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Eye tracking: from affect to visual concept

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Abstract: Based on the classic eye tracking experiments of Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus, which sought to determine visual attention by measuring eye position and eye movement, our paper posits an embodied empirical foundation for cognition, based on the Bergsonian concept of the image, contra the still widely-held, full-frame photographic conception of vision. Coupled to the thought of Spinoza, James, Bergson, Simondon, and Deleuze and Guattari, we aim to produce a speculative model of visual perception that harmonizes affective metaphysics with the production of concepts through vision.

Keywords*:* eye tracking, affect, concept, image, vision.

Rastreamento ocular: do afeto ao conceito visual

Resumo: Nosso exame das técnicas clássicas de rastreamento ocular do psicólogo russo Alfred L. Yarbus para determinar a atenção visual medindo a posição e o movimento dos olhos, postula uma base empírica incorporada para a cognição baseada no conceito bergsoniano da imagem contra a ainda amplamente difundida concepção fotográfica da visão. Acoplado ao pensamento de Spinoza, James, Bergson, Simondon, e Deleuze e Guattari nossa intenção é produzir um modelo especulativo da percepção visual que harmoniza a metafísica afetiva e a produção de conceitos pela visão.

Palavras-chave: rastreamento ocular, afeto, conceito, imagem, visão.

Seguimiento ocular: del afecto al concepto visual

Resumen*:* Nuestro examen de las técnicas clásicas de seguimiento ocular del psicólogo ruso Alfred L. Yarbus para determinar la atención visual mediante la medición de la posición y el movimiento de los ojos, postula una base empírica incorporada para la cognición basada en el concepto bergsoniano de la imagen en contraposición a la aún ampliamente aceptada concepción fotográfica de la visión. Utilizando el pensamiento de Spinoza, James, Bergson, Simondon, y Deleuze y Guattari nuestra intención es producir un modelo especulativo de percepción visual que armonice la metafísica afectiva y la producción de conceptos a través de la visión.

Palabras clave*:* seguimiento ocular, afecto, concepto, imagen, visión.

The barrage of images to which we are ceaselessly subjected, in all spheres of activity, demands that we select the relevant ones, and consider, codify, evaluate, judge, and embody them as immediate reactions, modes of thought, or as archival memories. But for the most part, these processes are conducted subconsciously, intuitively, without the intervention of our conscious rational mind. In accordance with Bergson (1991), we use a generalized definition of the image as a transduced stimulus, coursing through a center of indetermination, and productive of contraction to predicate the transformation of affect into concept and as foundational for our analysis. Eye tracking practices demonstrate that the pictorial image or scene is never seen as a synthetic whole: it is a composed, serial, relational composition of pin-point ocular fixations and saccades — the eyes move from point to point and not from full-frame photogram to full-frame photogram — effectively shattering the still widely-held photographic conception of vision and vindicating Bergson's conception of the image.

Eye tracking reveals that the visual comprehension of a scene into a coherent whole happens through a cumulative trial-and-error process that eventually yields an individuated composite whole. It is a subconscious and intuitive determination often characterized as aleatory, but which upon closer examination through eye tracking practices, appears to demonstrate a sequential narrative logic that sidelines the rational and engages the affective through a perceptual semiotics. In a results-oriented culture, people will usually respond that what drives the engagement with images is the satisfaction of "getting it" as the feeling of grasping what is being conveyed and capitalizing on the cashing-in of the perception as value (James, 1943). So, as spectators, what do we look for when we look? How does conceptual knowledge arise from affective, non-rational, experiential determinations? What is the operative logic that informs ocular movement from one fixation to the next so as to create a self-affirming conceptual loop? We gaze at a scene and immediately want to know "what is the concept?" Are we getting it? Or is what to be grasped over our head?

Our speculative approach to interpreting eye tracking attempts to posit an empirical foundation for concepts from Spinoza, James, Bergson, Simondon, and Deleuze and Guattari. Our intent is to produce a model of visual perception that correlates metaphysics with the physical workings of perception so as to postulate a coherent functionality of abstraction of the physical world as a processual imagistic philosophy. The intuition orienting this paper emerges from our research into the workings of perception and imagistic process to determine what motivates eye movement. We came upon the now-classic work of Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus and his seminal studies on ocular movement and eye tracking. His landmark experiments, described in his book *Eye Movements and Vision* (1967), illuminate the principles governing human eye movement and their role in the process of vision. Although eye tracking during the past quarter century has surpassed the technicity of the analog, and moved into the digital realm of high-resolution sampling and the computational methods of big data and artificial intelligence, we resort to Yarbus's experimental analog technology because of its more qualitative approach and its willingness to postulate phases or levels of discernment when taking in a scene.

