Colusão ótima com monitoramento imperfeito: teste do modelo de Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti para os mercados brasileiros regionais de cimento

Authors

  • Rodrigo M. Zeidan IBMEC
  • Marcelo Resende Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; Instituto de Economia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S1413-80502010000100003

Keywords:

Game Theory, Cement Market, PriceWar

Abstract

The paper considers the application of the non-parametric test proposed by StateBerry and Briggs (1988) for the model of collusion with imperfect monitoring by Abreu et al (1986) in the context of regional cement markets in Brazil during the 1992-2003 period. The test focuses on the implication of that model according to which the prices would follow a first-order Markov process. The evidence does not indicate the prevalence of optimal collusion in those markets.

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Published

2010-03-01

Issue

Section

Papers

How to Cite

Zeidan, R. M., & Resende, M. (2010). Colusão ótima com monitoramento imperfeito: teste do modelo de Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti para os mercados brasileiros regionais de cimento. Economia Aplicada, 14(1), 41-50. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1413-80502010000100003