Are population geneticists narrow inductivists?

Abstract

It is a widespread opinion that natural selection theory, as presented “qualitatively” by Darwin, has been replaced with a superior, quantitative version, provided by population genetics. This article argues against that thesis, holding instead that both theories are complimentary, not successive. To accomplish this, a novel line of argumentation is introduced, which takes its inspiration from Hempel’s critique of the “narrow inductivism”. It is argued that population geneticists would be incapable of successfully applying their theory without pre-conceived “ecological” hypotheses, coming from the darwinian theory, which allow one to partition the population into selectively relevant traits. Further, it its emphasized that the failure to notice this point is due to a bad comprehension of the structure of the darwinian theory, and its fundamental law or principle. Through a better reconstruction of said principle, the relation between both theories is reexamined in more detail.