If you watch the opening scene of Béla Tarr and Ágnes Hranitzky's 2011 film *The Turin Horse*, you will look at it objectively as a sequence of pictorial images on a screen, unaware of the static photograms that subtend the illusion of movement — and if you watch the film with a group, each spectator will see it, understand it, take it in differently, depending on their knowledge of cinema, Béla Tarr's work, Nietzsche, horses, and possibly even Freud. But if you happened to be present during the filming of *The Turin Horse*, your spectatorial involvement with the film becomes that much richer as you amalgamate the memories of the sensory experience of the set visit to the watching of the film: in your comfortable seat in front of the screen, you (re)call and (re)collect the various sense impressions as a (re)membering, as reconstituting the memorial body of the event, as reliving the affective experience of the shoot, and allowing it to (in)form the appreciation of the film as affective enrichment. Being there in person was likely altogether different from considering the film as finished artwork because the eight sensory systems — sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste, interoception, proprioception, and the

vestibular — were all engaged, effectively working together, to get the full picture of the experiential event rather than simply the heightened emphasis on sight and hearing that defines the cinematic spectacle[1].

[37] And concomitant attenuation of the other senses.

In any given experience, the eight sensory systems will transmit their transduced impressions to various cortices in the brain, so that whatever impression makes itself felt through each of the senses is converted into a flux of intensities that make their way inwards from the external world. Thus, we can understand the modulation of intensity in the eight sensory streams as waveforms that travel inwards from the sensory receptors via their respective neural circuits to the brain as transduced signals — each stream of data that is transduced and sent centripetally by each sense produces an image (of sorts): a visual image, an olfactory image, an auricular image, etc. Obviously, these imagistic streams are nothing like the impressions that generated them. But if we liken the waveform of a sensory stream to the numeric code produced by a digital sensor, it would explain Cypher's cryptic statement in The Wachowskis' 1999 film *The Matrix*, in which he explains to Neo that he does not see the code on his console, i.e., he does not see the waveforms of ciphers on the screen; he can read and interpret them directly as a blonde, brunette, and redhead, much like the mind translates the stream of sensory information into the audio-visual spectacle referred to as consciousness.

These transduced sensory streams undergird the experience of consciousness. Considered together as synthetic oneness felt as qualitative bodily change, they constitute the intensive flux of affect: waves being waves, we resort to high-school physics and *metaphorically* add them together to ideate the effect of all external impressions of the world as a singular consequence. The intensities are added together as if they were homogeneous qualities, and their composite additive synthesis gives us affect as univocal intensity. We represent this synthetic intellectual construct as a flux, as a curve of continuous modification of intensity as a dimensionless variation over time, which is continuous because our consciousness is said to be continuous. The various sensory impressions suffered by the body creates a variety of neural and physiological changes that continually vary — what French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon calls flux modulation (2005). Taken together as productive of an ever-changing indeterminate bodily state, this synthesis is commonly called the affect of the body, but what Spinoza distinguishes as *affectus*.

In *The Ethics*, Spinoza (1996) defines affect in two ways: as *affectus* and *affectio*, translated as Affect and Affection. In English, writers rarely distinguish between the two and predicate them as a singular manifestation, as the undifferentiated modality of affect. Nevertheless, *affectus* is the incessant variation of our power to act in the world, and *affectio* are affects that can be identified durationally as having a certain intensity and insistence as a bodily state. *Affectus* is neither measurable nor identifiable and is therefore dimensionless. Expressed in subjective terms of the increasing or decreasing of the power of a body to act, Spinoza describes it as Joy or Sadness —anything that heightens our body's ability to act is joyful, anything that diminishes our body's ability to act is sad. Thus, in Heraclitean terms, we can refer to our participation in the world as a becoming, as an entrainment into the affective flux, as an increase or decrease in our powers to act, as being experientially buoyed up by the flow, or dragged asunder. But if we understand power as capacity, the conception becomes Aristotelian and linked to being, so that the capacity to act and react would be referring to the body's internal capabilities to differentiate and discern as varying degrees of being. Today, we can refer to the being of a thing or the adequacy of its apprehension according to the existence or presence of neural circuits in the body that will differentiate similar affective stimuli consistently and repeatedly — i.e., effectuate the work that neural networks in AI carry out computationally.

