" of a case, through the evidence which it had access.

According to Howard Becker, "(the) model provides answers to the study theoretical questions and it demonstrates the contribution of each part of the structure to the phenomenon explanation in question" (1993:127).

The task that is put forward to the researcher is to make the material series´ passage (evidence related amongst themselves) to the evidenced series (the perceived reality indirectly, through the evidence). As such articulation is not evident by itself, it depends on the inferences elaboration. The difficulties to be faced on that task are of at least three orders:

a) there aren´t logical processes (algorithmic) to the discovery of relations among the evidence "in selection"(6) and the situation and its social context. These realtions should, therefore, be tentatively prepared;

b) several phenomena may produce similar evidence – so that is not possible to rebuild directly from the evidence to the phenomenon (and its "cause" in the phenomenon) by strictly inductive processes (from the effect to the cause, from the experience to its principle, from the consequent to the antecedent);

c) the initial hypotheses of the case´s general grasp– its own initial definition, while "case" – probably are based on "initially" more evident evidence, and/or in dependant premises of the established knowledge (theories) about the phenomena classes in which we inscribe the

case. It means that we´ve already started from prior ideas, that in some way, lead to the reflection, must, therefore, be tensioned by the research. So, the basic *démarche* in a case study, regarding the treatment of its hypotheses, corresponds to assume that the "starting"perceptions are excessively simple or even mistaken. The research work involves (in opposite perspective to the nomothetic, that wants to confirm or to invalidate a rigorous and initial specific proposition) to develop, to make them more complex, to deepen, to adjust or even to substitute the starting hypoteses by others, more appropriated to the set of available evidence, systematically raised and articulated.

The produced models about the set of evidence, through inferences and descriptive construction, remain hypothetical. Such "final hypoteses", will be, however, submitted to two "test" levels. On a first level, by the observation of their own competence to effectively establish relevance to the evidence and to articulate those evidence in an object´s "perceptive picture" . So, we can say that it´s about a good model that the evidence are coherently articulated, confirming its relevance; and inferences are made evidently derived from the organized facts. In that sense, the explanatory model and the developed inferences may produce an obvious thing impression".

However, the inferences must go through a second test level: the falseability confrontation resulting from objections. There, it´s not about disagreement proposals starting from that or that established theory – once that the disagreement would be mutual, between the singular model and the theory, remaining in suspended and dependant of posterior advances to know which one would be closer to a rigorous vision of things. The falseability depends on designating , in the object, contradictory evidence with the model; or of indicating the articulation incoherence hipothesized. The most interesting objections are those which show the modelization insufficiency proposed to the case, discussing the articulation´s coherence or the pertinence of what was inferred.

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In function of those difficulties designated above , to make inferences about a phenomeno that was given,starting from the evidence of a singular case, requires a "discovering" or "invention" work which is, inevitably, a risking process. As Ginzburg indicates, "it´s about the inference

that Peirce called 'presumptive' or 'abductive', distinguishing it from the simple induction"
(1989:264 note 38).

Jean Philippe Uzel,in turn, observes:

The abduction, that Peirce describes as "the unique logical operation that introduces a new idea
(5.171)", corresponds in fact to the precise moment of the creation of the explanatory
hypothesis, hypothesis that must be validated next of empirical way (induction), and after
verified (deduction) by the multiplication of experiences or of survey (1997:27 – our
translation).

The particular case modelization is what permits the passage to the other referred level by Uzel
– through the comparison of singular cases models. On that level, the particular case study
exceeds the production of punctual knowledge to serve as basis to more wide-ranging
theorizations.

Transversal inferences

The evidentiary "descriptions" of singular cases – exposition of their internal rules and of
articulations with the context – are not strictly limited to the scope of the empirical case. The
deepened knowledge of unique case, in its modelization, is articulated (from resource to the
established social knowledge) to general order propositions.

Howard Becker observes that:

...the case study usually has a double purpose. On the one hand, it tries to reach to a wide-
ranging comprehension of the under consideration group(...) At the same time, (...) it also tries
"to develop more general theoretical statements" about process regularities and social structures
(1993:118 – our italicize).

So, it´s possible to predict, in a case study, two main levels of inferences:

a)   those concerning the specific singular case logics, their internal "working rules";

b)   and those concerning the case insertion in certain social contexts of the research interest –
     in which the concrete conditions study, related to the established knowledge, permits
     general order propositions about the context.

