Newton, Locke and Berkeley's positions on the nature of gravitation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662013000400005Abstract
Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation.Downloads
References
Adam, C. & Tannery, P. (Ed.). Oeuvres de Descartes. Paris: Vrin, 1971. v. 9.
Ayers, M. R. (Ed.). Philosophical works of Georges Berkeley. London: Everyman, 1975.
Ayers, M. R. Mechanism, superaddition, and the proof of God’s existence in Locke’s Essay. The Philosophical Review, 90, 2, p. 210-51, 1981.
Ayers, M. R. Locke. Epistemology and ontology. London: Routledge, 1991.
Barra, E. S. O. Em que sentido Newton pode dizer “hypotheses non fingo”? Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Série 3, 5, 1-2, p. 221-45, 1995.
Barra, E. S. O. A primazia das relações sobre as essências: as forças como entidades matemáticas nos Principia de Newton. Scientiae Studia, 8, 4, p. 547-69, 2010.
Berkeley, G. Alciphron, or the minute philosopher. 1732. In: Complete works of Georges Berkeley. v. 5. Charlosttesville: InteLex Cooporation. (Série “Past Masters) (Alciphron)
Berkeley, G. Siris. 3 ed. 1752 [1744]. In: Complete works of Georges Berkeley. v. 3. Charlosttesville: InteLex Cooporation. (Série “Past Masters) (Siris)
Berkeley, G. Philosophical Commentaries. Ayers, M. R. (Ed.). Philosophical works of Georges Berkeley. London: Everyman, 1975 [1707-1708]. p. 305-412. (Comentários)
Berkeley, G. A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. In: Ayers, M. R. (Ed.). Philosophical works of Georges Berkeley. London: Everyman, 1975 [1710]. p. 71-153. (Princípios)
Berkeley, G. Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In: Ayers, M. R. (Ed.). Philosophical works of Georges Berkeley. London: Everyman, 1975 [1713]. p. 155-252.
Berkeley, G. De motu. Tradução A. A. Luce; revisão M. R. Ayers. In: Ayers, M. R. (Ed.). Philosophical works of Georges Berkeley. London: Everyman, 1975 [1720]. p. 253-76. (De motu)
Cajori, F. An historical and explanatory appendix. In: Newton, I. Mathematical principles of natural philosophy. Tradução A. Motte; revisão F. Cajori. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1934. p. 627-80.
Cala Vitery, F. E. La cuestión 31 de la Óptica o el programa de las fuerzas en la filosofía mecánica. Scientiae Studia, 4, 2, p. 177-220, 2006.
Chibeni, S. S. A fundamentação empírica das leis dinâmicas de Newton. Revista Brasileira de Ensino de Física, 21, 1, p. 1-14, 1999.
Chibeni, S. S. Locke on the epistemological status of scientific laws. Principia, 9, 1-2, p. 19-41, 2005.
Chibeni, S. S. Locke e o materialismo. In: Moraes, J. Q. K. (Org.). Materialismo e evolucionismo. Campinas: CLE, 2007. p. 163-92. (Coleção CLE, v. 47).
Chibeni, S. S. Berkeley: uma física sem causas eficientes. Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Série 3, 18, 2, p. 357-90, 2008.
Chibeni, S. S. Berkeley e o papel das hipóteses na filosofia natural. Scientiae Studia, 8, 3, p. 389-419, 2010.
Chibeni, S. S. Locke e a distinção entre qualidades primárias e secundárias. No prelo.
Clatterbaugh, K. The causation debate in modern philosophy, 1637-1739. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Cohen, I. B. Hypotheses in Newton’s philosophy. Physis, 8, p. 163-84, 1966.
Cohen, I. B. & Smith, G. E. (Ed.). The Cambridge companion to Newton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Colodny, R. B. (Ed.). Beyond the edge of certainty. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965.
Cummins, P. D. Berkeley on minds and agency. In: Winkler, K. (Ed.). The Cambridge companion to Berkeley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 190-229.
Descartes, R. Les principes de la philosophie. In: Adam, C. & Tannery, P. (Ed.). Oeuvres de Descartes. Paris: Vrin, 1971 [1644]. v. 9.
Dijksterhuis, E. J. The mechanization of the world picture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Downing, L. Berkeley’s natural philosophy and philosophy of science. In: Winkler, K. (Ed.). The Cambridge companion to Berkeley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 230-65.
Ellis, B. The origin and nature of Newton’s laws of motion. In: Colodny, R. B. (Ed.). Beyond the edge of certainty. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. p. 29-67.
Farr, J. The way of hypotheses: Locke on method. Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 1, p. 51-72, 1987.
Janiak, A. Newton and the reality of force. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 45, 1, p. 127-47, 2007.
Laudan, L. The nature and sources of Locke’s view on hypotheses. Journal of the History of Ideas, 28, p. 211-23, 1967.
Locke, J. Elements of natural philosophy. In: Tegg, T. et al. (Ed.). The works of John Locke. Dublin: Cumming, 1823. v. 3, p. 301-30.
Locke, J. Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s answer to his second letter. In: Tegg, T. et al. (Ed.). The works of John Locke. Dublin: Cumming, 1823. v. 4, p. 191-498. (Segunda resposta)
Locke, J. Some thoughts concerning education. In: Tegg, T. et al. (eds.). The works of John Locke. Dublin: Cumming, 1823. v. 9, p. 1-205. (Pensamentos)
Locke, J. An essay concerning human understanding. Introdução e notas P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. (Ensaio)
Locke, J. Method. In: Farr, J. The way of hypotheses: Locke on method. Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 1, p. 70-2, 1987. (Método)
Loparic, Z. Andreas Osiander: prefácio ao De revolutionibus orbium coelestium de Copérnico. Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, 1, p. 44-61, 1980.
Mach, E. The science of mechanics. La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court, 1974.
Mandelbaum, M. Philosophy, science and sense perception. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.
McDonald, J. F. Properties and causes: an approach to the problem of hypothesis in the scientific methodology of Sir Isaac Newton. Annals of Science, 28, 3, p. 217-33, 1972.
Moraes, J. Q. K. (Org.). Materialismo e evolucionismo. Campinas: CLE, 2007. (Coleção CLE, v. 47).
Newton, I. Mathematical principles of natural philosophy. Tradução A. Motte; revisão F. Cajori. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1934. (Principia)
Newton, I. Opticks, or a Treatise of the reflections, refractions, infractions, and colours of Light. 4 ed. London: William Innys, 1730. (Óptica)
Popper, K. Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan, 1972.
Tegg, T. et al. (Ed.). The works of John Locke. Dublin: Cumming, 1823. 10 v.
Tipton, I. C. (Ed.). Locke on human understanding. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Shapiro, A. E. Newton’s “experimental philosophy”. Early Science and Medicine, 9, 3, p. 185-217, 2004.
Yolton, J. W. John Locke and the compass of human understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Yost Junior, R. M. Locke’s rejection of hypotheses about sub-microscopic events. Journal of the History of Ideas, 12, p. 111-30, 1951.
Wilson, M. D. Supperadded properties: the limits of mechanism in Locke. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 2, p. 143-50, 1979.
Winkler, K. (Ed.). The Cambridge companion to Berkeley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2013 Scientiae Studia
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
A revista detém os direitos autorais de todos os textos nela publicados. Os autores estão autorizados a republicar seus textos mediante menção da publicação anterior na revista. A revista adota a Licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.