The composite curve of affect can be qualitatively described as a geometrical or mathematical entity that has no quantifiable qualities — only relative contrasts and differentials. If we describe affect as the power of a body to act and react over time (Spinoza, 1996) then we could label our vertical axis as energy and the horizontal axis as time. If the ever-changing curve of experiential intensity as felt by the body is affect, *affectus,* the differential at a point would be the identifiable affective state of affection as a specific mode of feeling relative to time; and the second differential,

the change of change as indicative of Spinozist Joy or Sadness. If we zoom in on our curve, we see that although our affective state is always variable, our bodily disposition is more or less stable. But when we are moved into action by the intensity of a stimulus, the body's metastable inertia overcomes an energic limit or boundary, a threshold, and we do in fact act — different contractions require different energic intensities. Our activity in the world is thus predicated on the passage from one moment to the next based on the energetics of perceived intensities that result in signification and significance as specific bodily contractions, as sign function that not only maps as signification and value but instigates advance. Why is the threshold important to us? Because it works with a processual non-pictorial definition of the image that links the affective with the contraction as imagistic process.

The image as defined by French philosopher Henri Bergson in *Matter and Memory* (1991) is a unitary assemblage of a Stimulus, a Centre of Indetermination, and a Contraction. Here, the word contraction can be interpreted in a number of ways: as a covenant, a compact, a relational or functional correspondence, an agreement enforceable by law, as identitary limitation, or as a shortening of a muscle. And accordingly, an image can be created in any of the body's sensory systems. Our brain brings to bear a refractive reflection of energic activity between the stimulus and the reaction, which can be said to produce a fold that reveals the reflection of the affective as pragmatic (Deleuze, 1993). When sensory stimuli produce intensive modifications within the body, and if sufficiently intense, they will result in a pre-conscious and pre-linguistic pragmatic resolution: As William James writes in *Pragmatism*, "To develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance" (James, 1912, p. 46). The Bergsonian model of the image indicates that the perceived image is not reproduced in the brain but is projected back to where it appears to be, outside our body, so that every perception is produced where it occurs. This is not only a geometric intuition that serves to ground the projective event (Rebolledo; Oliveira, 2021) but constitutes the cashing out of experience in the materiality of the body at the expense of the ideal. As such, the object of vision is ascertained or informed in terms of serial contractions as affective threshold events — as a correspondence between the introjective afferent perception designating the object and the projective efferent affirmation of the consequent saccade and fixation or indication.

The stimulus and the contraction occur on two types of neural circuits (Netter, 2002), separated by a gap or discontinuity that accounts for the qualitative leap (Deleuze, 1986), which remains indeterminate despite its resolving the stimulus into a specific contraction. For example, the neural circuit that conveys the luminous stimulus transduced by the retina, and centripetally relayed inwards to the brain via the optic nerve occurs on a different circuit than the neural circuit that conveys and dissipates the energic surcharge internally produced, centrifugally relayed outwards from the various centers in the brain, to effectuate the muscular contractions that produce a saccade.

In terms of visual stimuli, individual fixations are ascertained memorially as a habituated internal routing that guides the stimulus to a determination as a contraction. These imagistic determinations are now routinely modeled in AI as neural networks. Taken as a whole, the multiplicity of these memorial paths that ascertain stimuli not only constitute the stable repository or archive of our possible discernments, but define the capacity of what we can do as a body in terms of ascertaining our experience in the world as sensory, aesthetic activity (Massumi, 2018). The definition of contraction as a shortening of a muscle is the one that principally interests us here, particularly regarding vision in that eye movement occurs as a result of muscular contractions. We have light entering the eye, transduced into a neural signal, which will produce a movement as a result of muscular contraction when adequately routed and of an intensity and significance that will exceed the energic metastable containment, or threshold, as the determination of the current state.

