O relativismo de Kuhn é derivado da história da ciência ou é uma filosofia aplicada à ciência?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662012000300007Palavras-chave:
Relativismo, Relativismo epistêmico, Relativismo ontológico, Relativismo semântico, Incomensurabilidade, KuhnResumo
Está longe de ser fácil qualificar uma concepção ou um pensador de relativista. Como Kuhn rejeita ser tachado de relativista, discutiremos o que em sua obra dá ensejo a assim caracterizá-lo. Abordaremos três relativismos em Kuhn - o epistêmico, o ontológico e o linguístico - com o intuito de avaliar se o relativismo em Kuhn é fruto da aplicação de uma filosofia à compreensão da ciência ou se é derivado de uma fidedigna reconstrução histórica da ciência. Entendemos ser fundamental diferenciar o caso em que se emprega uma variante de relativismo filosófico na reconstrução da ciência do caso em que o relativismo é extraído de como a ciência vem sendo praticada. Tentaremos, operando com a distinção entre relativismo filosófico e relativismo metacientífico, demonstrar que as teses basilares de Kuhn são, quando muito, parcialmente apoiadas pela história da ciência. E também advogaremos que o relativismo kuhniano deve fundamentar-se em última análise em explicações psicológicas e sociológicas para ser solidamente defendido. Kuhn reconhece isso, mas questiona a capacidade explicativa das teorias até aqui forjadas pelas ciências sociais. E se Kuhn não é capaz de mostrar como e em que extensão os fatores sociais atuam sobre a racionalidade científica, então seu relativismo pode ser apropriadamente visto como fruto da aplicação de determinada epistemologia, ontologia e filosofia da linguagem à compreensão da ciência.Downloads
Referências
Arbib, M. & Hesse, M. The construction of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Ashman, K. Measuring the Hubble constant. In: Ashman, K. M. & Baringer, P. S. (Org.). After the science wars. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 98-119.
Ashman, K. M. & Baringer, P. S. (Org.). After the science wars. London: Routledge, 2001.
Asquith, P. & Nickles, T. (Ed.). Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association. East Lansing. Philosophy of Science Association, 1982. v. 2.
Baghramian, M. Relativism about science. In: Psillos, S. & Curd, M. (Ed.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of science. New York: Routledge, 2008. p. 236-47.
Baghramian, M. A brief history of relativism. In: Kraus, M. (Org.). Relativism: a contemporary anthology. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p. 31-49
Baringer, P. Introduction: the “science wars”. In: Ashman, K. M. & Baringer, P. S. (Org.). After the science wars. London: Routledge, 2001. p. 1-13.
Barnes, B. Thomas Kuhn. In: Skinner, Q. (Org.). The return of grand theory in the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. p. 83-100.
Bird, A. The historical turn in the philosophy of science. In: Psillos, S. & Curd, M. (Ed.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of science. New York: Routledge, 2008. p. 67-77.
Borchert, D. (Ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy. Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006. v. 8.
Brante, T. et al. Controversial science. From content to contention. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.
Bunge, M. Seudociencia y ideologia. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985.
Cedarbaum, D. Paradigms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 14, 3, p. 173-213, 1983.
Collingwood, R. An essay on metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
Colodny, R. (Ed.). Mind and cosmos. Essays in contemporary science and philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.
Cartwright, N. Relativism in philosophy of science. In: Kraus, M. (Org.). Relativism. A contemporary anthology. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p. 86-99.
Collins, H. & Yearly, S. Epistemological chicken. In: Pickering, A. (Org.). Science as practice and culture. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992. p. 301-26.
Dahrendorf, R. Law and order. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985.
Devitt, M. Against incommensurability. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 57, p. 29-50, 1979.
Doppelt, G. Scientific revolutions. In: Borchert, D. (Ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy. Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006. v. 8, p. 694-703.
English, J. Partial interpretation and meaning change. The Journal of Philosophy, 75, 2, p. 57-76, 1978.
Frank, P. Philosophy of science. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1957.
Fuller, S. Thomas Kuhn: a philosophical history for our times. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000.
Gutting, G. (Org.). Paradigms and revolutions. Appraisals and applications of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1980.
Hacking, I. (Org.). Scientific revolutions. London: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Harris, J. Against relativism. A philosophical defense of method. Chicago: Open Court, 1997.
Horwich, P. (Ed.). World changes. Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993.
Huene, P. Reconstructing scientific revolutions. Thomas S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Kitcher, P. Science, truth and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Kraus, M. (Org.). Relativism: a contemporary anthology. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Kuhn, T. The copernican revolution. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970a.
