Rational disagreement and scientific controversy

Authors

  • Alexandre Luis Junges Pontifícia Universidade Católica

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662013000300008

Abstract

Recent epistemological debate about what came to be called "the problem of rational disagreement" resumed the discussion, present among the ancient skeptics, on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Similar to the Pyrrhonian skeptic, some authors involved in the contemporary debate argued that in controversial contexts, where there is disagreement on some specific matter, the rational attitude of both sides of the debate is the suspension of judgment. For these authors, such a verdict should be extended to several fields of human knowledge, resulting in local skepticism regarding controversial topics. This article addresses this problematic in the scientific field. In several episodes of scientific controversy, scientists exhibit persistent disagreements where each side of the debate maintains his position in the face of disagreement. In this context, the question of the possibility of rational disagreement among scientists considered epistemic peers arises. From the structural and dynamic characteristics of science, it is argued that rational disagreement between scientists is possible. In other words, unlike the claims of contemporary authors, in the scientific context the epistemic significance of disagreement is not, necessarily, agnosticism.

Published

2013-01-01

Issue

Section

Artigos

How to Cite

Rational disagreement and scientific controversy . (2013). Scientiae Studia, 11(3), 613-635. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662013000300008