Social control of public administration by private agents: assessing the impact of social observatories on the expenditure of municipalities of Paraná
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/1980-5330/ea162776Keywords:
public goods, corruption, fiscal managementAbstract
This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the private initiative in controlling public administration. We estimated the impact of the introduction of Observatórios Sociais (OS) on various categories of municipal public spending in the state of Paraná. Using information from 2002-2017, the results showed savings in expenses with consumables and services contracted from legal entities of up to 0.5% of municipal GDP, which tend to be greater with time of operation. We conclude that social control initiatives independent of public authorities can be effective in controlling public administration.
Downloads
References
Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: a survey. The Economic Journal, London, v. 113, n. 491, p. 632–652.
Arellano, M. (1987). Computing robust standard errors for within-groups estimators. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Oxford, v. 49, n. 4, p. 431–434.
Banerjee, A.,Mullainathan, S. &Hanna, R. (2013). Corruption. In: GIBBONS, R.; ROBERTS, J. (orgs.) The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 1109-1147.
Battisti, M., Lavezzi, A. M., Masserini, L. & Pratesi, M. (2018). Resisting the extortion racket: an empirical analysis. European Journal of Law and Economics, Cham, v. 46, n. 1, p. 1–37.
Becker, G. S. & Stigler, G. J. (1974). Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. The Journal of Legal Studies, Chicago, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1–18.
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L. & Varian, H. (1986). On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, Amsterdam, v. 29, n. 1, p. 25–49.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Cambridge, v. 119, n. 1, p. 249–275.
Besley, T., Pande, R. & Rao, V. (2005). Participatory democracy in action: survey evidence from South India. Journal of the European Economic Association, Oxford, v. 3, n. 2-3, p. 648–657.
Björkman, M. & Svensson, J. (2009). Power to the people: evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Cambridge, v. 124, n. 2, p. 735–769.
Björkman, M. & Svensson, J. (2010). When is community-based monitoring effective? Evidence from a randomized experiment in primary health in Uganda. Journal of the European Economic Association, Oxford, v. 8, n. 2-3, p. 571–581.
Bona, R. S. & Boeira, S. L. (2018). Observatório Social do Brasil e os desafios organizacionais do controle social. Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania, São Paulo, v. 23, n. 75.
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R. & Tabellini, G. (2013). The political resource curse. American Economic Review, Nashville, v. 103, n. 5, p. 1759–1796.
Burai, P. (2020). Overcoming the pitfalls of engaging communities in anti-corruption programmes. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Disponível em: https://www.u4.no/publications overcoming-the-pitfalls-of-engagingcommunities-in-anti-corruption-programmes.
Caldas, O. V., Costa, C. M. & Pagliarussi, M. S. (2016). Corrupção e composição dos gastos governamentais: evidências a partir do Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos da Controladoria-Geral da União. Revista de Administração Pública, Rio de Janeiro, v. 50, n. 2, p. 237–264.
Campos, F. A. O., Castelar, I. & Soares, R. B. (2018). Fatores associados à corrupção municipal emtransferências de recursos da União. Nova Economia, Belo Horizonte, v. 28, n. 3, p. 879–911.
Campos, F. d. A. O. & Pereira, R. A. (2016). Corrupção e ineficiência no Brasil: uma análise de equilíbrio geral. Estudos Econômicos, São Paulo, v. 46, n. 2, p. 373–408.
Di, Tella, R. & Schargrodsky, E. (2003). The role ofwages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires. The Journal of Law and Economics, Chicago, v. 46, n. 1, p. 269–292.
Dixit, A. (2018). Anti-corruption institutions: Some history and theory. In: BASU, K.; CORDELLA, T. (orgs.) Institutions, governance and the control of corruption. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 15–49.
Favretto, J. & Riccio, E. L. (2017). Observatório Social do Brasil em números. E-book. Disponível em: http://osbrasil.org.br/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/e-book-OSB-06-04-2017-2.pdf.
Ferraz, C. & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Cambridge, v. 123, n. 2, p. 703–745.
Ferraz, C. & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral accountability and corruption: evidence from the audits of local governments. American Economic Review, Nashville, v. 101, n. 4, p. 1274–1311.
Ferraz, C., Finan, F. & Moreira, D. B. (2012). Corrupting learning: evidence from missing federal education funds in Brazil. Journal of Public Economics, Amsterdam, v. 96, n. 9-10, p. 712–726.
Imbens, G. W. & Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics of program evaluation. Journal of Economic Literature, Nashville, v. 47, n. 1, p. 5–86.
Lewis, B. D. (2017). Local government spending and service delivery in Indonesia: the perverse effects of substantial fiscal resources. Regional Studies, London, v. 51, n. 11, p. 1695–1707.
Michener, G., Contreras, E. & Niskier, I. (2018). From opacity to transparency? Evaluating access to information in Brazil five years later. Revista de Administração Pública, Rio de Janeiro, v. 52, n. 4, p. 610–629.
Moe, T. (2013). Delegation, control, and the study of public bureaucracy. In: GIBBONS, R.; ROBERTS, J. (orgs.) The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. v. 10, n. 2.
Oliva, F. (2012). A experiência do Norte de Minas. In: VERILLO, J.; VERILLO, N. (orgs.) O Combate à Corrupção nas Prefeituras do Brasil. São Paulo: 24X7 Cultural. p. 81-83.
Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, v. 115, n. 2, p. 200–249.
Olken, B. A. & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annual Review of Economics, Palo Alto, v. 4, n. 1, p. 479–509.
PNUD, IPEA & FJP (2013). O Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano Municipal Brasileiro. Brasília: PNUD.
Reinikka, R. & Svensson, J. (2011). The power of information in public services: evidence from education in Uganda. Journal of Public Economics, Amsterdam, v. 95, n. 7-8, p. 956–966.
Rocha, D. G., Zuccolotto, R. & Teixeira, M. A. C. (2020). Insulated and undemocratic: the (im) possibility of social accountability in Brazilian courts of accounts. Revista de Administração Pública, Rio de Janeiro, v. 54, n. 2, p. 201–219.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Cambridge, v. 36, n. 4, p. 387–389.
Superti, C. (2009). Addiopizzo: can a label defeat the Mafia? Journal of International Policy Solutions, La Jolla, v. 11, n. 4, p. 3–11.
Van Rijckeghem, C. &Weder, B. (2001). Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much? Journal of Development Economics, Amsterdam, v. 65, n. 2, p. 307–331.
Zuccolotto, R. & Teixeira, M. A. C. (2019). Transparência: aspectos conceituais e avanços no contexto brasileiro. Brasília: ENAP.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 Economia Aplicada
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
