This study aims to analyze the role of Folha de S.Paulo in the so-called “anti-subversive” struggle of the civil-military dictatorship in Brazil, focusing on a campaign of “psychological action” entitled “União Contra a Violência,” published by the newspaper in July 1969. Thus, we seek to further the analysis of the role of journalism as a legitimizing agent of the repressive apparatus of the State, attesting to the role played by Folha in one of the periods of greatest recrudescence of the regime (the creation of Operação Bandeirante) and the clear harmony between the company and the doctrinal precepts of the dictatorship.

THIS WORK IS PART of a research project that seeks to advance evidence on the possible collaboration and responsibility of the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo with the repressive organizations of the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship (1964-1985)1. Of an academic, theoretical-methodological, but also legal and political nature, the project aims to point out the various facets and connections established between different sectors of the business community and the regime in an attempt to pursue sufficient evidence to hold these companies and their managers responsible for relations of complicity with the dictatorship. It conditions, to the field of Communication, a different look at the journalistic practices carried out during the period, and provides a more accurate analysis of the effective involvement of communication companies with the military’s repressive policies.

It is necessary to go beyond, in this sense, from the analyses that are limited to investigating a certain editorial “complicity”or “support” given by newspapers to the 1964 coup or, at the other extreme, their role as resistant victims of the censorship perpetrated by the regime. This work attempts to take into account the active role that journalism played during that period, which allows us to think about the responsibility of these companies more transparently and straightforwardly and their considerable role in consolidating the repressive logic that developed during the dictatorship, according, for example, from what has already been developed by the most recent historiography on the theme (Basualdo, 2016; Campos, 2020; Campos et al., 2020; Verbitsky & Bohoslavsky, 2013).

Starting from this perspective, this article aims to demonstrate how Folha de S.Paulo , during one of the periods of greatest resurgence of the dictatorship, in July 1969, in the creation’s context of Operação Bandeirante (Oban)2, became involved in the elaboration of a campaign of “psychological action”, counter-information and advertising – entitled “Union against Violence” – summoning various sectors of civil society, businesspeople, politicians and the military to mobilize in the so-called struggle against “subversion”. Alongside this, it also aims to draw attention not only to the company’s apparent alignment with the doctrinal precepts of the dictatorship, which culminated in the arrest, torture and death of hundreds of opponents of the regime, but also its leading role and responsibility assumed at that time. This can help to scrutinize specific hegemonic readings about journalistic practice during the dictatorship and the role of Folha de S.Paulo, in particular, in creating a consensus established as supposedly “democratic”.

It is known and acknowledged the role played by the so-called mainstream press in supporting and sustaining the legitimacy of the coup that overthrew President João Goulart in Brazil in 1964 (Abreu, 2005; Bonsanto, 2014; Larangeira, 2014). Classical studies such as Dreifuss (1981) consolidated the interpretation that there was an apparent “solidarity of interests” between an organic elite at that moment, formed by the business intelligentsia, – of which this media sector, most of it, was part – and political and military groups that mobilized economically and politically in ideological campaigns to ensure an “appropriate” climate for military intervention. As a result of this view, we can state that the 1964 coup was also “media-driven” (Silva, 2014) and that the military dictatorship cannot be defined indiscriminately only by its “civil” character since a strong class orientation configures it as “business- military” (Campos et al., 2020; Comparato, 2014).

However, the official narrative of groups such as Folha de S.Paulo continues to state that this “support” would have been punctual and that soon after, they became resistant, when not victims of the authoritarian policies of the regime, later acting with great prominence in the process of re-democratization of the country (Mota & Capelato, 1981; Pilagallo, 2012; Pinto, 2012). Selectively appropriating from the past in an attempt to construct a particular narrative about the period – based on strategies that we previously defined as its “historiographical clichés of self-legitimation” (Bonsanto, 2018; 2021) – Folha de S.Paulo, which in 2009 characterized the military regime as a “soft dictatorship”, it was for a long time recognized, by itself, as the “Diretas newspaper”3. In its last hundredth anniversary, celebrated in 2021, it even called itself a newspaper “at the service of democracy”, promoting free online courses for its readers in the pursuit of teaching new generations what the “horrors” of the dictatorship were (Bonsanto, 2022).

