Thomas Kuhn e seus modificadores intercontinentais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662012000300005Palavras-chave:
Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, Friedman, Amsterdamski, Paradigma, Dinâmica da ciência, Racionalidade científica, Normatividade científica, Ideais de conhecimentoResumo
Discuto algumas dificuldades nos escritos de Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan e Michael Friedman, nas quais - no esforço de chegar a uma nova enunciação da normatividade metodológica e da racionalidade da ciência - eles modificam, complicam e expandem a concepção kuhniana do desenvolvimento da ciência, substituindo seu conceito de paradigma por um conceito mais rigoroso, ou complementando-o com vários conceitos de metaparadigmas. Não é claro que qualquer uma das substituições propostas por eles para "paradigma" seja mais (metodologicamente) racional, melhor (logicamente) desenhada e menos monopolística e dogmática. Apresento também mais amplamente a concepção de Stefan Amsterdamski dos ideais de conhecimento e minhas próprias ideias, elaboradas, em alguns casos, há muitos anos, de modo a melhorar a visão de Kuhn. Introduzo o conceito de "tradição intelectual" como uma estrutura de múltiplos níveis, contendo uma camada metafísica e (várias) camadas científicas, a ideia de hierarquia de realizações científicas baseada em sua significação cognitiva diferenciada e um esboço de uma história narrativa da ciência como um processo de autoconstituição.Downloads
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