The foundationalism of Thomas Reid
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v26i1p13-32Keywords:
Epistemology, Philosophy of science, Foundationalism, Thomas ReidAbstract
The paper aims to discuss in what measure Thomas Reid is committed to a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. Two discussions are presented. First, it is argued that Reid is in general a foundationalist, but not in all fields of knowledge – this is the case of politics. To understand this hypothesis, it is presented a distinction between Reid’s axiomatic conception of science and his foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. Secondly, the paper presents some objections to those interpretations which intend to hold that Reid is an anti-foundationalist, a coherentist, or a foundherentist.
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