A more critically examined and detailed reading of the newspaper’s performance during the period may reveal other facets. Firstly, there is a necessity to emphasize that the censorship imposed by the military acted both in its repressive and disciplinary character, as the State recognized the importance of the media at that time to disseminate ideas, create collective emotional bonds and legitimize certain consensuses (Ortiz, 1989). On the other hand, there was a relative affinity of interests between the business community and the regime, as we mentioned previously, and, in this sense, it is possible to affirm that the ideology of “security and development” preached by both made (self)censorship a conniving strategy and convenient to further strengthen these close relationships (Bonsanto, 2021). The “pragmatic opportunism” practiced by journalism during the dictatorship helped many companies to enhance their business during the period and, simultaneously, create a positive image of the regime. This harmonious society ran smoothly, exempt from conflict (Aquino, 1999). Their consent was “virtually total” (Smith, 2000), which assures us that for these media companies, there was much more self-censorship than prior censorship and effective control of news production, with a sort of idealization of their combative resistant and victimizing actions occurring a posteriori afterwards (Barbosa, 2006).

Folha de S. Paulo was one of the newspapers that certainly benefited most from this situation, primarily after the acquisition of the group by businessmen Octavio Frias de Oliveira and Carlos Caldeira Filho in 1962, two years before the outbreak of the dictatorship. The company’s official narrative states that it was a time of severe financial difficulties, where journalism was initially left aside so that its directors could prioritize resolving debts and reformulating the group’s organizational and technological structure (Mota & Capelato, 1981; Paschoal, 2007; Pinto, 2012).

Five years after the coup, in 1969, Folha de S.Paulo was positioned as one of the most read and circulated newspapers in Brazil, mainly due to the exponential and significant increase in the company’s vehicle fleet, which went from 24 cars in 1960, to a substantial growth of 165 vehicles. Folha de S.Paulo also boasted of being the owner of the largest and most modern graphic park in Latin America, representing a compound of recently acquired companies, comprising four more printed newspapers – Última Hora (1965), Notícias Populares (1965), Folha da Tarde ( 1967) and Cidade de Santos (1967), – as well as the “Fundação Cásper Líbero” and “Tv Excelsior”, to concentrate only on companies in the communication industry (Bonsanto, 2021).

It must be considered, therefore, that such growth would only have been possible in the face of a straightforward approach between the company and the dictates of power that were taking place at that time. On the occasion of the company’s 50th-anniversary celebrations in 1971, even after the promulgation of AI-5, with the dictatorship forcefully intensifying its repressive apparatus, silencing, torturing and systematically eliminating its opponents, Folha de S.Paulo stated, for example, to remain “deeply identified” with the direction of the nation, by following “the efforts of the Revolution of 64 to rebuild Brazil” (Meio século, 1971).

That is why, in addition to simply complying with the policies imposed by the military, we need to consider the responsibility assumed by the company during the period. This also allows us to affirm that there is a very significant difference between simple consented “support” given by the newspaper to the military and active, reciprocal participation, which certifies support and legitimacy to an authoritarian regime by, at least in the case of Folha de S.Paulo, almost a decade. However, before clarifying to what extent this harmony was present through the company’s journalism, in dialogue with the regime’s prerogatives, it is necessary to better define some concepts arising from the dictatorship’s security doctrine that guided these assertions to a certain extent.

An important document that helps us understand how the dictatorship sought to rationalize its practical doctrines of political action are the manuals of the “Escola Superior de Guerra”. They clearly establish the “National Security Doctrine” and the view, on the part of the military, that we were experiencing a moment of “revolutionary war”, a particular conflict where the presence of the internal and “subversive” enemy was a problem to be addressed, to be fought so that the “revolution” could fully achieve its objectives4.

