Coisa -em-si em Fichte, uma problematização
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v0i22p49-64Keywords:
thing -in-itself, Feeling, Idealism.Abstract
The concept of the thing-in-itself, both in Kant and in Fichte (in his writings between 1793 and 1797), has an ambiguous semantic field: sometimes it makes reference to the characterization of the realistic way of conceiving knowledge (theoretical and practical), others it represents a genuinely critical -transcendental determination. Fichte rejects the realistic sense of the concept, which plays for him an indispensable role, but in it’s critical sense. However, even in this last sense, there is a difference between Fichte’s and Kant’s understanding of the concept, once the author of the Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge relates the concept of thing -in -itself to the investigation of feeling and, in particular, to the original feeling.Downloads
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