Eye tracking records the movement of the eyes over a pictorial scene and produces a record of the sequence of directed fixations and saccades as a diagram of actual, pragmatic attention. If the fixation is where the eye stops and the saccade is the jerky eye movement that occurs between two fixations, eye tracking is essentially the process of identifying the serial progression of the gaze: with eye tracking, we can detect where

users look at a point in time, how long they look at something, and the path their eyes follow — therefore, eye tracking records show the elaboration of thought processes.

According to Duchowski (2017), the technics of eye tracking is composed not only by the specific techniques and practices for monitoring and measuring eye movements with high-tech apparatus, it is also a sophisticated research methodology whose pragmatic vocation is to tap into subconscious thought processes. The vast numerical data generated by eye tracking devices can be readily processed to produce heat maps of a scene (a pictorial image or an event) to identify centers of increased attention, attractors or lures for feeling, showing where the viewer's interest is going in terms of fixation duration, saccadic velocity, pupillary dilation, seriality, and repetition. This not only reveals interest but cognitive involvement, arousal, and intent. Eye tracking is now routinely used for screen-based research studies in UX design, education, and marketing using dedicated unobtrusive high-frequency sampling rate eye trackers (https://www.tobii.com). Studies can now be conducted via laptop cameras and mobile devices with cloud applications for quick, lower resolution, online analysis. Mobile applications that use eye tracking glasses coupled to miniature video cameras for analyzing visual engagement with the world also exist. Eye trackers are presently integrated into attention computing platforms (https://www.noldus.com/human-behavior-research) that analyze human behavior in real-time — specifically, facial expression using micro-movement tracking of facial muscles, heart rate, galvanic skin response, EEG streams, and event coding — to provide a full-spectrum affection image of our body's response to specific cognitive stimuli.

But as exciting as this technology is, we need to keep in mind that there is a pernicious side to it. It is not simply a matter of massive amounts of physical data being gathered, but a serious ethical quandary that arises from the recording and coding of our private and personal decision-making activity at its most foundational. These devices track subconscious somatic responses revelatory of thought processes that sideline our rational self, and unwittingly divulge our innermost logic of intentions, which spells out the decisive reasoning at work in the background we may not be conscious of nor wish to allow others to codify.

As we mentioned earlier, the Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus was a pioneer eye tracking researcher. His early research methodologies and analog technology using mirrors on rubber eyecups attached to the eye is truly fascinating (Yarbus, 1967). One series of experiments on complex visual objects, such as Ilya Repin's painting *An Unexpected Visitor* (Fig. 1), showed that when a test subject is asked to seek specific information within a complex scene, eye movements are conditioned by the nature of the information the viewer is asked to determine (Fig. 2).

Figure 1

Note: Ilya Repin (1884). An Unexpected Visitor. Public Domain. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ilya_Repin_Unexpected_visitors.jpg

Earlier, we invoked Freud through the opening scene of *The Turin Horse* because one of his most famous case histories dealing with a boy's experience of looking at a horse feels analogous to our visual experience of this film. What interests us about the Little Hans case study is not Freud's (1955) oedipal analysis of it, but Deleuze's take on the perceptual event. In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze writes that in taking in the event, the boy "makes a list of affects of a draft horse pulling a cart in a city (to be proud, to have blinders, to go fast, to pull a heavy load, to collapse, to be whipped, to kick up a racket, etc.)" (1988, p. 124). Deleuze's visual decoupage of the scene is very much like how a filmmaker might break down a scene into its visual components as a sequence of specifically framed shots. What is most surprising about this shot-list of details is the nature of the so-called affects. Each of them is of a different nature: each one is recognizable in itself but difficult to portray individually or to account for adequately. And it is this individually cognizable entity not immediately identifiable as a self-sufficient property of the event that makes it an affect. However, as alluring a conception as Deleuze's decoupage makes it, eye tracking reveals a similar decoupage, but one completely different. As will be shown, the affective constituents of the individual fixations are the iconic content of foveal fixations and therefore nothing so nicely imaged as "to be proud", etc.



