Mineral wealth, weak institutions and clientelism: the natural resources curse for local governments

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2019.153089

Keywords:

Natural resources, Institutions, Clientelism

Abstract

This article analyzes the role of institutions in the relationship between royalties from mineral wealth in the municipality and the probability of using this revenue for clientelist actions. We analyzed, for 2013 to 2016, whether the mayors in Minas Gerais State used the royalties of the mining to increase job positions in the cityhall and spending on materials, goods, and services for free distribution. Additionally, we analyzed whether the possibility of re-election of mayors or the transparency of public spending interfered on the propensity of such clientelist practices. The evidences indicate that there is a strong association of higher royalty revenue with a disproportionate number of commissioned positions. The transparency of public expenditures was not sufficient to annul this effect and has further exacerbated by the possibility of the mayors applying for re-election.

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Published

2019-05-24

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How to Cite

Rodrigues, A. de C., & Rodrigues, S. B. (2019). Mineral wealth, weak institutions and clientelism: the natural resources curse for local governments. Revista De Contabilidade E Organizações, 13, e153089. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2019.153089