Regulation and Corruption: theoretical debates, empirical findings, and the role of Regulatory Process quality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2319-0558.v13i1p%25pKeywords:
Regulation, Corruption, Regulatory capture, Regulatory process quality, Meta-regulationAbstract
This article examines the multiple relationships between state regulation and corruption, articulating theoretical contributions and recent empirical evidence. It initially revisits the main explanatory formulations regarding the functions of regulation, notably public interest theories and regulatory capture theories, as well as their contemporary reappraisals. It then analyzes empirical studies that demonstrate the ambiguity and non-linearity of the interactions between the volume of regulation and the risk of corruption. Finally, it explores the importance of the quality of the regulatory process and of meta-regulation as institutional strategies for corruption prevention, highlighting instruments such as regulatory impact assessment, public consultations and hearings, decision-making collegiality, and qualified social participation. It concludes that strengthening the quality of the regulatory process is a structural component of public integrity policies, contributing to greater resilience of regulatory systems in the face of the risks of capture and corruption.
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