Kuhn, T. Logic of discovery or psychology of research? In: Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Org.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970b. p. 1-24.
Kuhn, T. Reflections on my critics. In: Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Org.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970c. p. 231-77.
Kuhn, T. The essential tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
Kuhn, T. Commensurability, comparability, communicability. In: Asquith, P. & Nickles, T. (Ed.). Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association. East Lansing. Philosophy of Science Association, 1982. v. 2, p. 669-88.
Kuhn, T. Metaphor in science. In: Ortony, A. (E.). Metaphor and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. p. 533-42.
The road since structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Lakatos, I. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmers. In: Lakatos, I. &
Musgrave, A. (Org.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. p. 91-198.
Musgrave, A. History of science and its rational reconstructions. In: Hacking, I. (Org.). Scientific revolutions. London: Oxford University Press, 1981. p. 107-27.
Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Org.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Laudan, L. Progress and its problems. Towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Laudan, L. Science and values. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Laudan, L. Science and relativism. Some key controversies in the philosophy of science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Laudan, L. Beyond positivism and relativism. Theory, method and evidence. Oxford: Westview Press, 1996.
Mcallister, J. W. Relativism. In: Newton-Smith, W. H. (Ed.). A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. p. 405-7.
McMullin, E. Rationality and paradigm change in science. In: Horwich, P. (Ed.). World changes. Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993. p. 55-78.
Megill, A. Introduction: four senses of objectivity. In: Megill, A. (Ed.). Rethinking objectivity. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. p. 1-20.
Megill, A. (Ed.). Rethinking objectivity. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
Musgrave, A. How to avoid incommensurability. The logic and epistemology of scientific change. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 30, 2, p. 336-46, 1979.
Newton-Smith, W. H. (Ed.). A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
Nola, R. Introduction: some issues concerning relativism and realism in science. In: Nola, R. (Org.). Relativism and realism in science. Dordrecht: Kluver Academic Publishers, 1988. p. 1-35.
Nola, R. (Org.). Relativism and realism in science. Dordrecht: Kluver Academic Publishers, 1988.
Nola, R. & Sankey, H. Introduction. In: Nola, R. & Sankey, H. (Ed.). After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Recent issues in theories of scientific method. Dordrecht: Kluver, 2000. p. xi-xix.
Nola, R. & Sankey, H. (Ed.). After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Recent issues in theories of scientific method. Dordrecht: Kluver, 2000.
Ortony, A. (E.). Metaphor and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Pickering, A. (Org.). Science as practice and culture. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992.
Pinch, T. Paradigm lost? A review symposium. Isis, 70, p. 430-4, 1979.
Psillos, S. & Curd, M. (Ed.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of science. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Putnam, H. The corroboration of theories. In: Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.). The philosophy of Karl Popper. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing, 1974. p. 221-40
Putnam, H. What is mathematical truth. In: Putnam, H. Mathematics, matter and method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 60-78.
Putnam, H. Meaning and the moral sciences. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
Putnam, H. Reason, truth and history. London: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Radnitzky, G. Contemporary philosophical discussion as debates between early Wittgensteinians, Popper and later Wittgensteinians. Manuscrito, Campinas, 2, 2, p. 67-117, 1979.
Rorty, R. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Sankey, H. Kuhn’s ontological relativism. Science & Education, 9, 1-2, p. 59-75, 2000.
Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.). The philosophy of Karl Popper. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing, 1974.
Shapere, D. Meaning and scientific change. In: Colodny, R. (Ed.). Mind and cosmos. Essays in contemporary science and philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. p. 41-85.
_____. The structure of scientific revolutions. In: Gutting, G. (Org.). Paradigms and revolutions. Appraisals and applications of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1980. p.27-38.
Scheffler, I. Science and subjectivity. New York: Bobbs-Merril Company, 1967.
Siegel, H. Objectivity, rationality, incommensurability and more. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31, 4, p. 359-75, 1980.
Skinner, Q. (Org.). The return of grand theory in the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Suppe, P. (Org.). Structure of scientific theories. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977.
Van Fraassen, B. The scientific image. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Weinberg, S. Dreams of a final theory. New York: Vintage, 1992.
Weinberg, S. Facing up. Science and its cultural adversaries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Whitehead, A. Adventures of ideas. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954.
Wolpert, L. The unnatural nature of science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Downloads
Publicado
Edição
Seção
Licença
Copyright (c) 2012 Scientiae Studia
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
A revista detém os direitos autorais de todos os textos nela publicados. Os autores estão autorizados a republicar seus textos mediante menção da publicação anterior na revista. A revista adota a Licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.
