Leibniz: Rational Action and Weakness of Will

Abstract

This article is an attempt to investigate a classic problem associated with the human action that can be extracted from the Leibnizian texts about the weakness of will, an issue emblematically briefed by Ovide: “I see clearly which [way] is better, and I know it is right, yet I follow the way that is worse”. The author of the Theodicy seems to suggest a way to understand the phenomenon of akrasia. A good source for this research is his work New Essays on Human Understanding, in which he directly debates thesis of the book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by Locke. In Leibnizian text, one of the concepts discussed is the uneasiness. Locke believes that the fundamental basis for human actions would be to prevent the uneasiness caused by the feeling of missing something. Leibniz not completely refutes the idea of the English philosopher, however looks for improving it by introducing “the perceptions which are not apperceived”. In Leibnizian philosophy the problem of weakness of will may be linked to a region that the agent does not know directly but which is fundamental to any action, even for the so-called rational