Figure 2

Note: Eye track plots/diagrams by Yarbus of seven tasks assigned to test subjects. Public Domain. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yarbus_The_Visitor.jpg

Yarbus (1967) designed his experiment around seven different tasks for his participants (Fig. 2) and found that depending on the problematization of the encounter — i.e., on the cognitive task given to the test participants — the order, rhythm, and duration of fixations will vary, and diverse visual narratives will result: the scene will be coded differently depending on how the encounter is conditioned. The same scene — in this case, the same painting — will be looked at differently depending on the given task so that the diagram of saccades and fixations made by the movement of the eyes scanning the picture will differ depending on the type of information a test subject is asked to glean. Hence, for each task, a different set of elements will be seen and others neglected. With each task, a test subject will look at the same scene, but each time engaging it differently, thus composing a different object for consideration, so that different patterns of signification will emerge from the same pictorial source and result in different narratives as sequential concatenation of primitive visual elements. Yarbus (1967) shows that

each problem or task, as an object of thought, produces a different diagrammatic pattern of cognition, of coding the image: we will see and understand any given scene differently depending on how we problematize it.

As we have mentioned, vision does not function in terms of full-frame photograms of the visual field. Instead, the human gaze moves from point to point within the field of vision as a sequence of fixations and saccades motivated mostly by a subconscious logic of its own. Unlike a photographic plate or digital camera sensor, the retina, which extends over the rear of the eye, is not equally sensitive throughout. Whereas the photographic apparatus seeks uniform sensitivity and resolution throughout the sensitive plate, the retina of the human eye has topographic disparities of varying sensitivity (Forrester et al., 2016). The peripheral retina surrounds the *area centralis* of 5-6 mm in diameter, which in turn contains the *macula lutea* of 1.5 mm in diameter. And within the *macula lutea,* we find a tiny circle of 0.35 mm in diameter, called the *fovea centralis.* There are two types of photoreceptor cells in the human eye: rods and cones, and they are unevenly distributed across the retina. Rods are responsible for sensing contrast, brightness, and motion, whereas cones subserve fine and spatial resolution and color vision (Forrester et al., 2016). And despite accounting for only 2% of the total retinal area, the *fovea centralis* provides an inordinately high concentration of rods (to the exclusion of cones), thereby lending the ultra-high-resolution definition and pin-point accuracy of vision — everything else offers a radically lower density of photoreceptors (Forrester et al., 2016). The *fovea centralis* is of the utmost importance because it provides the content for the fixations as the primitive constituent elements of vision, which when predicated in terms of the reduced area of ultra-high sensitivity and resolution is termed Foveal Vision. We might think that our entire visual field is in focus because when we shift our gaze from one point to another, the image is in focus. However, the eye refocuses after every saccade at every fixation on whatever our subconscious processes deem logical or worthy of interest as content for the *fovea centralis*. The content of one fixation, transduced by the retina and centripetally relayed inwards, is the stimulus which is somehow processed and ultimately results in a contraction; taken together as a unit, they compose a Bergsonian image.

Eye tracking shows us where and for how long a fixation occurs — the "where" indicates that which interests and is an attribute of value, and the "duration" informs us of the intellective effort required to make sense of the fixation. But can the sequence of saccades and fixations be used to tell us why the sequence requires the necessary order that it eventually acquires? Eye tracking proponents will assert that fixations are what really matters because they directly identify what the *fovea centralis* literally pinpoints. The motivation of eye movement needs a causal logic, a sufficient reason for its motivation. So, following Yarbus, we extracted the iconic component indicated by the fixations and ordered them sequentially, according to the order revealed by eye tracking, to examine the logic that would determine the sequential seriality of passage from one fixation to the next. Within the individual records of visual inspections of complex images, Yarbus (1967) detected "phases" in the inspections until a final determination was achieved. Initially, in the exploratory phase, the viewer tries different approaches to determine the signification that the scene is trying to convey. *Initially*, nomadic empiricism takes place (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) as the eyes wander through a scene to establish a fixed sense, an order, a semiotically logical sequence, in which one iconic impression relays and commands attention to a subsequent fixation. The patterns of exploratory visual inspection at first seem aleatory and random but when the "logic" of the scene is established according to the assigned problem or task, the sequence of saccades and fixations becomes a closed loop (Yarbus, 1967) — a conceptual individualization — which gives way to a phase of iterative affirmation. The fixations which ultimately determine the closed series of the taking in of the pictorial image and which produce the recurring conceptual diagram (Fig. 2) constitute the pattern which reveals the solution to the task as a problem posed becomes the positive determination, and that which is not selected provides the negative space of emergence. The chosen points as a concatenation constitute the relevant affective compositional facts that contribute and inform the intuitive realization of the truth of the solution as comprehension, as functional coherence, as the closed diagram of affects that seeks affirmation in recognition and constitutes the conceptual whole. Thus, we can define the conceptual image of a scene as the sequential loop of fixations and saccades that are

