The epistemic condition for moral responsibility as a way of maintaining structures of oppression
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2023.213918Keywords:
moral responsibility, gender schemes, epistemic condition, sense of agencyAbstract
When thinking about the conditions for adequately attributing moral responsibility, Ciurria does not discuss whether the agent had control of the action. She proposes bringing the victim to the center of the discussion, and questions even the idea that the agent’s moral ignorance precludes attribution of blame in some cases. This challenge to the epistemic condition may give rise to objections. Hence, I propose to explain why this condition is not important if we take Ciurria's proposal seriously, and how the influence of gender schemes on the sense of agency helps to show this.Downloads
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