Mercado financeiro e integração empresas/stakeholders: um olhar para o passado e um olhar para o futuro
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2026100-3.enPalavras-chave:
teoria clássica de finanças, imperfeições de mercado, mercado financeiroResumo
Neste artigo, a evolução da teoria de finanças, área de estudo voltada à alocação de recursos escassos em fins alternativos sob condições de incerteza, é apresentada, destacando-se três momentos: as finanças clássicas, marcadas pelo advento das teorias microfundamentadas aplicadas ao ambiente corporativo e da relação desse ambiente com o mercado de capitais; as imperfeições de mercado, capazes de alterar as normativas clássicas representadas pela restrição financeira, custos de agência e mecanismos de controle sugeridos pela governança corporativa; e os temas emergentes que, baseando-se na racionalidade limitada do agente, buscam incorporar o comportamento do decisor às normativas clássicas já ajustadas pelas imperfeições de mercado. Por fim, apresenta-se um panorama da área de mercado financeiro e integração empresa/stakeholders na Revista Contabilidade & Finanças ao longo dos últimos anos, finalizando com uma provocação sobre o futuro das pesquisas na área.
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