The problem of substance in Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence (1813)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v23i2p81-104Keywords:
substance, accident, relation, refutation, SpinozaAbstract
The aim of this article is to clarify the way in which Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence (1813) develops a critical presentation of the category of substance. To this end, I will proceed in three steps. In the first place, I will present the relational character of substance in the relevant place of the Doctrine of Essence (1813); in the second place, I will analyze the shortcoming which drives the logical science beyond the relation of substantiality; in the third place, I will make a few comments on the general sense of Hegel’s refutation of Spinoza’s system.
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