Porchat, a diaphonía e o torvelinho do fenômeno no neopirronismo

Abstract

I examine some consequences of Porchat’s claim that neo-pyrrhonism needs to provide no precise and worked-out definition of phenomenon. At the face of it, to allow such a crucial notion to be undefined seems to render the neo-pyrrhonist epokhé utterly imprecise — the operation of accepting but not believing in phenomena forms the doubly articulated epokhé together with the suspension of judgment concerning what is beyond the phenomena. This imprecision seems to make neo-pyrrhonism vulnerable. I argue that this vulnerability is one of its chief virtues for it makes sure skepticism is situated, dependent on variable circumstances and opposite to the idea that the variability of phenomena can be immunized.
I make use of the idea that phenomenon is above all a situated manifestation of things and it is precisely to it, and to the incorrigible turmoil it engenders, that neo-pyrrhonism is solidly faithful.