Movimento Neobrandeisiano em meio aos objetivos do antitruste
não apenas “processo competitivo”
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.0102-8049.ip%25pPalavras-chave:
Movimento Neobrandeisiano, Neobrandeisianismo, objetivos do antitruste, direito da concorrência, bem-estar agregado, bem-estar do consumidor, desigualdadesResumo
Este artigo analisa o Movimento Neobrandeisiano, a fim de compreender os seus reais objetivos para a política de defesa da concorrência. Investiga-se a hipótese de que o Neobrandeisianismo, embora se apresente como um movimento defensor da aplicação do objetivo do antitruste de manutenção do processo competitivo, em várias passagens revela-se também como um movimento de retomada de objetivos do antitruste diversos dele, mas sempre não-baseados em critérios eficiência econômica. Para isso, no tópico 2, analisam-se os seguintes objetivos baseados em critérios de eficiência econômica: (i) bem-estar agregado; (ii) bem-estar do consumidor; e (iii) progresso tecnológico. Adiante, no tópico 3, são abordados alguns dos principais objetivos não-baseados em critérios de eficiência econômica: (i) proteção dos pequenos negócios; (ii) dispersão do poder; e (iii) justiça, equidade, redução das desigualdades e da pobreza. No tópico 4, enfim, discute-se se o Movimento Neobrandeisiano realmente só persegue o processo competitivo como objetivo do antitruste ou se também incorpora em suas análises e recomendações outros objetivos dentre aqueles aprofundados nos tópicos 2 e 3. A conclusão do estudo confirma a hipótese.
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