In this war to achieve national purposes, the Doctrine declared in advance who you should lean on : “This process is the responsibility of the elites [emphasis added], part of which are the people themselves, precisely because of their more effective – and more enlightened – participation in homeland” (Brasil, 1979, p. 34). Due to their “presumed superior qualification”, the “full awareness of their role” and the “patriotism of their actions”, it would be up to the elites, thus, to “indicate the paths to follow”, interpreting the national interests and aspirations so that they disseminate in public opinion the “high values of social coexistence” and the “authentic interests and aspirations” of the ongoing revolutionary process (Brasil, 1979).

The Armed Forces saw themselves, in this sense, as just “one of the combat elements, only occasionally the most important”. This war, they stated, belonged to the entire nation and should be fought in unity, “with the effective participation of the government and the people” (Brasil, 1979, p. 222). For this there were effective instruments, such as an efficient “psychological action”, carried out with the correct use of social communication, propaganda and public relations, creating a current of favorable opinion, focused on “national interests” and which kept the population immune to “subversive action”.

Utilizing psychological warfare was fundamental, in the view of the military, even more so with the “sophistication of contemporary means of communication”, which allowed “to destroy the enemy through the fabulous power of penetrating his spirit and undermining him to the point of nullifying any defense effort, without sometimes having to fire a single shot” (Brasil, 1979, p. 227). Thus, in this war, the main objective would be to “influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviors” of the population in the struggle against subversion. Your “psychological action” plan ought to bring together a series of resources and techniques – which could range from “demonstrations” and requests for help, to “pressure” and “threats” – to generate this predisposition of behaviors in the community, executed in “aggressive and continuous” conduct, in order to act in a preventive, repressive and operative manner (Brasil, 1979, p. 228).

There is still a breach in the historiography of the Brazilian press regarding the role played by journalism in these “psychological action” campaigns during the dictatorship. Whether due to the scarcity of documentation, little explored and systematized, or due to the lack of work more closely related to the dynamics of the newspapers themselves, which are often concerned with analyzing specific issues, such as the simple “support” given to the coup, neglecting the responsibility exercised by many companies in the support and legitimacy of the regime’s repressive policy.

Significant research is being developed in Argentina, such as the work of Risler (2018), which analyzes the “productive dimension” of the dictatorship exercised mainly due to the help of psychological action campaigns carried out by the press in his country. Likewise, in Brazil, the Argentine dictatorship sought to generate forms of consensus and legitimacy about its actions, based above all on the adherence to moral values, order and family and the campaign against the so-called “subversion” and the regime’s internal enemies. Psychological action campaigns were designed as a systematic policy. Acting as “moral correction technologies”, their purpose was to influence the “social minds” of the population in order to guide emotions, impose behaviors and model attitudes and values that were consistent with the repressive policies implemented by the military (Risler, 2018).

Another important work was carried out by Micaela Iturralde (2012; 2014; 2015) in her research on the role of the newspaper Clarín in the psychological action campaigns of the last Argentine dictatorship. According to her, the periodical played a fundamental role in the so-called “campaign against subversion”, working to build a hegemonic consensus to “spread, legitimize and implement” the programmatic lines of the military’s official discourse (Iturralde, 2015). Therefore, Clarín ’s journalism participated as a political actor that sought to intervene explicitly in the course of events, playing a fundamental role in the symbolic construction of the Government led by the Army of its country, and that was responsible, above all, for the legitimization and normalization of its repressive apparatuses (Iturralde , 2012; 2014).

Forwardly, we will see how these actions materialized in the pages of Folha de S.Paulo, along lines very similar to the experiences listed above. Here, we must also emphasize the importance that the Brazilian military gave to the existence of an “effective information system” capable of concretely monitoring subversive movements (Brasil, 1979). Considering this, since the 1964 coup, they have progressively implemented policies – whether “legal” or clandestine – that have made it possible to intensify the instrumentalization of the struggle against subversion. The National Security Law, enacted in March 1967, for example, warranted the normalization of the norms of “internal war”, allowing political opposition activists to be indiscriminately classified as “subversives” and enemies of the nation (Fico, 2001). It was the AI-5 decree, in December 1968, in turn, that “institutionalized” the strategy of security agencies in combating subversive struggle, representing the “legal gateway” to a more efficient and organized repressive structure during the dictatorship (Alves, 1984; Joffily, 2013).

