O que é função? Debates na filosofia da biologia contemporânea

Abstract

In this paper, we examine two very influential approaches to the nature of functional explanations/attributions: Wright's selectionist etiological approach and Cummins' functional analysis. The former seems to adequately grasp the meaning of several explanations in evolutionary biology, even though it is not sufficient to account for each and every evolutionary explanation. The latter, in turn, is more applicable to explanations in physiology and in other scientific areas dealing with complex systems. We see these two theories as distinct enterprises, which should not be combined in a single approach to functions. This leads us to support Godfrey-Smith's rejection of such a unity, in the form of his dualist consensus thesis. This thesis can be grounded on the distinction between evolutionary and functional biology, as sketched by Mayr and Jacob. We also address Cummins' critique of selectionist etiological approaches, which he labels as "neo-teleological". Although we consider that several criticisms raised by Cummins do identify flaws in these approaches, we intend to show that his attempt to reject neo-teleology as a whole is illegitimate. Criticisms from both sides of the debates about functions are contributing to enrich the comprehension of this central concept in Biology. These criticisms reinforce the need of delimiting the scope and limits of each approach, and, thus, point in the direction of a pluralism in the debate about functional explanations/attributions in the Philosophy of Biology.