Sobre el concepto de ley permisiva y su función argumentativa en el § 2 de la Rechtslehre
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v0i22p65-81Keywords:
Property, Permissive law, Private right, Kant.Abstract
This paper analyzes why Kant states in § 2 of the Rechtslehre that the postulate of practical reason can be called a permissive law, considering that after that the author offers no further definition nor theoretical development of that concept. The way the argumentative function of the concept of lex permissiva is interpreted in the development of the doctrine of property, which Kant presents in the section “Private right” of the mentioned text, has fundamental consequences for the understanding of the relationship between property and State in Kant’s political thinking.Downloads
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