The end of the 1960s also marked the resurgence of the dictatorship’s policies against left-wing combat, mainly in large urban centers. The regime saw these groups as a major threat to sustaining the legitimacy of its government and homeland security, as seen from the perspective of its security doctrine. After having created the National Information Service (NIS) in 1964, and the Information Centers of the Army (CIE), Aeronautics (CISA) and Navy (CENIMAR), in 1967 and 1968, the dictatorship organized what it can be considered one of the most notorious centers of information, prison, torture and death in the State of São Paulo and of the entire regime. Once again, the harmony and collaboration of the political and business elite seemed to be tested, with Folha de S.Paulo ’s journalism a recognized protagonism and participation, as we see.

According to current analyzes of historiography, it was in February 1969, during the First Internal Security Seminar in Brasília, that it formally gave the initiative to create Operation Bandeirante (Oban), a centralized organization for the “anti-subversive campaign” which should operate in São Paulo, as the main center for combating subversion in the country (Fon, 1979; Huggins, 1998; Joffily, 2013). In June 1969, under the command of the general of the II Army, José Canavarro Pereira, a meeting was called to discuss a plan to combat “terrorism” in a more systematic way, which resulted in the solemn act of founding the body, on July 1st. As it is known, the act was attended by several civil and military authorities of the State, as well as political and business figures (Joffily, 2013, p. 42).

There is evidence that the Federation of Industries of São Paulo was directly held accountable for financing the organization, which helped with a “little fund” where significant portions of the São Paulo, national and international business community collaborated. In Gaspari’s book (2002, p. 62) there are reports that groups such as Ford, Volkswagen and Ultragas, for example, lent cars to Oban so he could carry out the repression. Nowadays, due to a series of investigations and reports endorsed by the National Truth Commission itself (Brasil, 2014), it is known that Folha de S. Paulo actively participates in providing its vehicles for the pursuit and capture of opponents of the regime. Cláudio Guerra, former Dops deputy, in a statement to the Commission of the São Paulo Journalists Union, stated that the dictatorship’s agents used the company’s cars “to enact surveys and place wiretaps because the press car did not attract attention. Back then it was not as easy as it is today (...) and the car was great for that” (Bellintani et al., 2017, p. 44).

Due to its initially illegal and clandestine character, Oban was never formalized institutionally. This ensured them a certain “dynamism” and “flexibility” to implement their repressive activities, since in theory they did not even need to be responsible for their actions (Joffily, 2013). On June 28th, 1969, in an indirect mention of the creation of the organization Folha even reported that São Paulo was executing a “plan to combat terrorism”. In an interview with the newspaper, the then governor of the State, Abreu Sodré, did not give further details, saying only that “the plan is confidential”, but he already left a clear message to the population: “Now we too are going on the offensive” (“São Paulo executa”, 1969).

Even though they maintained a certain amount of secrecy about the organization’s configuration, internal documents later produced by the military described what its functions would be. Oban, as a joint and coordinated operation between several organizations, aimed to “identify, locate and capture the members of subversive groups” in São Paulo, with the purpose of “destroying or at least neutralizing the organizations to which they belong”5. To this end, they had a specific center designed to “develop guidelines and trigger psychological action”, as well as undertake “counter-propaganda anti-terrorist” campaigns6.

As we sought to demonstrate in this article, Oban did not conduct its psychological action and counter-propaganda work alone. As the document above highlighted, this operation needed to be carried out in a “joint and coordinated” manner. Professional journalism, represented by sectors of the mainstream press, worked in this sense as a fundamental agent in configuring the dictatorship’s counter-information policies, acting with recognized protagonism and legitimizing certain consensuses in the struggle against subversion.

