Thomas Kuhn e seus modificadores intercontinentais

Authors

  • Barbara Tuchanska Universidade de Lodz

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662012000300005

Keywords:

Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, Friedman, Amsterdamski, Paradigm, Dynamics of science, Scientific rationality, Scientific normativity, Ideals of knowledge

Abstract

I discuss some difficulties in writings by Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Michael Friedman, where - in efforts to reinstate methodological normativity and the rationality of science - they modify, complicate, and expand Kuhn's conception of the development of science by replacing his concept of paradigm with a more rigorous one, or by supplementing it with various concepts of meta-paradigms. It is not clear that any of their proposed replacements of "paradigm" are more (methodologically) rational, better (logically) designed, and less monopolistic and dogmatic. I also present more broadly Stefan Amsterdamski's conception of the historical ideals of knowledge and my own ideas, elaborated, in some cases many years ago, in order to improve Kuhn's view. I introduce a concept of an "intellectual tradition" as a multi-level structure, containing a metaphysical layer and (several) scientific layers; the idea of a hierarchy of scientific achievements based on their differentiated cognitive significance; and an outline of a narrative of the history of science as a self-constituting process.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Amsterdamski, S. Between history and method. Disputes about the rationality of science. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992 [1983].

Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (Ed.). New essays on the a priori. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

Carrier, M. Explaining scientific progress: Lakatos’ methodological account of kuhnian patterns of theory change. In: Kampis, G. et al. (Ed.). Appraising Lakatos: mathematics, methodology and the man. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002. p. 53-72.

Couvalis, G. The philosophy of science: science and objectivity. London: Sage Publication, 1997.

Coyne, G. V. et al. (Ed.). Newton and the new direction in science. Proceedings of the Cracow Conference. Cracow: Specola Vaticana, 1988b.

Friedman, M. Transcendental philosophy and a priori knowledge: a neo-kantian perspective. In: Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (Ed.). New essays on the a priori. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. p. 367-83.

Friedman, M. Dynamics of reason: the 1999 Kant lectures at Stanford University. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001.

Gavroglu, K. et al. (Ed.). Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific knowledge. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

Giere, R. Explaining science: a cognitive approach. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Ginev, D. Scientific progress and the hermeneutical circle. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 19, p. 391-5, 1988.

Gutting, G. (Ed.). Paradigms and revolutions: appraisals and applications of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980.

Horwich, P. (Ed.). World changes: Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993.

Kadvany, J. Imre Lakatos and the guises of reason. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2001.

Kampis, G. et al. (Ed.). Appraising Lakatos: mathematics, methodology and the man. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002.

Kmita, J. & £astowski, K. (Ed.). Historyzm i jego obecnoœæ w praktyce naukowej [Historism and its presence in scientific practice]. Warszawa: PWN, 1990.

Kolakowski, L. The priest and the jester. In: Kolakowski, L. Toward a marxist humanism. Essays on the left today. New York: Grove Press, p. 9-37, 1968.

Kuhn, T. S. The copernican revolution: planetary astronomy in the development of western thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Kuhn, T. S. The structure of scientific revolutions. 2a. ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970 [1962].

Lakatos, I. Fasification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In: Worrall, J. & Currie, G. (Ed.). Philosophical papers of Lakatos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978a [1970]. v. 1, p. 8-101.

Lakatos, I. History of science and its rational reconstructions. In: Worrall, J. & Currie, G. (Ed.). Philosophical papers of Lakatos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978b [1971]. v. 1, p. 102-38.

Larvor, B. Lakatos: an introduction. London: Routledge, 1998.

Laudan, L. Progress and its problems: towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Laudan, L. Science and values: the aims of science and their role in scientific debates. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Laudan, L. Beyond positivism and relativism: theory, method, and evidence. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Ed.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Masterman, M. The nature of a paradigm. In: Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Ed.). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. p. 59-90.

McGuire, J. E. & Tuchañska, B. Science unfettered: a philosophical study in socio-historical ontology. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000.

McMullin, E. Rationality and paradigm change in science. In: Horwich, P. (Ed.). World changes: Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993. p. 55-78.

Newton, I. Mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Pera, M. Methodological sophisticationism: a degenerating project. In: Gavroglu, K. et al. (Ed.). Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific knowledge. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. p. 169-87.

Pitt, J. C. & Pera, M. (Ed.). Rational changes in science: essays in scientific reasoning. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987.

Popper, K. R. Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972.

Radnitzky, G. & Anderson, A. (Ed.). The structure and development of science. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Comppany, 1979.

Rescher, N. Some issues regarding the completeness of science and the limits of scientific knowledge. In: Radnitzky, G. & Anderson, A. (Ed.). The structure and development of science. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Comppany, 1979. p. 19-40.

Sady, W. Dlaczego odkrycie promieni X przez Roentgena bylo naukowe? [Why Roentgen’s Discovery of X-ray Was Scientific?]. Przeglad Filozoficzny, 13, p. 7-20, 2004.

Shapere, D. The structure of scientific revolutions. In: Gutting, G. (Ed.). Paradigms and revolutions: appraisals and applications of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980. p. 27-38.

Tuchañska, B. The idea of incommensurability and the copernican revolution. The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 1, p. 65-79, 1988a.

Tuchañska, B. Newton’s discovery of gravity. In: Coyne, G. V. et al. (Ed.). Newton and the new direction in science. Proceedings of the Cracow Conference. Cracow: Specola Vaticana, 1988b. p. 45-53.

Tuomela, R. Science, protoscience, and pseudoscience. In: Pitt, J. C. & Pera, M. (Ed.). Rational changes in science: essays in scientific reasoning. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987. p. 83-101.

Woleñski, J. Paradygmaty, programy badawcze itp. - historia czy historiozofia nauki? In: Kmita, J. & £astowski, K. (Ed.). Historyzm i jego obecnoœæ w praktyce naukowej. Warszawa: PWN, 1990. p. 82-94.

Worrall, J. & Currie, G. (Ed.). Philosophical papers of Lakatos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978a [1970]. v. 1.

Zahar, E. Einstein’s revolution: a study in heuristic. La Salle: Open Court, 1989.

Zycinski, J. Jezyk i metoda [Language and method]. Cracow: Znak, 1983.

Published

2012-01-01

Issue

Section

Artigos

How to Cite

Thomas Kuhn e seus modificadores intercontinentais. (2012). Scientiae Studia, 10(3), 505-534. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662012000300005