John Rawls’s original sense: a moral ideal for a democratic society

Abstract

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has reoriented western philosophic thought,
starting a new period of reflection on justice. Designed so as to offer “one” theory, this
work does not present a dogmatic purpose; however, it does propose principles of justice,
resulting from a hypothetical original agreement, to constitute what it calls “justice
as fairness”, characterized by the foundation of the rules of “fair” in the institutions.
Through the “veil of ignorance” imposed to men in their “original position”, Rawls
makes the design of such principles the result of a rational common sense among individuals,
trying to achieve a moral ideal that works as an alternative for the utilitarian doctrine
and as the basis for a fair democratic society. The importance of Rawls’s complete
work can be assessed by the great attention and comments it has received in the academic
world, becoming responsible for the rebirth of discussions related to fundamental
issues concerning ethics and political philosophy. This has not prevented criticism to the
author’s thinking from arising. The paper aims demonstrate that the vehement disagreement
used by Rawls’s critics when attacking the argument of original sense decreases the
importance of his theory