Folhade S.Paulo , back then, seemed to be a very engaged and supportive vehicle for national security guidelines. On July 1st, considered to be the formal date of the founding of Operação Bandeirante, the newspaper printed on its cover the “sincere congratulations” it received from Marshal Costa e Silva, then “president” of the Republic, for “always faithfully informing the population” (“Costa e Silva congratula-se”, 1969). Already on the 5th, the newspaper showed us signs of the articulation that was taking place between the local business community and the repression, by reporting the “solidarity” and “trust” given by “company men” to the police and military commands. In the form of the then president of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), Theobaldo de Nigris, Folha spotlighted the business community’s repulsion towards subversive movements: “It is necessary to retaliate with energy against all attacks perpetrated by the elements that hide behind of this agitation” (“Solidariedade dos empresários”, 1969).

Here it is worth a brief parenthesis to draw attention to how these speeches between the business community and the regime seemed to take place, even if in a veiled and not apparent way. On the same July 5th, Folha ran an advertisement from Ford, published in other editions throughout the month, about its F-350 trucks, the very known “Ford Forte”, a vehicle that, according to the publication, “performs the services that requires speed, efficiency, strength and economy”. This unpretentious advertising could have gone unnoticed, if it weren’t for the fact that the advertisement (Figure 1) featured trucks of distribution from Folha de S.Paulo itself and the company Ultragas, both, like Ford, recognized as being involved in “strong” and “efficient” services that, through the transfer of their cars to the military, collaborated with the dictatorship’s repressive actions, many culminating in illegal arrest, torture, death and disappearance of political activists7.

The newspaper’s publications thus showed the degree of harmony between business, political and military groups, who were mobilized at the time in the struggle against the “subversive” movements. The trigger for the events appears to have occurred with a fire that destroyed a significant part of the assets of TV Bandeirantes, in São Paulo, on July 16, 1969. The following day, Folha gave extensive prominence to the case on its cover. According to Governor Abreu Sodré, these fires could only be “the work of terrorists”, hence the need for the people to “join the government, in the campaign against the enemies of the country”8:

In addition to this forceful statement by the governor, encouraging the population to denounce, not to remain idly by, but to become a sort of police officer so that together they could “lay their hands” on subversive elements, Folha also emphasizes a speech by General José Canavarro Pereira, commander of the II Army and one of the founders of Oban, as we have seen. For the general, the country’s security was the responsibility of “all the people”, expressing his concern “in the face of the need to launch a civic campaign to re-educate young people” (“General Canavarro”, 1969).

Folha ’s journalism seems to have gone further, promptly answering the call of businesspeople, the governor and the general. That same day, he started a campaign, entitled “Union against Violence”, which would gain prominence on its pages for practically a month. Even though the origin of the fires had not been proven, the newspaper declared its solidarity against the “manifestations of insanity” articulated by a “cunning, unscrupulous and daring adversary” who sought to compromise public tranquility. Solidarity which, according to an editorial published by Folha, should be translated:

In the following days, the newspaper began to reproduce on its pages the expressions of support that had been receiving for the positioning of its campaign, due to “so much repercussion [which] is having in the press and other sectors of Brazilian life” (“Repercute o apelo”, 1969). Once again, General José Canavarro had his speeches accentuated by Folha, now on the occasion of the tribute paid to the Army by the Commercial Association of São Paulo, where he reinforced that “businessmen and authorities” should “march together in the search for achieving the objectives of the Revolution”. For the general, the role of the business community was fundamental in the work of political formation of Brazilian nationality: “It is, however, in the psycho-social field where the company must play, at the moment, its great role” (“Canavarro: empresários”, 1969b).

On July 20th, an extensive political-advertising manifesto was published on Folha’s internal pages. This time, FIESP showed solidarity with the newspaper’s campaign, giving its message to “Brazilian people” against the groups of subversives who “deserted their Homeland”. According to the Federation, this was a “fortunate for awareness” moment:

Along with this manifesto, Folha began creating headers with advertising messages from the “Union against Violence” campaign, put it out over the next few weeks (Figure 2), with the following messages: “order and progress”; “love builds and hate destroys”; “we trust in Brazil”; “work is the law of the strong”; “decision and courage – Greater Brazil”; “United we will win – Greater Brazil”, all signed as a “collaboration by Folha de S.Paulo”. The newspaper remained convinced of its collaboration, showing itself to be one of those largely responsible for mobilizing the people with the government to “banish” “terrorism” activities from national life. The person who once again confirmed this recognition was the president of FIESP, Theobaldo de Nigris, who believed that the work of mobilizing public opinion against the “enemies of Homeland” was fundamental: “and there is no one better than the publicity organizations to be responsible for leading this movement, following the example of what FOLHA DE S.PAULO has already been doing” (“Empresário: união”, 1969).