apprehended jointly as a stand-alone compositional comprehension which serves as response to the intentional conditioning of the encounter understood as a problem.

This tells us that any of the many significations of a scene are not immediately given whole but result from an initial nomadic exploration as a sequential construction guided by a subconscious automaticity that seeks its specific teleology internally as closure (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). It would seem that the serial recursivity that guides eye movement is not aleatory although it happens without the apparent engagement of the willful reason that marks us as human. But because the content of the fixation is inadequately identifiable or expressible as a known entity or thing, the fixation is understood not only as an affect of the object itself, but as an affect to the body because we suffer the affects sensorially. And depending on its effect or impact upon the observer, we understand the affect as an intensity whose effect will be considered or contemplated, an intensity that will be processed by way of neural circuits and whose intensity might overwhelm their thresholds and result in a contraction according to the implicit logic of associative or empathic affordances in the affective to constitute a sequential, interlinked, functional assemblage. Although we still express metaphorically the intensity of an affect in mechanical terms, i.e., the impact or impressiveness of an image, the intensity could be expressed in terms of neural circuits availed or activated by an affect.

The world before us can be flattened onto a 2-D pictorial plane as a surface of selection from which meaning and signification emerge. Thus, we refer to it as the Plane of Consistency or Immanence as the effective set of associated affective elements from which signification emerges as a system of immanent relation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). But, as we just saw, within that plane of consistency, various significations can be made to emerge as functional logical assemblages that work coherently and consistently. Each problematization or task creates its own pragmatic functionality made up of a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects existing in space-time (3D+T) but gathered to function as a surface, as a plane of consistency, as a stratum constructed of iconic points, of a self-contained and consistent, closed sequential series of Bergsonian images that constitute a conceptual whole, wherein the assemblage of ocular fixations is grasped as one.

Each fixation, as an iconic figure imbued with sign function, exists concretely as a relational entity. According to Gilbert Simondon, a thing exists concretely when it can assume a variety of functional roles simultaneously, without necessarily actualizing all of them at one time. To illustrate the meaning he gives to the concept of concreteness, in his book *The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* (2017), he uses the example of the cooling fins on a motorcycle engine: they add rigidity to the cylinder walls, dissipate heat, reduce weight, enhance performance and aesthetics. Each functional feature will become relevant depending on the system under consideration and represents a distinctly affective attribute of the machinic assemblage. The fins can take on multiple roles without actualizing all of them at any one time, so that they shoulder a variety of functions concretely, and assume various roles simultaneously. The plurifunctionality of the fins can occur on several affective regimes of signification, thereby concretely participating in many conceptual diagrams depending on the role the fins are asked to play. The concreteness of the fins expresses their potential to function in different assemblages of signification depending on the cognitive task we have been asked to carry out. Similarly, the individual affective fixation as lure for feeling can take on different roles within the myriad possibility of assemblages emerging as solutions to different tasks within any given event as scene.

The processual advance from one fixation to the next can thus be predicated as part of a system of signs that sequentially articulate folds of explication and implication. Yarbus (1967) reveals through his experiments that vision follows a logic of processual succession of explaining itself, of unfolding, driven ahead by the forward-gazing quest of sign function for the perfective closure to perception as comprehension. This movement of the mind of “grasping or seizing together” involves and enfolds perceptions by composing serially with affects to produce concepts insofar that, as Deleuze asserts, “comprehending is the internal reason that accounts for the two movements, explaining and implying” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 68). This imagistic

semiotic, which is possibly more general and anterior to the linguistic, constitutes the discursive logic of the logos of essence predicated on affective signification, in which Deleuze and Guattari (1994) situate the function of the artist as producer of affects and percepts and the philosopher as creator of concepts.

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