Afirmando o conseqüente: uma defesa do realismo científico (?!)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662006000200004Palavras-chave:
Realismo científico, Abdução, Argumento do milagre, Indução pessimista, Método hipotético-dedutivo, Empirismo, Larry Laudan, Hilary Putnam, Arthur FineResumo
Neste artigo examina-se a afirmação de Larry Laudan de que "desde a Antigüidade os críticos do realismo epistêmico basearam seu ceticismo numa convicção profundamente enraizada de que a falácia da afirmação do conseqüente é de fato falaciosa". Tal afirmação é confrontada com o "argumento do milagre", formulado por Hilary Putnam, que desempenha papel central na defesa do realismo científico. Embora esse argumento apresente uma estrutura lógica semelhante à da referida falácia, procura-se mostrar que nas circunstâncias especiais em que é empregado captura uma intuição epistemológica legítima e relevante para a ciência. Avalia-se, ao longo da análise, uma série de interpretações e críticas ao argumento por parte de anti-realistas, indicando-se sob que aspectos elas são insatisfatórias, ou podem ser rebatidas.Downloads
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