Berkeley and the empty clock. An exercise in the philosophy of science

Abstract

In this article I argue, contrary to what is commonly held, that Berkeley formulated and systematically pursued throughout his philosophical career, from the juvenile Notebooks to his last major work, Siris, a coherent and unified project for natural philosophy, whose metaphysical foundations were the immateriality and causal inactivity of bodies, derived, in their turn, from a strictly empiricist theory of knowledge. Taking the cue offered by his treatment of the issue of the apparent irregularity of certain natural phenomena, I endeavour to show that in his own philosophical system we can find adequate resources to cope with the difficulties, often pointed out in the literature, for seeing Berkeley as effectively implementing his main goal, as announced in the subtitles of the Principles and the Three Dialogues, namely, to inquire into “the main causes of error and difficulties in the sciences”, in order that they are rendered “more easy, useful and compendious”. Notwithstanding the potential risk of anachronism, I suggest, as an analytical tool for examining the Berkeleyan project, some tentative parallels between this project and the way in which philosophers of science have been discussing the issue of scientific realism since the inception of modern science, in the seventeenth century.