A estabilidade da firma
alinhamento esperado do poder de controle na sociedade por ações
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.0102-8049.ip%25pPalavras-chave:
firma, poder de controle, controle interno, controle externo, direito de votoResumo
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Copyright (c) 2009 José Inácio Ferraz de Almeida Prado Filho
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
