Razão e sentimento na teoria moral de Hume

Abstract

The roles played by reason and sentiment in Hume's moral theory have raised some controversies among the scholars of his work. Some, such as David Fate Norton, find it somewhat strange that Hume uses a tone which seems to disqualify the influence of reason in the moral distinctions made by men when, in fact, the philosopher's arguments seem to ascribe a role to it. Other scholars state that the term reason, in Hume's moral writings, is not to be understood in the sense we usually atribute to it. I argue, along this article, that the reading of Hume's moral writings in the context of the debate concerning the principles of morals in the 18th century makes it clear that, when he speaks of reason, Hume has in mind a meaning not so different from the one usually atributed to it. Even so, despite the tone employed by him, this fact shouldn't be thought of as surprising, since the author uses his rethoric not against reason itself, but against a certain conception of morality which saw reason as the ultimate foundation of moral distinctions.