The board of directors and law 13,303/2016 in the face of Agency and Resource Dependence Theories: a theoretical essay
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2025.221448Keywords:
Board of directors, Political connections, Agency Theory, Resource Dependency TheoryAbstract
This theoretical essay analyzed the board of directors and law no. 13.303/2016 from the perspective of Agency Theory and Resource Dependence and, additionally, the impacts on private companies, since the law regulates companies controlled by the government. Agency Theory studies the interplay of interests in the separation between capital and management, which may justify, among other things, the impediment for the member of a regulatory agency to occupy a seat on the board, given the conflict of interests. In turn, Resource Dependence Theory explains the various exchanges that may occur between board members and society, justifying the impediment for the union director, since he could establish a clientelist relationship of support for the government's political base in exchange for positions; and for those occupying positions in the executive branch, those holding elected positions and the director of a political party, who, by encouraging support for a certain political group, would be aiming at the formation of the so-called coalition government, in which one of the objectives is the distribution of government positions. Law No. 13,303/2016 is inserted in this context, since, by preventing politicians from serving on the board of controlled companies, the legal provision may consider them an agency cost and, therefore, undesirable, which is not necessarily supported by the literature. In this scenario, it is possible to think of two specific situations: inefficient management, and therefore the need for state intervention; or undue state intervention in a market relationship. Amidst this debate, the research innovates by proposing a new construct for political connection, aiming to corroborate, or not, the idea that politicians do not necessarily represent the desires of those who elected them and, at the same time, subsidize the political class, during the legislative debate in search of improving the law. Thus, it will be possible to present scientific data on the real effects of the proximity between companies and politicians.
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