Contradiction, Being, and Meaning in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Gamma

Authors

  • Pascal Massie Miami University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v16i1p27-50

Keywords:

Aristotle, Principle of non-contradiction, Refutation, Metaphysics

Abstract

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.

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References

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Published

2022-04-21

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Articles

How to Cite

Massie, P. (2022). Contradiction, Being, and Meaning in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Gamma. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 16(1), 27-50. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v16i1p27-50