Aristóteles e a necessidade do conhecimento científico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2020.181249Keywords:
Demonstration, Scientific Explanation, Necessity, Causality, Essencialism, KnowledgeAbstract
The paper discusses the exact meaning of the thesis according to which the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. The thesis is expressed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in his definition of scientific knowledge. The traditional interpretation understands this definition as depending on two parallel and independent requirements, the causality requirement and the necessity requirement. Against this interpretation, I try to show, through the examination of several passages that refer to the definition of scientific knowledge, that the necessity requirement specifies more exactly the causality requirement: what cannot be otherwise is the explanatory relation between the explanandum and the cause by which it is what it is.
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