Ceticismo e dogmatismo em Pascal

Abstract

The aim of this article is to compare the way Pascal deals with the relations between skepticism and dogmatism in two of his main works, the Pensées and Entretien avec M. de Sacy, which, although not conflicting, bring about a relevant change of point of view. The Entretien approaches the skepticism/ dogmatism debate directly from the moral angle, so that moral risks (and the corresponding passions of pride and laziness) for readers will be the fundamental criterion for evaluating the two philosophies. It is also from the moral point of view that Epiteto and Montaigne, representatives of skepticism and dogmatismo, will be considered irreconcilable, since their reciprocal annihilation of vices and virtues precludes the constitution of a perfect moral. In the Pensées, the assumed point of view is that of the theory of knowledge, even though the clash between the two schools ends in the same moral impasse of the Entretien. The most important difference, however, is that the Pensées bring this clash into human nature. Both works agree to point to the Christian religion as a source of explanation for the paradoxes of the human condition.