The Function of intentionality in the work The Transcendence of the Ego, by Jean-Paul Sartre

Abstract

The objective of this article is to analyze the function of the intentionality employed by Jean-Paul Sartre to demonstrate the thesis defended in The Transcendence of the Ego. For such, we observe different approaches to the concept of Intentionality such as the ones used by Husserl and Sartre, emphasizing that the great discrepancy between them lies in the admission of the “Self” as a pure structure immanent in consciousness since Husserl’s flow of intentional consciousness comes from a pure “Self” strongly defended in Ideas I. However, Sartre radicalizes Husserl’s intentionality by considering that the “Self” will not be admitted in the consciousness, it will be in the world as a transcendental object. Therefore, we conclude the paper with the attempt to explain the necessity of the notion of Intentionality to support the thesis of the transcendental Ego and stage for the three conclusive consequences of The Transcendence of the Ego: the liberation of the transcendental field; an attempt to overcome solipsism; and a possible refutation of idealism.