The financial market and company/stakeholder integration: past and future
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2026100-3.enKeywords:
classical finance theory, market imperfections, financial marketAbstract
This article presents an overview of the evolution of finance theory, which is the study of allocating scarce resources to different uses in situations of uncertainty. The article highlights three periods: classical finance, which is characterized by micro-based theories applied to the corporate environment and its relationship with the capital market; market imperfections, which can alter classical norms and are represented by financial constraints, agency costs, and control mechanisms suggested by corporate governance; and emerging themes, which are based on limited rationality and seek to incorporate decision-maker behavior into classical norms that have already been adjusted for market imperfections. Finally, it provides an overview of financial markets and company/stakeholder integration in the Accounting & Finance Review over the last few years, concluding with a reflection on the future of research in this area.
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