On the radical criticism of being and time to the metaphysical notion of consciousness

Abstract

This article proposes to investigate the original way Martin Heidegger approached the phenomenon of consciousness, thus overcoming the traditional concept of consciousness of modern metaphysics. Our investigation is focused on the first phase of Heidegger’s thought, more precisely, Being and Time (1927). In this work, Heidegger presents his conception of consciousness, firstly, as an existential phenomenon that, as such, is rooted in the being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s conception of this phenomenon thus differs from the model that separates subject-object – or consciousness-world – whose most remarkable proponent is René
Descartes. Consciousness is essentially an existential phenomenon that, as such, is rooted on the fundamental constitution of Dasein – being-in-the-world – because, according to Heidegger, consciousness seeks to recover the authentic will-to-power of Dasein.