Political competition and fiscal response for municipalities in Brazil
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/1980-5330/ea158362Keywords:
Political competition, Fiscal spending, Municipal electionsAbstract
This paper uses the sharp discontinuity regression methodology to investigate whether political competition affects the allocation of public expenditures among municipalities in Brazil. Election data from 2004 to 2016 suggest that the level of political competition seems to have changed over the course of electoral cycles, since we found the migration of votes to more competitive candidates less intense than that described in the literature (Fujiwara 2011, Chamon et al. 2017). Additionally, we found evidence that municipalities with more competitive elections reduced their administrative expenditures (less salient) in election years.
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