Entre ética e ciência: necessidade e contingência na teoria da ação em Aristóteles

Abstract

This article investigates the possibility of moral issues being of the same nature as that of occurrences for the most part (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) which are discussed in the Physics, in the Metaphysics and in the Analytics, as opposed to the categories of what happens by strict necessity and by chance/accident. That category (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) sometimes seem to be approximately equivalent to that which happens by strict necessity, when Aristotle highlights that things that happen by chance/accident do not belong to the scope of science, and sometimes seem to be sharply distinct of strict necessity, when Aristotle specifies the differences between both of them in terms of possible conclusions that may be obtained from syllogisms of both types. It seems to be that actions resulting from a formed character are ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, thusly belonging to the register of hypothetical necessity, since character is the agent’s second nature. If this hypothesis is correct, actions resulting from a formed character do not have the status of openness to contraries.