The ontological issue of color perception
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-863X2001000100007Keywords:
Visual perception, Color vision, Sensorial psychophysicsAbstract
The present study focuses on ontological issues about color, essentially the debate between Physicalism and Subjectivism. Analyzing those discussions, between a physical conception, considering color as a physical property of external objects, and a subjectivist one, which identify color with mental processing, we found syllogistical problems, experimental evidences, and other kinds of arguments supporting the conceptions. Nevertheless, an alternative hypothesis is offered, Psychophysicalism, in which psychophysical experimental support and evolutionary models provide a description of color ontology. Color must be considered a dual property, owning a physical and a psychological feature that are tightly related.Downloads
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