Equipollence, suspension of judgment and tranquillity in pyrrhonian skepticism

Authors

  • Raquel Albieri Krempel

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2594-5920.primeirosestudos.2009.136844

Keywords:

Skepticism – Equipollence – Suspension of judgement – Tranquillity

Abstract

Skeptical philosophy seems to rest on three main assumptions, based on the exposition made by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of skpticism: (1) once noticed the equipollence among confl icting accounts, it would be necessary to suspend judgment regarding the nature of things; (2) those who suspend judgment would be lead necessarily to tranquility; (3) only by means of skepticism, that is, by suspension of judgment, it would be possible to remain in a state of tranquility. In this article, we try to examine these main aspects of pyrrhonian skepticism arguing that they do not prevent the possibility of dogmatism. It will also be argued that such assumptions may lend skepticism a dogmatic feature, since they recommend skeptical suspension as the best philosophical attitude

Published

2009-12-05

Issue

Section

não definida

How to Cite

Krempel, R. A. (2009). Equipollence, suspension of judgment and tranquillity in pyrrhonian skepticism. Primeiros Escritos, 7(1), 251-265. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2594-5920.primeirosestudos.2009.136844