In *O queijo e os vermes* (1987 – one of the microhistory´s foundation texts), Carlo Ginzburg develops, from the analysis of the miller Menocchio´s condemnation by heresy, an encouraged study about the popular culture of the 16th century. It´s about the abductive effort of "seeing the general into the specific" (Burke,200:16) – what is an inverse movement of "classifying" the specific in the general rule already established.

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The amplest knowledge derivation based on evidentiary researches is not based on the premise of "typicalness" or the "representativity" of the singular case – but in the verification of the "existence possibility" of the phenomenon – evenof low frequency or even unique. So, it´s possible, to research and to theorize about the social conditions of that possibility.So, we can make "more general theoretical statements" – it completes the "case theory", beside the clarification of the internal rules and the contextualization logics.

The wide-ranging extension of the developed propositions from a case are not "generalizations" – at least in a sense of the quantitative studies by samplings , or in the nomothetic sense. It´s not about ,on that extension of wide-ranging propositions, of affirming all cases of a set what was discovered for the specific case. But of making abstract inferences ("generics") about the world "in which that case may occur."

Those two levels of inferences production (about the singular case and about its context) are prepared in the specific space of each research. Considering now the research set in the scope of a discipline, we can glimpse a third level of propositions. It´s about the "transversal" inferences and a plurality of comparable cases (by similarity or by differentiation - that permit to derive general propositions about phenomena "classes" and "kinds" of logics and processes in action.

The comparison of singular cases – generating transversal knowledge from a superior order modelization to the individual case – permits to use the evidentiary knowledge, that was developed, as basis to the formulation of the area´s general propositions and as theoretical – methodological foundation to subsequent case studies(7).

On that third level of inferences, that passes through the cases set researched in the discipline, it is found into process the constitution of studies field in communication itself. A general question may

be put forward in the case studies horizon that had some interest to the discipline construction – "what is there, of communication?"

In the previous article (Braga, 2004:225), we´ve observed that the (discipline) construction seems to request a disemboweling of the object and of other perspectives, at the same time in which the elaboration itself, that doesn´t join in the object´s aspects that are fundamental to (its) "comprehension". The case studies offer that possibility, by refusing the aprioristic reduction of contextual elements – relevants to the perception "in situation" of the phenomena communication. While doing a case study, the researcher who inscribes it in reflections about the field will ask what interactional logics are relevant to its working; and how those logics are related to other social processes that characterize the phenomenon. To perceive such relations, it´ll be necessary to infer, through the relevant evidence exam for that, what properly communication is and what derives from social circumstances of other orders, "moluding" the communication.

We find a whole diversity of case studies in the area –broaching production processes, products, reception instances, circulation processes, critical devices, mediation of cultural and social processes; and we still find cases of communication approach about objects in the scope of other knowledge, as well as relevant approaches to other areas about communication phenomena. All that diversity proves the "possibility and the interest " of a general knowledge production through the objects studies and singular situations.

Beyond of that diversified interest, what we especially designate, is that that productively may and must be thought while producer mode of amplier knowledge - constitutive of a collection of theoretical propositions "in the scope itself to the Communication discipline". It´s in that scope that we can consider the Communication an evidentiary discipline.

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1) It´s reffered to the disciplines turned to the investigations (natural and social)

2) Joel Candau(2004:6) observes, however, about that category, that (it´s) still necessary to ask about the interpretation modalities" (our translation)

3) In the sociology field – a discipline originally nomothetic – there are the etnomethodological studies, which are turned to singular studies. In the Psi field, coexist differentiated knowledges , as an experimental nomothetic psychology; and a clinical psychology; which develops evidentiary knowledge.

4) So, not occuring, a distinction work between essential and accidental evidence.

5) At most, we can intend the abstraction derivation rules to "certain kinds" of case, inside a theoretical-methodological specific scope. But that put us in a territory caused by previous case studies.

6) And not "selected". The participle would make supor that the essential evidence would have been completely distinguished, when it starts to relate them among themselves and with process to detect in the phenomenon. Actually, the game of the essential selection, of the articulations and of the inferences are developed of overlapped way, through gone and coming reituradas among the three processes.

7) That processsualidade can be verified in the history of the antropological knowledge.

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