O legado de Thomas Kuhn após cinquenta anos
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662012000300006Keywords:
Science, Society, Rational factors, Social values, Kuhn, Strong program, Science studiesAbstract
In this article I analyze the thought of Thomas Kuhn in the light of the idea that his work has reopened discussions on the relationship between science and society. In fact, his work The structure of scientific revolutions, published in 1962, had an impact that left indelible marks on the debates about scientific practice. As a consequence, two side effects arose: One of them leading the way to extremely technical matters and, somehow, unproductive. The other intensified the discussion concerning the place that science has - or should have - in society. My main argument is that the second effect was originated unconsciously by Kuhn. In other words, Kuhn can be seen as the generator of an involuntary liberation, because, regardless of his wishes, he reopened discussion of the science/society relationship. Thus, he can be pointed to as the major source of inspiration for the strong program and, subsequently, for science studies. Therefore, it is important to reevaluate his main theses in order to cast light on issues related to the interaction between rational factors and social values.Downloads
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