Transcendental deduction and realism in the Critique of Pure Reason

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v28i1p43-60

Keywords:

Kant, Hume, Transcendental Deduction, Refutation of Idealism, Berkeley

Abstract

The article addresses the merits of the Transcendental Deduction, a central argument for the Critique of Pure Reason, with regard specifically to the clash with Hume's epistemological skepticism. The idea is developed that the price paid by Kant in his anti-Humean project, the transcendental idealist position, although conceptually distinct from Berkeley's idealism and, in fact, the consequent development of a more general modern anti-realism, is still and precisely because of this common commitment in a territory that is unavoidably vulnerable to the critique of knowledge, hence the presence of a dogmatic foundation implicit in this point of Kant's work.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Anônimo (2000). “Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. 1781. 856 pages in Octavo”. In: Sassen, B. (ed.). Kant’s Early Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-58.

Almeida, G. A. de. (2013). Kant e a Refutação do Idealismo II. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, 17(2), 13-50.

Altmann, S. (2017). Propósito e estrutura do Quarto Paralogismo. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, 21(1), 85-121.

Ameriks, K. (1978). Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument. Kant Studien, 69(1-4), 273-87. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1978.69.1-4.273

Ayers, M. (1982). Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 13, 51-69. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X0000153X Beiser, F. (1987). The Fate of Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Berkeley, G. (1973). Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano. In: Berkeley, G.; Hume, D. Os Pensadores (vol. XXIII), pp. 7-50.

Caranti, L. (2007). Kant and the scandal of philosophy: the Kantian critique of Cartesian scepticism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Conant, J. (2016). Why Kant is not a Kantian. Philosophical Topics, 44(1), 75-125. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20164417

Gardner, S. (1999). Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. London: Routledge.

Gardner, S. (2015). “Introduction: The Transcendental Turn”. In: Gardner, S. e Grist, M. (eds.). The Transcendental Turn. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-19.

Guyer, P. (1982). Kant’s tactics in the Transcendental Deduction. Philosophical topics 12(2), 157-99. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198112229

Guyer, P. (1986). The Failure of the B-Deduction. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 25(54), n. S1, 67-84. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1987.tb01652.x

Kant, I. (1902). Kants Gesammelte Schriften: herausgegeben von der Königlich Deutschen Akademie der Wissehschaften. Berlin: Felix Meiner, 29 vols.

Kant, I. (2012). Crítica da razão pura. Tradução de Fernando Costa Mattos. Petrópolis: Vozes.

Kant, I. (2014). Prolêgomenos a qualquer metafísica futura que possa apresentar-se como ciência. Tradução de José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade.

McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rego, P. (2013). Fenomenismo, realismo e as coisas “fora de nós”. Kant contra o idealista material. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, 17(2), 96-118.

Rego, P. (2018). O que exatamente o ‘eu penso’ tem que poder acompanhar? Revisitando a dedução transcendental das categorias. Studia Kantiana, 16(3), 7-26.

Strawson, P. (1966). Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason. New York: Methuen.

Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental Arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65, pp. 241-56. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2024395

Published

2023-06-26

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Transcendental deduction and realism in the Critique of Pure Reason. (2023). Cadernos De Filosofia Alemã: Crítica E Modernidade, 28(1), 43-60. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v28i1p43-60