Ainda é preciso ser neopirrônico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2020.181252Abstract
This article deals with two questions: why would the way in which the neopyrronicle conducts his philosophical activity be more virtuous than his dogmatic, non-pyrrhic colleague does? And why would the result he achieves be more valuable? That said, my answer to the first question is that the way the neo-Pyrrhonian investigates is more virtuous because it seeks to deliberately avoid the vices of precipitation, arrogance and mental closure. Regarding the second question, I suggest that the outcome of the neopyronic investigation, whatever it may be (even if it is not the truth) is more valuable because of the way he conducts his investigation.Downloads
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