Problèmes liés à l’usage du Canon de Morgan
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-6564e240112Mots-clés :
Canon de Morgan, cognition animale, Psychologie comparée, Philosophie des SciencesRésumé
Le Canon de Morgan est un principe qui a orienté la pratique de la psychologie comparée et d’autres sciences étudiant la cognition animale depuis sa création. Il privilégie les processus cognitifs les plus simples pour expliquer le comportement des animaux. En raison de ce principe, on a longtemps évité d’attribuer des états mentaux complexes aux animaux non humains. Dans cet article, ce principe fera l’objet d’un examen critique basé sur son histoire et ses motivations. Plus précisément, deux problèmes liés à son utilisation en science seront abordés. D’abord, le problème de justification, affirmant que sa force en tant que critère d’interprétation n’a pas de justification équivalente. Ensuite, le problème de testabilité, qui affecte la pratique scientifique en ne proposant pas d’hypothèses testables. En se basant sur ces problèmes, on conclut que son utilisation doit se faire avec prudence en tenant compte des probabilités de chaque contexte et de la possibilité de son application dans des hypothèses testables.
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