Reinforcing the support of its campaign partners, Folha published another editorial to highlight the need for the “appeal” that in union against violence: “and we are pleased to note that it is raising awareness in areas of opinion” (“Contra a violência” , 1969). He took the opportunity to emphasize once again that “terrorism” activities were not only directed against the government, as those who suffered the consequences were the people themselves. At this point, Folha ’s journalism carried out work that was not limited to preventive actions, as it also acted, – as the recommended practices in the “Superior School of War” manuals showed us – in its “repressive” and “operative” character. This was what the newspaper did, for example, when it published photos and names of “wanted terrorists” on its pages, many of whom were later arrested, tortured and killed by the dictatorship (“São 25 os procurados”, 1969).

This tone shaped the company’s collaboration in the struggle against the subversive groups. It is not our place here to repeat these speeches exhaustively, since we have already shown how Folha ’s journalism was directly responsible for this mannerism. Just to illustrate the scope and extension of the campaign, it is worth mentioning that the newspaper also received, throughout the month, expressions of support from commercial entities (“Entidades do Comércio”, 1969); of the rural classes (“Líderes rurais”, 1969); of the archdiocese (“Cardeal Rossi”, 1969); from the State government – which gave its “applause to the newspaper’s initiative. . . [for acting] as a convening sector for the population. . . , entirely in tune with present needs”(“Sodré conclama”, 1969b); of the stock exchange – declaring that Folha’s initiative was a “national salvation” campaign, of great repercussion and “absolutely necessary” (“Bolsa conclama”, 1969); and, finally, the commander of the II Army, General Canavarro, who classified Folha ’s campaign as “patriotic and praiseworthy” (“Canavarro: união”, 1969a).

On August 3rd, 1969, practically a month after the foundation of Oban, Folha concluded its campaign with yet another editorial, recognizing that its appeal had been “fully accepted” by the entire Brazilian community: “high authorities, military and ecclesiastical classes, as well as the business classes, added their voice to ours and to the public opinion” (“A união e a violência”, 1969) . By an act that we cannot consider as flawed, Folha made a subtle semantic shift in the title of its campaign, by naming its editorial “Union and violence”. It was as if it was no longer enough to call on the population to unite “against” it, but rather “with” violence. In this way, the text ended by stating that their proposed objectives would have been achieved: stopping subversive violence with the union of all “responsible” people.

The necessity to stand a “clear and defined” position, called for from a “united front” with the constituted authorities, made the undertaking assumed by Folha a success, not only editorially on a journalistic level, as it was not just Folha who recognized the success of his own work. Documents produced in the following year, 1970, by the dictatorship’s security organizations, stated that the “success of the repression of subversion” and “terrorism” in São Paulo resided, in summary, “in the support of civil elites and civil and military authorities, in integrated work that combines efforts and multiplies results.”9 Thus, the Second Army referred to Oban with “great and just pride”, as “without a doubt, it marked the beginning of our offensive in the field of subversion and is becoming an example for the entire country.”10

The union and violence assumed by the business, political and military sectors – including Folha de S.Paulo journalism played a significant role, as we have seen in this article – they were responsible for a pioneering model of combating opponents of the regime. Its information and repression mechanisms became so efficient that they ended up serving as a model for the implementation of the Information Operations Department – Internal Defense Operations Centers (DOI-CODI), later spread throughout the country. The final report of the National Truth Commission (Brasil, 2014) states that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of political prisoners who had their rights violated in these places. Only in the DOI-CODI of the II Army, belonging to the São Paulo region, more than 5 thousand people were detained in its own premises, at least 50 of whom did not leave there alive. Figures that Folha today probably must not be proud of. It should at least be on the account of the company to recognize its responsibility for these acts, before so categorically proclaiming its role “at the service” of democracy.